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Résumé 
 
L’approche des capabilités a été caractérisée par un développement 
fulgurant au cours des vingt-cinq dernières années. Bien que formulée { l’origine 
par Amartya Sen, détenteur du Prix Nobel en économie, Martha Nussbaum reprit 
cette approche dans le but de s’en servir comme fondation pour une théorie 
éthico-politique intégrale du bien. Cependant, la version de Nussbaum s’avéra 
particulièrement vulnérable à plusieurs critiques importantes, mettant 
sérieusement en doute son efficacité globale. À la lumière de ces faits, cette thèse 
vise { évaluer la pertinence théorique et pratique de l’approche des capabilités de 
Nussbaum, en examinant trois groupes de critiques particulièrement percutantes 
formulées à son encontre. 
 Le premier groupe d’objections concerne la nature de l’objet { distribuer 
par les capabilités et affirme que l’analyse de ce dernier révèle une sous-
détermination ainsi que des ambiguïtés. Dans le cadre de notre thèse, nous 
contestons cette allégation en démontrant qu’elle repose sur des difficultés 
propres aux modes de rédaction de Sen et de Nussbaum, et qu’une reconstruction 
conceptuelle de l’objet { distribuer par les capabilités peut, en fait, être accomplie 
avec succès en examinant leurs écrits originaux sur ce sujet. De plus, il est 
démontré que l’approche par les capabilités fut déjà mise en opération depuis un 
certain temps, tel qu’illustré par plusieurs discussions { ce sujet apparues au cours 
de la dernière décennie. Finalement, nous arguons que toute inquiétude résiduelle 
à cet égard peut être éliminée en adoptant une version standardisée de l’objet des 
capabilités, basée sur son noyau conceptuel originel, et en éliminant les 
formulations plus problématiques de Sen et Nussbaum. 
 Le deuxième groupe de critiques concerne la justification morale de 
l’approche de Nussbaum. Ce dernier remet en question l’efficacité des nombreuses 
tentatives faites par Nussbaum en vue de justifier sa théorie par la voie de ses 
 
 
 
ii
‘quatre approches au raisonnement moral’, ainsi que par ses réponses { quatre 
contre-arguments de nature relativiste formulés contre celle-ci. Contre ces 
objections, cette thèse démontre que l’usage d’une forme institutionnalisée de la 
théorie de l’observateur idéal permettrait de formuler un jugement définitif 
concernant la valeur morale réelle de l’approche de Nussbaum, et que ce jugement 
serait probablement de nature positive. De surcroit, la prétention des ‘capabilistes’ 
selon laquelle leur approche est moralement supérieure aux théories rivales 
resourcistes et welfaristes a été remise en cause. Mais nous démontrons que ces 
dernières s’avèrent forcées d’incorporer une distribution des capabilités de base 
dans leurs théories respectives, révélant ainsi la supériorité de l’approche par les 
capabilités à un niveau fondamental. 
Le troisième ensemble de critiques s’attarde à la question des relations de 
pouvoir propres { nos sociétés humaines, argumentant que les ‘capabilistes’ 
omettent de prendre suffisamment en considération ce phénomène complexe dans 
leurs formulations quelque peu idéalistes. Contre ce dernier groupe d’objections, 
cette thèse affirme que la création et le maintien constant d’un triangle 
fondamental d’informations véridiques, d’individus alertes, et de formes 
appropriées de protection institutionnelle peuvent être proposés pour remédier à 
cet important défaut de l’approche par les capabilités. De plus, le fait qu’il soit 
inévitable et nécessaire de faire face à une multitude de choix difficiles lors de 
l’implémentation de l’approche de Nussbaum, ainsi que la nécessité et l’existence 
de régimes libéraux démocratiques appuyés par la communauté internationale en 
tant que prérequis au bon fonctionnement de cette approche sont également 
examinés. 
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En conclusion, j’affirme que, bien qu’imparfaite, l’approche par les 
capabilités de Nussbaum ne fait finalement face à aucune objection fatale, et que 
l’on peut donc défendre et promouvoir son développement. 
 
Mots-clés : Sen, Nussbaum, approche par les capabilités, universalisme, pluralisme, 
relativisme, théorie de justice distributive, théorie de l’observateur idéal, Realpolitik 
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Abstract 
 
The capabilities approach has seen significant development over the past 
quarter century, branching out into a variety of fields and directions. Originally 
developed by Nobel Prize Laureate Amartya Sen, Martha Nussbaum has sought to 
extend this approach beyond its mainly instrumental role into a tangible 
foundation for a full-fledged ethical-political theory of the good. However, this 
move has attracted a great number of criticisms levelled against Nussbaum’s 
specific version of the capabilities approach. In this thesis, I identify three main 
groups of observations under which said criticisms can be classified, and assess 
their respective strength and tenability. 
The first group includes various charges of ambiguity and 
underdetermination befalling the proposed object of distribution by the 
capabilities approach. I dispute this claim, pointing out that these charges can be 
traced back to difficulties associated with the respective writing styles of Sen and 
Nussbaum, and that a successful reconstruction of the capabilities object can in 
fact be achieved by examining their initial writings dealing with this approach. 
Also, I point out that a successful operationalization of the capabilities approach 
already has been achieved for some time now, as attested by numerous 
discussions that have flourished during the last decade. Furthermore, I argue that 
any remaining worries can be alleviated by advocating for a standardized account 
of the capabilities metric, based heavily on its initial conceptual core, and by 
disregarding some of the more problematic formulations that have initially been 
made by Sen and Nussbaum. 
The second group claims that Nussbaum’s attempts to defend her 
capabilities approach by way of her ‘four approaches to moral reasoning’, together 
with her treatment of four relativistic counterarguments levelled against it, is both 
problematic and inadequate. Against these assertions, I advocate for the use of an 
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institutionalized form of ideal observer theory in order to produce a definitive 
moral judgment regarding the overall value of her project, and I provide a positive 
anticipatory response of its likely outcome. Furthermore, capability theorists have 
also claimed moral preferability over resourcist and welfarist competitors. While I 
argue that this initial claim is unfounded, this is only in light of the fact that the 
competition ends up endorsing a form of basic capability distribution as well. 
The third group claims that capability theorists have paid insufficient 
attention to the nature of power-relations in our human societies. Against this 
claim, I advocate for the creation and constant preservation of an underlying 
fundamental triangle of veridical information, alert individuals, and appropriate 
institutional protection as an initial starting point for further consideration. 
Furthermore, I point out that Nussbaum’s capabilities approach will, by necessity, 
need to take into account a variety of hard choices associated with its practical 
implementation, and that it will most probably require the presence of liberal-
democratic regimes backed by various levels of support on behalf of the 
international community to function successfully. 
Ultimately, I conclude that, while not entirely trouble-free, no truly fatal 
objections exist against Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, and that further work 
towards its practical implementation can consequently proceed unimpeded. 
 
Keywords: Sen, Nussbaum, capabilities approach, universalism, pluralism, relativism, 
distributive theory of justice, ideal observer theory, Realpolitik 
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Chapter 1: (Introduction) developing the capabilities approach as a 
foundation for an ethical-political theory of the good 
 
Introduction: 
 
 The ethical-political theory referred to as the capabilities approach has 
experienced huge growth over the past quarter century, motivated initially by a 
number of perceived drawbacks in existing resourcist and welfarist approached to 
human development, ethical analysis and policy planning, as well as by 
Aristotelian and Marxian conceptions of the good life, recognized as authentic 
goals worthy of collective pursuit.1 By 2011, it constitutes one of the major 
recognizable approaches to addressing a variety of issues pertaining to the all-
important question of human well-being. Originally developed in the early 1980s 
by Nobel Prize Laureate Amartya Sen, this approach has since seen significant 
levels of further development and branching out thanks to the ongoing work of a 
number of authors, commentators, and additional capability theorists. 
One such prominent capability theorist and probably the most recognizable 
one after Sen himself is Martha Nussbaum. Nussbaum sought to extend the mostly 
instrumental role envisaged by Sen for this approach into an actual full-fledged 
ethical-political theory of the good, intended to serve as a blanket solution for 
resolving various basic levels of social injustice. The proposed means to 
accomplish this task involve distributing to all individuals a number of highly 
                                                             
1
 The numerous historical and philosophical cross-continental and multicultural origins of the modern 
version of the capabilities approach are discussed at some length by Nussbaum (2011a: 123-142). 
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substantial freedoms to do and to be a variety of things that are deemed essential 
in order to live a minimally decent and fulfilling life. These substantial freedoms 
have been enumerated by her under an original list of ten central human 
capabilities, whose distribution and preservation is to become the direct 
responsibility of a variety of governmental agencies throughout the world. 
Nussbaum further claims that, once this task is accomplished, minimal levels of 
social justice will be effectively attainable for all, while simultaneously maintaining 
acceptable degrees of pluralism, diversity, and freedom of choice in the process. 
Hence, because of its overarching ambition to serve as an effective foundation for 
an ethical-political theory of the good, I will mainly refer to Nussbaum’s specific 
version of the capabilities approach as the ‘foundational project’ throughout this 
thesis.2 
 Understandably, such a proposal has solicited significant levels of 
scepticism on the part of a number of authors who see grave problems associated 
with such a bold project. These observations can be classified into three main 
groups. The first group contains questions pertaining to the very theoretical 
nature of the capabilities approach itself. In particular, the actual ‘object’ that this 
approach proposes to distribute, namely ‘capabilities’, has been accused of being 
ambiguous, underdetermined, overly-complicated, and consequently unfit to serve 
as the basis for a tangible distributive theory of justice (no matter what its 
                                                             
2
 These various aspects proper to Nussbaum’s version of the capabilities approach are discussed in greater 
detail (together with corresponding references) in section 2.1 of chapter two, under the heading entitled 
‘The Development of Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach’. 
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proposed extent), insofar as one is simply unclear regarding what it is exactly that 
ought to be made available to people in the first place. The second group claims 
primarily that Nussbaum’s attempt to morally justify her approach by way of her 
‘four approaches to moral reasoning’ is flawed for a variety of reasons, and that 
her approach runs further afoul of four relativistic counter-arguments levelled 
against it, severely undermining its overall moral tenability. Under this second 
group, one also encounters additional objections being made regarding the 
original claim according to which the capabilities approach is morally superior to 
competing resourcist and welfarist competitors, questioning its true tenability. 
Finally, the third group claims that the capabilities approach in general, and 
Nussbaum’s version in particular, pays insufficient attention to the problem of 
power-relations in society, meaning that any attempted implementation thereof 
(and particularly Nussbaum’s version in particular) would actually result in the 
creation of graver levels of social injustice than those initially sought to be 
corrected thereby. 
Together, these three distinct groups of observations threaten to severely 
undermine the overall tenability of Nussbaum’s foundational project. However, 
closer examination of the salient literature reveals a variety of ways in which said 
problems can be mitigated, overcome, or actually shown to be non-applicable to 
Nussbaum’s specific version of the capabilities approach. Consequently, I argue 
that the final implications thereof effectively salvage her project by ultimately 
preserving its theoretical, moral, and practical underpinnings. I briefly discuss the 
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specific contents of each respective topic below, before going into greater detail in 
the following four chapters. 
 
1.1 Three groups of observations made against the foundational project 
 
 The first group includes various charges of ambiguity and 
underdetermination claiming that the proposed object of distribution by the 
capabilities approach cannot be successfully utilized, insofar as its highly complex, 
unclear, and at times contradictory formulations simply render incomprehensible 
what it is exactly that ought to be distributed. While it is true that a proper and 
successful analysis of the theoretical contents of capabilities and of any 
corresponding distributive spreads do end up conceptually very taxing and rather 
difficult to put into practice, the additional claim that this renders this approach 
ineffective is simply unfounded. There are a number of reasons to maintain this 
affirmation. Firstly, a significant reason for the appearance of these charges rests 
directly with the specific writing styles of Sen and Nussbaum, making a successful 
reconstruction of their respective idea of ‘capabilities’ rather difficult to perform. 
Nevertheless, a successful reconstruction thereof can be still achieved by looking 
at their initial writings dealing with this approach, insofar as the central 
conceptual core that they devise at this stage remains, for all intents and purposes, 
unchanged in their later writings as well. Secondly, initial worries that have 
appeared in the salient literature regarding the theoretical tenability of the 
capabilities approach can be overcome by pointing out the significant ways in 
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which discussions pertaining to actual or further possible models of 
operationalization have flourished, especially during the last decade. This 
indicates that the capabilities approach already has, for all intents and purposes, 
been operationalized quite successfully in a variety of ways and in many 
environments. Thirdly, any remaining worries regarding possible ambiguity and 
underdetermination can be alleviated by advocating for a standardized account of 
the capabilities metric, based heavily on its initial conceptual core. This can be 
done by disregarding some of the more problematic formulations that have 
initially been made by Sen and Nussbaum, and by suggesting that any additional 
operational refinements thereto be made solely when needed, and in accordance 
with the ongoing preservation of this core in question. In this way, the distributive 
object proposed by the capabilities approach remains comprehensive, as well as 
sufficiently flexible and multivalent in order for it to function quite effectively at 
the center of Nussbaum’s proposed list of central human capabilities. 
 The second group encompasses specific moral problems pertaining to 
Nussbaum’s foundational project concerning the manner in which she sought to 
defend it by way of her four approaches to moral reasoning, together with her 
treatment of four relativistic counterarguments levelled against it. Here I take up a 
rather different defensive tactic, insofar as I begin by arguing that the capabilities 
approach actually relies, as a whole, on a tacit endorsement of ideal observer 
theory in order to justify its specific prescriptions. After an examination of this 
theory, its overall tenability, and a proposal for an institutionalized collective 
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version thereof in order to overcome its many recognizable drawbacks, I apply its 
principles to Nussbaum’s four approaches to moral reasoning and to the four 
relativistic counterarguments levelled against it. This analysis allows for the 
identification and extraction of the more successful elements from these four 
approaches (and disregard of the more problematic ones) towards the creation of 
a fifth improved approach to moral reasoning that promises to vindicate the moral 
tenability of her theory quite nicely. Furthermore, it also allows for an overall 
assessment of the actual strength and tenability of the four relativistic 
counterarguments, which end up not being very prominent in the end. Finally, 
though Nussbaum’s idea of a global overlapping consensus in order to morally 
justify her project is shown to not have been reached, as of yet, its eventual 
realization along the lines of ideal observer theory is defended, and an assessment 
of the probable outcome of such an exercise with regards to the ultimate moral 
value of Nussbaum’s foundational project is undertaken and found to be positive, 
in light of currently existing empirical evidence. This suggests that there is no 
fundamentally damaging moral claim to be made against her project, and that its 
eventual moral justification by the respectable avenue of an institutionalized 
collective version of ideal observer theory stands as a very real possibility, to be 
seriously envisaged in the future. 
Another significant part of the moral claims made in favour of the 
capabilities approach involves an alleged preferability of this approach over 
competing resourcist and welfarist alternatives. Capability theorists support this 
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assertion by analyzing competing theories according to three key desiderata, 
including (a) the inherent desirability of the proposed distributive object itself, (b) 
the acceptability of the consequences incurred by distributing said object in some 
fashion or other, (c) the compatibility of the proposed distributive scheme with 
(what is taken to be) an optimal notion of personal agency and autonomy. 
However, while these three desiderata constitute valid goals for any tangible 
distributive theory of justice to achieve, capability theorists also ‘strawman’ the 
competition, either by depicting their proposed distributive object and 
distributive patterns (or spreads) in a caricatured, primitive, or somewhat 
oversimplified manner, or by making an unwarranted equivocation between early 
proposed versions of said object and spreads as the only and final ones in 
existence, disregarding (or ignoring) later attempts at refinement. Hence, careful 
analysis reveals that competing resourcist and welfarist approaches are, in fact, 
quite able to address the variety of objections levelled against them. However, 
further examination also suggests that, in order to do so, they need to end up 
advocating for a distribution of objects that come to conceptually resemble 
capabilities more and more. Therefore, while capability theorists are wrong in 
their many claims regarding the inherent drawbacks of resourcism and welfarism, 
I argue that they nevertheless earn an indirect victory in having the competition 
concede the moral goodness of distributing at least something akin to Nussbaum’s 
central human capabilities. This effectively vindicates the capabilities approach 
(and Nussbaum’s version thereof) at this particular level of the moral debate. 
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 The third group of arguments made against the capabilities approach 
concerns its allegedly severe oversight of the nature of power-relations in society, 
and the manner in which this greatly undermines the many prescriptions made by 
capability theorists if they were to be attempted in an as-is manner in our current 
world. These claims have been primarily levelled against Sen’s version of the 
approach, though Nussbaum has seen her fair share of criticism as well. 
Furthermore, because of her strong ties to Sen’s version of this approach, all these 
criticisms tend to befall her foundational project to greater and lesser extremes as 
well. Since these many objections appear to be rather well-founded, I do not 
dispute them here, and seek, instead, to suggest a variety of further avenues of 
development by way of which Nussbaum’s foundational project could be 
‘immunized’ from the many nefarious consequences that its reckless 
implementation risks engendering. Hence, by relying on a variety of suggestions 
made by a number of capability authors focusing on this topic, I advocate for 
consideration of the creation and constant preservation of an underlying 
fundamental triangle of veridical information, alert individuals, and appropriate 
institutional protection, in order to assist in the practical implementation of the 
foundational project. I also point out that any such attempt will invariably need to 
take into account the respective type and degree of hard choices generated by the 
necessity to employ coercion and force when dealing with particularly recalcitrant 
regimes, and that any ‘foundational project-friendly’ regime will most probably be 
of a rather liberal-democratic persuasion. Finally, I suggest that global capability 
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implementation will need to be done by way of local regimes in concordance with 
required actions undertaken by the international community when need be, 
insofar as the stage is simply not set (as of yet) for a one-world foundational 
project-based government. Ultimately, I argue that these various measures and 
precisions, based on principles of Realpolitik, can promise a smooth and (mostly) 
trouble-free implementation of Nussbaum’s foundational project at the local, 
national, and (eventually) global level. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
 By carefully examining what I take to be the three major groups of 
observations that threaten to undermine the overall tenability of Nussbaum’s 
foundational project, I argue that, despite the many problems identified thereby, 
most can be overcome rather successfully. This does not entail that Nussbaum’s 
foundational project remains overly problem-free. But it does show that there 
exist no known knock-down arguments that would imply that the foundational 
project is a theoretically impractical, morally dubious, or practically dangerous 
distributive theory of justice to implement. Further work can consequently 
proceed towards making it a practical reality, as resources to bring this about 
already exist within the very broad and highly detailed capabilities literature. With 
this being said, I now move on to a detailed examination of the first group of 
claims pertaining to the charges of ambiguity and underdetermination that have 
10 
 
 
been levelled against the capabilities approach in general, as well as the 
foundational project in particular. 
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Chapter 2: Conceptualizing capabilities within the foundational 
project 
 
Introduction: 
 
 Martha Nussbaum’s foundational project proposes that we distribute 
central human capabilities to all persons everywhere in order that minimal levels 
of social justice become a global reality. At the core of her foundational project is a 
list of roughly ten such central human capabilities, intended to serve as a guide 
and to be implemented into the respective constitutions of all nations around the 
globe. The list itself rests on what I refer to here as the ‘capabilities metric’3, which 
corresponds to a conceptual core intended to define what it is exactly that is 
meant by ‘capability’, as well as what the respective parameters of its deployment 
and distribution consist in. Though initial examination of this conceptual core 
appears rather unproblematic, later observations reveal serious drawbacks 
caused by various levels of ambiguity and undetermination that have been 
deemed to befall the capabilities approach in general, as well as Nussbaum’s 
foundational project in particular. Despite these numerous drawbacks, the latest 
attempts at operationalization show remarkable progress being made towards the 
ultimate realization of a fully-functional and wholly-applicable capabilities metric. 
However, this has come at the price of a very heavy conceptual load on the part of 
capability theorists, threatening to render its implementation notoriously difficult, 
                                                             
3
 I use this term in relationship to other metrics that have also been proposed, namely resourcist and 
welfarist ones. 
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especially along the lines of the (at times) vaguely defined central human 
capabilities. Against this worry, I propose a conceptual reduction back down to the 
key components first developed by capability theorists, together with the 
elimination of some of the more troublesome aspects surrounding the very 
definition and use of the term ‘capability’ that were responsible for the appearance 
of the ambiguity and underdetermination charges that befell the capabilities 
approach in the first place. This, in turn, promises to produce a more ‘manageable’ 
capability metric that can then be more successfully (and easily) employed to 
underpin the various complex parameters proper to the specific implementation 
of Nussbaum’s central human capabilities. 
 Hence, this second chapter is divided into five sections. The first makes 
some preliminary remarks regarding the nature and scope of the capabilities 
literature, together with reasons given for why it is rather difficult for a newcomer 
to aboard it successfully, and why this can contribute, in no small part, to the 
appearance of the aforementioned charges of ambiguity and underdetermination 
that have appeared later on. The second seeks to delimit the main key components 
proper to the capabilities metric, as they reside at the very core of the capabilities 
approach itself. The third illustrates how various levels of ambiguity and 
underdetermination have spread confusion across the capabilities literature, and 
lead to serious doubts regarding its possible operationalization. The fourth gives a 
nod to the sizeable efforts employed thus far in order to arrive at actual 
operationalization models that are fully functional. The fifth examines a number of 
13 
 
 
ways in which some of the problems identified thus far either do not apply to 
Nussbaum’s foundational project, or can be overcome by way of some clever 
tweaks applied thereto. It also identifies some residual worries surrounding it that 
continue to persist to this day. 
 
2.1 Some preliminary remarks regarding the nature of the capabilities 
literature 
 
 Ever since its appearance a quarter of a century ago, the capabilities 
approach has branched out into many diverse fields of specialization, with its 
distinct vocabulary making its way into a number of areas of expertise. As of the 
end of 2011, the Human Development and Capability Association reports the 
existence of over 850 publications related to the capabilities approach in some 
way or another.4 Amartya Sen’s initial formulation of the capabilities metric, and of 
the capabilities approach that encompasses and utilizes it, has served to influence 
the formation of the Human Development Report published annually since 1990 by 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP). Furthermore, more than 500 
human development reports, utilizing capability-based theoretical tools and 
frameworks, have come to exist, as of this day.5 As far as further actual or 
proposed potential use is concerned, the capabilities approach has aroused 
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 The Human Development and Capability Association is accessible at www.capabilityapproach.com, with 
constant updates regarding journals, lectures, conferences and publications, as well as various other events 
related to the capabilities approach. 
5
 Robeyns (2006: 351-352) 
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interest in such diverse fields as disability studies6, education7, business ethics8, 
germ-line engineering9, rights of other species10, Christian ethics11, international 
justice12, and environmental justice13, to name but a few. It would thus not be a far 
exaggeration to state that, as of today, there is practically something to be said for 
capabilities in (almost) every field, and in (almost) every flavour, relating to some 
aspect or another of human (as well as animal14 and environmental) well-being.15 
While this stands as a testament to the great interest and scope that this 
approach has engendered, it can also feel rather overwhelming for a newcomer 
who aspires to become a future capability theorist, or who simply wishes to 
acquaint themselves with the basic aspects of the capabilities approach proper. In 
such cases, it is usually preferable to start off, either by consulting a solid, 
reputable, secondary introductory source, specializing in the capabilities 
approach, or by consulting the works of the recognizable founders of this 
                                                             
6
 Terzi (2005a); Nussbaum (2002a); Nussbaum (2006: chapter 2 & 3) 
7
 Saito (2003); Unterhalter (2003b) 
8
 Gagnon and Cornelius (2002) 
9
 Cooke (2003) 
10
 Nussbaum (2006: chapter 6) 
11
 Hicks (2005a) 
12
 Nussbaum (2006: chapters 4 & 5) 
13
 Perrett (1998); Holland (2008) 
14
 The question of ‘non-human animal capabilities’ is an important one that Nussbaum (2006: chapter 6) 
discusses at some length. I do not deal with it here for two reasons. First, the applicability of capabilities to 
non-human animals hinges, in an important manner, on its preliminary applicability to human beings. 
Second, there are a number of technical difficulties associated with the underlying principle of choice 
enablement made possible by capabilities that avails itself to be quite problematic when dealing with less 
sentient beings — a fact duly recognized by Nussbaum herself (388-392). Hence, non-human animal rights 
theory constitutes an additional external branching-out topic for the capabilities approach. 
15
 For a good (albeit now dated) overview of current applications of the capabilities approach, see Clark 
(2005a: 11-12) and Robeyns (2006). 
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approach, namely Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum — preferably in 
chronological order. However, while the first option on the list is, pending some 
reservations16, quite attainable, the second option presents one with a number of 
specific difficulties that can severely detract and discourage one from the task at 
hand. This is because each text by Sen and Nussbaum deals with at least three 
distinct thematic aspects of their capabilities approach. These aspects involve: (i) 
discussions regarding the very nature and properties of the capabilities metric; (ii) 
discussions regarding the broad scope of application of the capabilities approach; 
(iii) discussions formulated as complex justificatory exercises intended to 
convince the reader of the inherent goodness and preferability of utilizing the 
capabilities metric, and the capabilities approach in general, over competing 
alternatives (generally variations on resourcism and welfarism). The second 
problem has to do with the fact that there are no truly dedicated texts, so to speak, 
dealing exclusively with one of these thematic aspects in particular. Rather, the 
writing styles of Sen and Nussbaum essentially force one to piece back together 
discussions pertaining to each such respective thematic aspect from a series of 
books and articles, stretching over a period close to a quarter century. The third 
(and most confounding) problem has to do with the fact that, once this 
reconstructive exercise is complete, one does not always get a proper sense of 
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 Probably the best introductory work to the capabilities approach out right now is by Deneulin and Shahani 
(2009). Even so, the reading is rather thick and multifaceted (and not always easy), covering a great variety 
of subjects, owing to the (by-now) greatly expanded scope of the capabilities approach at the time of its 
publication. Nussbaum (2011a) aims to fill the gap by way of her latest book entitled Creating Capabilities, 
intended to serve as a more accessible up to date introduction to this approach. 
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completeness for each of these thematic aspects in particular. Rather, one often 
ends up left with the uneasy impression that, despite all the discussions pertaining 
to the subject matter at hand, not all of one’s questions have been answered. A 
quick rundown of the general development of Sen and Nussbaum’s specific 
versions of the capabilities approach drives this point home. 
 
The development of Sen’s capabilities approach 
 
Sen came to articulate the capabilities metric as an alternative to a number 
of other metrics that have come to be proposed (and employed) within the 
economic literature. In particular, a variety of welfarist 17  and resourcist 18 
approaches (amongst others19) have been the long-standing target of Sen’s in-
depth criticisms, regarding their fundamental inadequacy in fully addressing the 
complex problem of properly assessing and rectifying various aspects of human 
well-being. Their perceived drawbacks, and the corresponding impetus to 
articulate a new metric for human well-being, effectively pre-date by (at least) 10 
                                                             
17
 Sen understands welfarist approaches to well-being as referring to any approach that (i) utilizes the metric 
of utility, understood in one way or another, and that (2) attempts to redistribute it by way of a certain 
algorithm or distributive principle (Sen (1979a: 471-472)). For purposes of continuity, I will stick to his 
specific definition of ‘welfarism’, in this work. 
18
 Sen can be broadly construed as understanding resourcist approaches to well-being as referring to any 
approach that (i) utilises some type of ‘resource’ (material, financial, institutional, political, social, etc.), and 
that (2) attempts to allocate, entitle, distribute, or otherwise connect it with human beings in one 
substantive way or another. The respective approaches of Rawls and Dworkin are paradigm examples of 
these, to which Sen devotes much time and ink: Sen (1979b: 213-216); Sen (1984b: 321-323) (respectively). 
Just as for welfarism above, I will also stick to this specific definition of ‘resourcism’, in this work. 
19
 Asides from the respective metrics of various welfarist and resourcist approaches, Sen also examines and 
criticises other ones that do not fit quite well into those two broad categories, such as ones focusing on 
libertarian rights (Sen (1982a)), or basic needs (Sen (1984a: 513-515)). 
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years the appearance of the term ‘capability’ in Sen’s writings.20 Therefore, as Sen 
eventually came to discuss the preferability of the capabilities metric, this 
occurred at the end of an already substantial number of discussions dealing with 
the inherent drawbacks of its alternatives. Hence, his pioneering article entitled 
“Equality of What”21 contains an exposition of the drawbacks of welfarist utility 
and Rawlsian primary goods in properly addressing egalitarian concerns, ending 
with the suggestion that the focus of such concern actually be something like ‘basic 
capability equality’22. However, little more is said regarding the capabilities metric 
itself at this stage, other than that basic capabilities refer to one’s ability to do 
certain basic things, that they are informationally superior to utility and primary 
goods, and that one of the future challenges facing this new metric will be that of 
indexing the basic capability bundles, as rather culturally relative. 23  By 
‘informationaly superior’, Sen means that, by assessing a certain aspect of human 
existence in terms of capabilities, such an exercise carries morally salient features 
better than the particularly narrow manner in which economists have come to 
appropriate and attempt to quantify and distribute utility, and better than what a 
like exercise employing primary goods as its ‘metric of goodness’ is at all able to 
accomplish. 
                                                             
20
 This term first appears in Sen (1979b: 217), whereas his first critiques of welfarism and resourcism are 
traceable back (at least) to Sen (1970: in particular, chapters 7 and 9). 
21
 Sen (1979b) 
22
 Ibid (217-219) 
23
 Ibid (218-219) 
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Shortly thereafter, one encounters a substantial increase in capabilities-
related publications by Sen, concentrated most prominently in a number of 
important articles, most of which can be found compiled in two volumes, 
respectively entitled Choice, Welfare and Measurement24 and Resources, Values and 
Development25. In these numerous articles, Sen clarifies with greater precision that 
primary capabilities are akin to primary powers, i.e. akin to positive types of 
freedoms26, and he now argues in a much more developed manner for the inherent 
preferability of the capabilities metric over a variety of competing welfarist and 
resourcist ones27. Finally, 5 years after “Equality of What”, Sen develops what is to 
become the central conceptual core of his particular version of the capabilities 
metric, and of the capabilities approach in general, in “Well-being, Agency and 
Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1985”28, as well as in his Commodities and 
Capabilities29. Most of his later writings, however, are concerned primarily with 
expanding the applicatory scope and reach of his capabilities approach, and with 
providing a justification for his approach, regarding its inherent goodness. Hence, 
once one has duly absorbed the essentials of his publications from 1985, one ends 
up well-equipped with a decent perspective on just what his capabilities metric 
consists in. 
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 Sen (1982d) 
25
 Sen (1984h) 
26
 Sen (1982a: 16-19, 38); Sen (1984c: 281-282, 294); Sen (1984b: 315-317) 
27
 Sen (1984f: 334-340); Sen (1984e: 376); Sen (1984d: 497-499); Sen (1984a: 509-529) 
28
 Sen (1985d: 197-203) 
29
 Sen (1985b: chapters 2, 4 and 5) 
19 
 
 
 Discussions pertaining to the broad scope of application of Sen’s capabilities 
approach follow a similar line of development. In particular, his approach is 
expandable into, or holds important contributions for, the fields of (1) equality 
theory, (2) (human (a) and general (b)) rights theory, (3) poverty analysis, (4) 
famine analysis, (5) economic and human development theory, (6) personal well-
being and agency theory and analysis, (7) standard of living vs. level of well-being 
analysis, (8) family analysis, (9) gender conflicts, and finally, (10) personal 
freedom analysis, to name but the most important ones.30 These discussions are 
structured around a form of continuous on-going development, present across an 
important number of his publications, leading one to invariably find oneself in 
need of performing some rather significant reconstructive work to get a handle on 
things.31 For example, the explicit contributions of the capabilities approach to 
field (1), first addressed in “Equality of What”, are later revisited in “Well-Being, 
Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984”32, before being given a thorough 
treatment in Inequality Reexamined33. However, the very theme of equality and 
inequality pervades Sen’s capabilities approach at large, insofar as important 
capabilities to function are seen by him as the actual targets of proper egalitarian 
concerns, per se. Consequently, while not explicitly dealing with the very theme of 
equality theory itself, most (if not all) of the other fields above also have 
                                                             
30
 Other important fields worth mentioning involve technology, culture, and (naturally) economy. 
31
 This is all the more the case, seeing as how Sen intensely refers his readers to his earlier publications 
dealing with such fields, whenever he returns to them in later ones. 
32
 Sen (1985d: 192-195) 
33
 Sen (1992) 
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something important to say about the role and impact of the capabilities approach 
upon considerations of equality and inequality, as they respectively apply to the 
subject-matter of each of these fields in question.34 As far as field (2) is concerned, 
the topic of general rights (2a) is addressed particularly in “Liberty, Unanimity and 
Rights”35, in “Rights and Agency”36, in “Liberty and Social Choice”37, in “Rights and 
Capabilities”38, in “Well-Being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984”, 
in On Ethics and Economics39, in “Freedom of Choice: Concept and Content”40, and 
in Development as Freedom41. The topic of human rights (2b) is addressed mainly 
in “Culture and Human Rights”42, and in “Human Rights and Capabilities”43. 
Discussions regarding field (3) are to be found primarily in “Poor, Relatively 
Speaking” 44 , and in “Poverty as Capability Deprivation” 45 . Field (4) sees 
discussions in “Famines”46, and mainly in Poverty and Famines: An Essay on 
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 Cameron (2000) overviews the relationship between Sen’s capabilities approach and the theme of 
equality and inequality. 
35
 Sen (1982b) 
36
 Sen (1982a) 
37
 Sen (1983) 
38
 Sen (1984b) 
39
 Sen (1987) 
40
 Sen (1988b) 
41
 Sen (1999) 
42
 Ibid (chapter 10) 
43
 Sen (2005). See also Fukuda-Parr (2011) on this important and expansive topic. 
44
 Sen (1984f) 
45
 Sen (1999: chapter 4) 
46
 Sen (1980b) 
21 
 
 
Entitlement and Deprivation47, with some additional discussions to be found in 
Resources, Values and Development48, and in some later publications as well. Field 
(5) is mainly discussed in “Development, Which way Now?”49, in “The Concept of 
Development”50, in “Development as Capability Expansion”51, and later on in 
Development as Freedom. Similarly, fields (6 –10) are likewise discussed across a 
number of Sen’s books and articles, with some focusing more closely on one such 
specific field, but with many having something to say about each such field in 
question.52 All in all, no proper grasp on each of these respective fields of 
application can be had without consulting a significant number of Sen’s 
publications on the topic at hand. 
Finally, this writing style repeats itself again when dealing with the complex 
justificatory exercises that serve to support Sen’s capabilities approach. These can 
be broken down into three main groups of argumentation. Group 1 employs the 
‘better metric’ argument, utilizing a variety of counterfactual, hypothetical, and 
actual (empirical) examples, intended to demonstrate the moral preferability of 
the capabilities metric over alternative ones (with the metrics of resources and 
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 Sen (1982c) 
48
 Sen (1984h) 
49
 Sen (1984d) 
50
 Sen (1988a) 
51
 Sen (2003) 
52
 Item (6) is dealt with in Sen (1985d: lecture 3), Sen (1992: chapter 4), Sen (1993a: sections 5-6). One is 
luckier with item (7), insofar as it is quite well covered in Sen (1985a). Item (8) is mainly covered in Sen 
(1984g), Sen (1984e), in Sen (1984a), and in Sen (1990b). Item (9) is dealt with in Sen (1985c), in Sen (1990b), 
and in Sen (1999: chapter 8). Finally, Item 10 is covered in many of Sen’s publications (Sen (1985d), Sen 
(1988b)), but it undoubtedly receives its most thorough defence in Sen (1999). 
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utility receiving the brunt of the attack). Group 2 employs the ‘valuation and 
balancing approach’, which begins by taking for granted that the very moral 
goodness of (at least a certain number of central) human capabilities is quite 
defensible, and seeks to show how their respective weights and values can be 
counterbalanced against one another, and arranged into tangible capability sets, 
from which genuine choices for human well-being can then be made. Finally, 
group 3 seeks to address the concerns of those who expressed doubts regarding 
the practical applicability of Sen’s capabilities approach (regarding, primarily, the 
exercises of recognizing, assessing, valuing, ordering, and distributing said 
capabilities), by proposing procedures for capability valuation and aggregation, 
together with mathematical formulations and ordering principles aimed at 
producing tangible capability sets, towards actual distribution within human 
environments. 
This being said, a notable difference resides with the fact that these three 
groups of argumentation, constituting Sen’s complex justificatory exercises, 
receive very different exposure across his various capabilities publications. 
Indeed, Group 1 receives so much exposure that the question one need ask is not 
‘which of Sen’s capabilities-related publications deal with the preferability of the 
capabilities metric over its welfarist and resourcist competitors’, but rather ‘which 
ones do not’. Indeed, one would be hard pressed to find a single one of Sen’s 
capabilities-related publications that does not deal with this first group of 
arguments, in (at least) a small and cursory way. Nevertheless, most of the truly 
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salient argumentation related to this group is to be found in his earlier 
publications (even in those ante his capabilities definition), with the latter ones 
often offering not much more than a resume or repetition of these earlier ones. 
Groups 2 and 3, on the other hand, receive considerably lesser exposure by Sen. 
Furthermore, Sen does not actually perform (even by way of an example) the 
important tasks of fully defining, assessing, valuing, ordering, and distributing 
various capability types. He merely proposes and circumscribes the tools by way 
of which these tasks are to be performed, and argues for their practical 
applicability and tenability.53 Hence, the actual task of rendering his capabilities 
approach fully operational is left up for other capability theorists to take up. 
Indeed, the following comment by Ingrid Robeyns sums up precisely the nature of 
Sen’s writing style: 
 
“One remark is called for. I fully grant that it is not easy to 
reconstruct an exact account of Amartya Sen’s capability approach. 
Sen’s articles on the capability approach are dispersed over a wide 
range of journals and books, which cut across the disciplines. 
Moreover, depending on his audience, Sen stresses different aspects 
of the approach, which makes interpretating it even more difficult. In 
addition, Sen has developed his approach gradually; hence to 
understand it one would need to go back to read all Sen’s papers on 
the capability approach, as there is no clear overview by Sen that 
neatly describes the approach.”54 
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 This is explored at some length by Martins (2007b), crossing over onto the very metaphysical 
presuppositions (ontological realism) implied by Sen’s capabilities approach. 
54
 Robeyns (2003: 545). An earlier (albeit somewhat peripheral) attempt at such reconstruction can be 
found in Robeyns (2000). 
24 
 
 
The development of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
 
 Despite sharing many of the same concerns, the development of 
Nussbaum’s capabilities metric follows a rather different route than Sen. 
Nussbaum developed her capabilities approach as the result of a period of 
collaboration with Sen at the WIDER institute. A distinguished Greek scholar, she 
immediately recognized the connection between Sen’s central idea regarding the 
aim of justice needing to focus upon, not resources or utilities, but rather 
individual freedoms (capabilities), as bearing much closeness to what had already 
been articulated by Aristotle some time back.55 Consequently, her very first 
capabilities writings immediately plunge the reader head first into Aristotelian 
thought, and into his ideas regarding the object of human living as reaching 
eudemonia, or the ‘good life’, and his ideas regarding the purpose of government in 
making it possible for citizens to reach it, if they so desire (i.e., empowering them 
with the required capabilities).56 In this respect, the gist of her capabilities metric 
comes to be developed rather quickly and thoroughly in her first writings on 
capabilities proper. Hence, in “Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on 
Political Distribution”57, after beginning the discussion with a brief critique of the 
metrics of resources and utility in constituting the proper aim of distribution and 
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 This is to be found mainly in his Nichomachean Ethics and in his Politics. 
56
 Nussbaum (1988: 175-179) 
57
 Ibid  
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political planning (as Sen did in “Equality of What”58), Nussbaum jumps right into 
a rather in-depth discussion of what she understands to be functionings and 
capabilities. While essentially borrowing Sen’s initial conceptual framework59, she 
adds further refinement to it by drawing a distinction between internal, external, 
and basic capabilities, and explains at length what these consist in.60 With these 
new refinements in place, the next problem that Nussbaum tackles is the need to 
determine which of the various important capabilities ought to be enabled by 
governments for their people (this is akin to Sen’s emphasis on the need to 
perform valuational and ordering exercises of various functioning and capability 
types).61 Unlike Sen, however, who essentially leaves these valuational and 
ordering exercises to be performed within the various socio-political, economic, 
and cultural environments within which a capabilities-based approach to 
examining and rectifying human well-being is to be employed, Nussbaum 
formulates the need to draw up a list of central human capabilities to function that 
is to be objective and universal enough for it to become the object of a global 
overlapping consensus.62 She does not develop such a list in this first article, but 
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 Ibid (179-182) 
59
 Some differences exist between Sen’s and Nussbaum’s versions of the capabilities metric, though these 
reside more at the peripheral level than at the core conceptual one. She enumerates the main ones in 
Nussbaum (2000e: 11-15). 
60
 I discuss these in the next section as I lay down the essentials of the conceptual core proper to the 
capabilities metric. 
61
 Nussbaum (1988: 196-198) 
62
 Ibid (198-201). This is akin to the current declaration of human rights. While Nussbaum’s list is probably 
the best known, it is important to realize that it is not the only capabilities-related list in existence. 
Alternative lists of varying similarity to Nussbaum’s have also been formulated by Desai (1995), Qizilbash 
(1996a: 14), Alkire and Black (1997), Clark (2002: chapter 4), Clark (2003: tables 1-4), Robeyns (2003: 71-72), 
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she already points out the prevalent importance that practical reason (akin to 
Sen’s refined functioning as choosing, and correspondent capability as being able 
to choose, amongst centrally important capabilities) is to play as one of the key 
central human capabilities.63 Rather, it is in her following publication entitled 
“Aristotelian Social Democracy”64 that she goes on to formulate just such a list. In 
doing so, she revisits in greater detail some of the justificatory arguments found in 
“Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribution”65, and lays 
down what she calls the ‘thick vague conception of the constitutive circumstances 
of the human being’, based upon which the central capabilities ought to be 
determined.66 She also re-affirms the overarching importance of practical reason 
and (now also) affiliation, as essential human functionings that serve to organize 
and arrange all the others.67 Her list is then formulated as an indication of the most 
central and universally acceptable basic human functional capabilities.68 Here is 
the original list from that article: 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
and Alkire (2005c). The very phenomenon of such ‘lists’ of human ends in economic literature (together 
with a few pertinent examples thereof) is discussed by Alkire (2002). 
63
 Nussbaum (1988: 201-204) 
64
 Nussbaum (1990b) 
65
 Nussbaum (1988: 206-217) 
66
 Ibid (219-224). This list serves to lay down a set of underpinning universal conceptions of the essentials of 
the human condition, based upon which she then drafts up her actual list of central human capabilities. A 
more basic version of this underpinning list is also to be found in Nussbaum (1993). See also Nussbaum 
(1992: 216-221), as well as Nussbaum (1995: 76-80). 
67
 These two key overarching functionings receive important re-appraisal in many of her subsequent 
writings. 
68
 Nussbaum (1988: 225) 
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1. Being able to live to the end of a complete human life, as far as is 
possible; not dying prematurely, or before one's life is so reduced as to 
be not worth living. 
2. Being able to have good health; to be adequately nourished; to have 
adequate shelter; having opportunities for sexual satisfaction; being 
able to move about from place to place. 
3. Being able to avoid unnecessary and non-useful pain, and to have 
pleasurable experiences. 
4. Being able to use the five senses; being able to imagine, to think and 
reason. 
5. Being able to have attachments to things and persons outside 
ourselves; to love those who love and care for us, to grieve at their 
absence; in general, to love, grieve, to feel longing and gratitude. 
6. Being able to form a conception of the good and to engage in critical 
reflection about the planning of one's own life. 
7. Being able to live for and with others, to recognize and show concern 
for other human beings, to engage in various forms of familial and 
social interaction. 
8. Being able to live with concern for and in relation to animals, plants, 
and the world of nature. 
9. Being able to laugh, to play, to enjoy recreational activities. 
10. Being able to live one's life and nobody else's. 
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10a. Being able to live in one’s own life in one’s very own surroundings and 
context. 
 
This list, together with its scope of application and the justificatory 
exercises that surround it, comes to constitute the essential core of Nussbaum’s 
capabilities approach. And it remains as is, for the most part, throughout her 
subsequent publications. Hence, while some important adjustments and 
provisions end up being made to her capabilities approach itself69, one realizes 
that her conception of the capabilities metric actually receives relatively little 
further development. Her central capabilities list, for instance, undergoes a 
number of slight alterations and modifications, but tends to retain the basic above 
structure and layout quite strongly.70 Her three new capability types enumerated 
above — internal, external, and basic — remain, with the noticeable difference 
that she later comes to call a combination of internal and external capabilities 
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 These concern primarily the manner in which she seeks to justify it, as well as its scope of application. 
70
 This observation is shared by Clark (2005a: 7). Admittedly, some of these alterations and modifications 
are nonetheless rather important, in terms of clarification of content that they bring to her list, but they do 
not drastically alter the general structure and format of the list itself. Hence, her list gets a slight ‘pruning’ in 
Nussbaum (1992: 222), insofar as items 10 and 10a become merged. In Nussbaum (1995: 83-85), items 4-7 
acquire some substantial refinement and clarification, and item 10 is split up again into items 10 and 10a, 
and both also receive some important clarification. Also, the importantly close connection between her list 
and the various elements of the universal declaration of human rights is well laid out in Nussbaum (1999b: 
44-46). From there, it is reprinted with slight alterations to item 10B in Nussbaum (1999a: 235), and in 
Nussbaum (2000a: 231-233) This list is then carried over pretty much unchanged (with little real alteration) 
to her important work Nussbaum (2000e: 78-80). Some further changes are to be found in Nussbaum 
(2002d: 129-130), with the introduction of sub-classifications A and B for items 7 and 10, and with some 
pruning again for some of the other items. Finally, this latest list is carried over once again (with, you 
guessed it, minor alterations) into Nussbaum (2003a: 44-45), into Nussbaum (2006: 76-78), and into 
Nussbaum (2007c: 23-24). The latest printed version of her list can be found in Nussbaum (2011a: 33-34). 
For a good (albeit much earlier) overview of items that tend to overlap Nussbaum’s and Sen’s respective 
ideas regarding important human capabilities, see Crocker (1995: 174-177). 
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combined capabilities71, whose production in people it becomes the final aim of 
public policy. Indeed, most of her subsequent work focuses much more greatly on 
expanding the reach of her approach into a variety of additional topics, and on 
furthering her justificatory exercises, than on actually further developing the 
capabilities metric itself. Hence, one also realizes that the developmental gist of 
her capabilities metric is mainly concentrated around her earlier ‘Aristotelian’ 
articles, and around her two important books entitled Women and Human 
Development72 and Frontiers of Justice73. Indeed, most of her post-2000 articles 
dealing with the capabilities approach add relatively little to the metric itself. Her 
later writings simply refer to the earlier ones, where this metric was duly laid out 
and explained, whenever the need arises. 
 As far as the scope of application goes, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach 
mirrors that of Sen’s in some important regards, all the while branching out into 
other important avenues as well. On the one hand, Nussbaum does not go into 
some of the ‘technicalities’74 that Sen is particularly concerned with. On the other, 
she develops her approach into directions that Sen prefers to leave untouched. 
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 Nussbaum (2002d: 132) This definition remains as is, throughout her works (Nussbaum (1998: 775n36), 
Nussbaum (1999a: 236-238), Nussbaum (2000a: 234-235), Nussbaum (2000e: 83-86), Nussbaum (2007b: 11-
12, 34, 69). Mcreynolds (2002: 146) argues that, following Dewey, all capabilities ought to be considered as 
‘combined ones’. 
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 Nussbaum (2000e) 
73
 Nussbaum (2006) 
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 I am referring here to the problems of capability valuation, weighing, and indexing, and to the disparity 
between what Sen calls agency freedom and well-being freedom. Because of her reliance on a central 
heterogeneous capabilities list, these problems do not present themselves to Nussbaum in the same 
manner in which they do to Sen – though, unlike what some commentators have suggested, they do present 
themselves to Nussbaum’s foundational project as well. 
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Most important and noteworthy is the articulation of her ‘foundational project’, 
whereby she proposes that her list of central human capabilities become the 
ethical-political foundation for peoples, nations and states everywhere, by 
inscribing this list into their respective constitutions as a set of fundamental and 
non-alienable entitlements to be guaranteed to all citizens everywhere. Other 
notable scopes of application include: (1) the relationship between her central 
capabilities list and that of human rights, as developed in “Capabilities, Human 
Rights, and the Universal Declaration”75, in “The ‘Capabilities’ Advantage to 
Promoting Women’s Human Rights”76, in “Capabilities and Human Rights”77, and in 
“Human Rights and Human Capabilities”78; (2) the relationship between her 
capabilities approach and international feminism, as developed in “Public 
Philosophy and International Feminism”79, in “Women’s Capabilities and Social 
Justice”80, and in “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social 
Justice”81; (3) the relationship between capabilities and disabilities, as developed 
in “Capabilities and Disabilities: Justice for Mentally Disabled Citizens”82, and in 
Frontiers of Justice83; and (4) the need for thinking about capability rights and 
                                                             
75
 Nussbaum (1999b) 
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 Nussbaum (2000d) 
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equality for other species, in Frontiers of Justice84. Especially important for the 
universality of her foundational project, she also (5) criticizes the social contract 
tradition, and it’s proposed international extension by John Rawls in his Law of 
Peoples, in “Capabilities as Fundamental Entitlements: Sen and Social Justice”, in 
“Beyond the Social Contract: Capabilities and Social Justice”85, and in Frontiers of 
Justice86. Finally, she provides an in-depth examination of the relationship between 
the (potential) future endorsement of her list of central capabilities, and the 
various problems of legal enforcement and rectification in Women and Human 
Development (India), and in “Constitutions and Capabilities: ‘Perception Against 
Lofty Formalism” (United States)87. Just like Sen, Nussbaum develops these 
various scopes of application in a number of publications stretching over a given 
period of time, requiring, invariably, some noteworthy levels of reconstruction to 
get a proper handle on things.88 
 One particular area where Nussbaum excels in is the articulation of various 
justificatory exercises aimed at defending her capabilities approach. While Sen 
focuses primarily on showing how the capabilities metric is preferable to those of 
utility and resources, and how capabilities can be practically ordered into tangible 
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sets for human distribution, Nussbaum undertakes a much more thorough 
examination and critique of the myriad of underlying conditions responsible for 
bad moral judgments, and proposes a number of ways for producing adequate 
moral judgments. Asides from criticizing the metrics of utility and resources in a 
way very similar to Sen’s, Nussbaum also develops a number of additional 
justificatory exercises that can be classified into two main groups, with each group 
aimed at fulfilling a specific argumentative task in the overall justification of her 
foundational project. Group A contains an examination and critique of four 
relativist claims (the charges of imperialism and paternalism, and the arguments 
from culture and diversity), based on which various arguments have been 
formulated against the proposed universalization of her central capabilities list.89 
Group B contains the articulation of four additional argumentative strategies (the 
Aristotelian approach, the narrative approach, the morally-constrained 
proceduralist or informed-desire approach, and the non-Platonist substantive-
good approach), aimed at demonstrating just how and why her foundational 
project is truly justified. In essence, both these argumentative groups function as 
what I will refer to here as highly complex and refined ‘intuition pumps’, albeit 
with ‘differently aligned valves’. Group A, in particular, functions by attempting to 
illustrate the ultimate untenability of accepting some version or another of 
normative moral relativism, and by showing how the foundational project does 
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not run aground of the four charges levelled against it. The pump ‘operates’ both 
ways: it functions one way so as to purge our moral intuitions of the appeal that 
some version or another of normative moral relativism may hold on us, and it 
functions the other way so as to supplement our intuitions with the realization 
that the foundational project is truly compatible with certain degrees of 
paternalism, and with the reasonable preservations of human culture and 
diversity. Group B functions by attempting to produce, in us, all relevant moral 
intuitions required for the full acceptance of the foundational project. It does so by 
relying on a variety of techniques, appealing just as well to a subjective form of 
non-metaphysical essentialism, as it does to imagination, empathic representation 
and recognition of oneself in another, and to our intuitions regarding the very 
conditions required for the exercise of proper moral judgment itself.90 
 The main problem with Nussbaum’s justificatory exercises is that, asides 
from the fact that they are highly intricate, complex, and difficult to get a proper 
handle on (let alone duly assess and critique), they are simply not developed in a 
continuous manner. In particular, her earlier publications dealing heavily with 
Aristotelian thought focus greatly on the Aristotelian approach, but the 
essentialism that they entail is not quite the same as the essentialism that appears 
in Women and Human Development, and in subsequent writings.91 One therefore 
needs to get a handle on what kind of essentialism Nussbaum is truly defending, 
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when one wishes to take her capabilities literature as a whole. Furthermore, each 
of her real-life examples dealing with poverty, deprivation, abuse, or simply lack of 
human sensitivity (of which there are many, spanning a great number of her 
publications), can be classified under the ‘narrative approach’, and each needs to 
be duly examined, assessed, and recognized, so as to establish its true ‘pumping 
strength’, in orienting our intuitions in the direction of her foundational project. 
Finally, there is the all-important matter of reconstructing the entirety of all her 
above arguments, subsumable under groups A and B, so as to get a clear picture of 
just how exactly Nussbaum attempts to defend her foundational project as a 
whole, and whether her justificatory exercise are at all successful.92 
 
The pattern of capability development is conducive to the appearance of charges 
of ambiguity and underdetermination 
 
 The purpose of the above discussion regarding the development of the 
capabilities approach by Sen and Nussbaum has not been to merely produce a 
gratuitous critique of their works, but rather to demonstrate how and why the 
specific pattern and mode of writing that they have adopted reveals itself to be 
particularly conducive to the appearance of the charges of ambiguity and 
underdetermination that have been levelled against the capabilities approach in 
general. As we shall soon see, however, these charges rest, not only with 
difficulties related to the reconstructive exercises required to get a proper handle 
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on what Sen and Nussbaum respectively understand to be ‘capabilities’ from their 
many publications, but also (and much more importantly) on a number of peculiar 
formulations which they have themselves made, and which lead many 
commentators to doubt the very possibility of practical operationalization of the 
capabilities approach. In the meantime, we will reconstruct the key components of 
the capabilities metric, and explore some of the possible additional conceptual 
layers that can then be laid down upon it, leading, either to desirable forms of 
greater refinement, or to unnecessary conceptual weight that does little but 
undermine the very idea of ‘capabilities’ itself. 
 
2.2 The conceptual core of the capabilities approach 
 
What exactly is the ‘capabilities metric’? As its etymological roots suggest, 
the first component, namely a ‘capability’, refers to the internal ability of someone 
or something to do certain things, together with the actualization of certain 
external circumstances of enablement. In the case of human beings, it refers to the 
conjunction of a particular set of very specific ‘foreground’ and ‘background’ 
conditions that allow individuals to hold freedoms of various types. This 
distinguishes it from other like terms, such as capacity or ability, in that one may 
have a capacity for something, or even an ability to do something, but be otherwise 
prevented from doing it for various additional reasons. On the other hand, when 
one has an actual, genuine, bona fide capability, then one is, in an important sense, 
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quite free to exercise the object of that capability in question.93 As for the term 
‘metric’, it refers to the practical application of the capability concept within the 
sphere of various social analysis or public good policy-driven projects designed to 
assess and quantify varying levels of well-being achievement. The most prominent 
examples include the United Nations Development Program’s Human 
Development Reports, though a number of national-level as well as an even 
greater number of localized ones exist as well. 
The basic components of the capabilities metric are first articulated by Sen 
in “Well-being, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984”. Capabilities are 
based on functionings, which correspond to ‘beings’ and ‘doings’ (the basic things 
from “Equality of What” that one has an ability to do), themselves referring to 
activities, or states of existence or being94. Since an individual is able to be many 
things and to do many things, when one aggregates the totally of beings and 
doings that an individual actually achieves, this corresponds to their functioning 
vector 95 . Naturally, assessment of a complete functioning vector requires 
identification of the great variety of functioning types that can make up a human 
existence, followed by recognition of the relevant ones, given a certain individual 
in question.96 In doing so, not all such functionings will necessarily be valuable 
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ones. However, when assessing one’s functioning vector, all actual functionings 
need to be identified, for the simple reason that neutral or non-valuable ones 
nevertheless will and do invariably impact upon the realization of one’s and 
other’s valuable functionings, as well as one’s and other’s capability sets. And this 
is vital for proper prioritization and distribution of capability sets, following the 
adequate completion of valuational exercises.97 
Hence, a person’s singular capability is what a person is free to do and to be, 
regarding a certain given functioning, whereas a person’s capability set 
corresponds to the totality of possible functioning bundles that said individual can 
respectively come to choose from. However, one needs to remember that 
capabilities are ‘units’ of freedom, and that they consequently correspond, not to 
what one is actually achieving, but rather to what one is, in important ways, free 
and able to achieve. Also, one needs to remember that all individuals have a 
certain set number of choices that they can make, regarding the beings and doings 
that are open to them. Individuals cannot, for obvious reasons, ‘do all and be all’, 
all at the same time. They must consequently choose amongst practically available 
groups of functionings those that best suit their needs, wants, and desires. There 
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understanding of more worldly aspects, than does sheltering from the elements, which takes into account a 
significantly lower number of variables. 
97
 An example formulated by Williams (1995b: 101) concerns the capability of buying a certain brand of 
washing powder, vs. Adam Smith’s example of the possibility of appearing in public without shame. It is 
unlikely that, following proper valuational exercises, the washing-powder associated capability (and 
functioning) end up being that important, whereas Smith’s example of being able to appear in public 
without shame generally holds greater importance in people’s minds. Williams was using this example to 
indicate the importance of distinguishing between precise (and, to a certain extent trivial) capabilities, and 
fundamental ones. 
38 
 
 
is, however, a finite number of such possible alternative functioning vectors 
(though it can be admittedly quite large) that individuals can choose from, and 
their totality corresponds to what Sen calls a capability set98. A person’s capability 
set corresponds, therefore, to the totality of possible individuated functionings 
that he or she may choose from, by way of the totality of possible alternative 
combinations through which these may actually be achieved. Thus, the 
functioning-capability pair, together with the relationship between functioning 
vectors and capability sets, constitutes the basic conceptual core of Sen’s 
capabilities metric. And for all intents and purposes, that is the core that remains 
once one strips down all other refinements that can be made thereto and added up 
atop it. 
But what are some examples of such possible refinements? Examination of 
the salient literature reveals that they are quite numerous and can take on a great 
variety of forms. One such possible refinement involves drawing a distinction 
between what Sen calls ‘basic’ vs. ‘refined’ functionings, corresponding 
respectively to the difference between functionings that are exemplary of actual 
beings and doings, and ones corresponding to the very activity of choosing 
amongst a variety of possible functioning vectors.99 As a corollary to this, Sen also 
discusses at some length the need to perform various valuational exercises, aimed 
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at ascribing appropriate values to the various functioning, functioning vectors, and 
correspondent capability sets that individuals may hold.100 Finally, he explains the 
need to perform hierarchical orderings of these, according to the respective 
weights, values, and importance that come to be attributed to them.101 These 
important tasks are discussed and developed in Sen’s many subsequent 
writings102, and they represent just some amongst the many possible avenues of 
further refinement that the capability metric can be subjected to.103 
Other examples of possible refinements can be gained by drawing upon 
Nussbaum’s specific articulation of her understanding of capabilities. Nussbaum 
distinguished early on between internal and external capabilities. The former 
correspond to what could be construed as internal characteristics and provisions 
(i.e. mental resources and capacities), allowing one to function in a certain way, 
whenever the appropriate circumstances present themselves.104 She characterizes 
internal capabilities as follows: 
 
“A person is I-capable of function A at time t if and only if the 
person is so organized at t that, should the appropriate 
circumstances present themselves, the person can choose an A 
action.”105 
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 This capability is, in a sense, an incomplete one, as far as true freedom is 
concerned. This is because Nussbaum points out that such a capability may well be 
present, but that it may not come to be chosen, lest the circumstances of its 
activation arise. In other words, it is quite possible for someone to have one of 
Nussbaum’s internal, or I-capabilities, and not truly have any actual degree of 
freedom, regarding when and how one comes to exercise the corresponding 
functioning. This, she connects to background conditions that need to be present 
for an individual’s internal potentiality (to function) to have an opportunity for 
externalization (to exercise the corresponding capability).106 Consequently, one 
realizes that it is when one combines an individual’s I-capability with the absence 
of limiting or impeding background conditions that one can also be said to hold an 
external, or E-capability. She characterizes external capabilities as follows: 
 
“A person is E-capable of function A at time t, if and only if at t 
the person is I-capable of A and there are no circumstances present 
that impede or prevent the exercise of A.”107 
 
 These two capabilities are closely related to each other, insofar as, not only 
is an E-capability required for an I-capability to become exercised, but the absence 
or removal of E-circumstances will also impede the production of I-capabilities in 
youth, and erode them in adults.108 One can thus see how internal mental ability 
cannot operate alone, to generate a true degree of freedom, without the presence 
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of genuine external opportunities for functioning, and how such ability cannot at 
all come to arise, or can even dissipate, if the appropriate external conditions are 
not met. Nussbaum then proceeds to add another category to her two capability 
types articulated thus far. Since according to her the purpose of good government 
is the enablement, by way of proper education and training, of I-capabilities in 
people, and the arrangement of states of affairs such that E-capabilities likewise 
become enabled and sustained, it is important to define the recipients of the 
distribution of these two main capability types. Nussbaum, following Aristotle, 
states that their recipients ought to be individuals who have basic capabilities, 
which she defines as follows: 
 
“A person is B-capable of function A if and only if the person 
has an individual constitution organized so as to A, given the 
provision of suitable training, time, and other instrumental 
necessary conditions.”109 
 
 Hence, a basic, or B-capability can be construed as corresponding, in a way, 
to latent potential that one has to develop the more complex I and E capabilities. 
And it becomes the role of the lawgiver to distribute various forms of social goods 
to those who are naturally endowed with B-capabilities, so that they may then 
come to achieve and exercise I and E-capabilities.110 Thus, in addition to the 
functioning-capability pair, together with the relationship between functioning 
vectors and capability sets, the capabilities metric can be further refined in terms 
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of complexity (basic vs. refined functionings or capabilities), in terms of type 
(internal, external, combined), as well as in terms of the relative value and weight 
of its components, as established by their position on a hierarchical ordering scale. 
  Further refinements can be garnered by employing the corollary concepts 
of ‘multiple realizability’ and ‘freedom amplitude’. Indeed, unless defined in an 
exceptionally narrow and concise manner, practically all capabilities are multiply 
realizable. What this implies is that, for any given capability, its correspondent 
functioning can be exercised in a variety of ways, and still reflect the given 
meaning of the functioning in question. Consider the simple example of riding a 
bicycle. The functioning associated with this capability has a relatively narrow 
number of invariables and a greater number of variables. The invariables 
constitute basic conditions that are essential for the correspondent activity to 
match the functioning definition in question. These regard only the person, the 
object class (bicycle) and the activity type (bicycle riding). The variables, however, 
are multiple, and I characterise them as follow: 
 
 Bicycle type (racing, mountain, hybrid, BMX, etc.) 
 Riding style (street, off-road, cross-country, acrobatic, etc.) 
 Organization (alone, family, friends, group, organized event, charity, etc.) 
 Objective (recreation, fitness, transportation, competition) 
 Timeframe (dawn, day, dusk, night) 
 Season (summer, fall, winter, spring) 
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 What this means is that one could combine most any of these given 
variables (with some natural limitations), and still end up with an activity 
corresponding to the general meaning of the functioning of ‘riding a bicycle’. The 
multiple realizability of one’s capability set corresponds, therefore, to the variety 
of ways in which each and every functioning that one is presently exercising or 
that one may freely choose to exercise can come to be realized by way of a 
specifically identified multiplicity of corresponding states, activities or 
practices.111 
 As far as ‘freedom amplitude’ is concerned, this concept refers to the 
proportional ease with which one is free to exercise the correspondent functioning 
in question, in relationship to the respective trade-offs and compromises that this 
implies.112 A further analysis of the capability to ride a bicycle above brings this 
into perspective. One can be said to be in actual possession of the capability to ride 
a bicycle under the condition that all positive conditions are minimally fulfilled for 
one to do so, and that all negative conditions are sufficiently absent. This being 
said, one still needs to take the following into consideration, when one wishes to 
exercise one’s capability to ride a bicycle: 
 
 Possible personal trade-offs (ride a bicycle or engage in other 
activities with the family) 
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 Possible temporal trade-offs (ride a bicycle or engage in other 
similarly time-consuming recreational activities) 
 Possible financial trade-offs (purchase or lease a bicycle or utilize 
those funds towards other activities and projects) 
 Possible professional trade-offs (ride a bicycle or utilize that time to 
advance one’s career) 
 And so on… 
 
Naturally, freedom amplitude is only a function of capabilities that are 
already realized, seeing as how incompleteness along positive and negative 
conditions required for possession of a certain capability implies the practical 
absence of its realization. Freedom amplitude corresponds, therefore, not to how 
much headway has been made in making a certain capability available to someone, 
but rather to how easy it is to choose to exercise a certain capability-functioning 
that is already, for all intents and purposes, practically available to the individual 
in question. 
Other refinements still involve the development of specific layers along the 
various functioning vectors and capability sets (themselves possibly containing 
additional functionings and capabilities), as well as the development and 
articulation of additional capability types. Possible examples thereof include 
further conceptual refinements made to previously-defined basic and refined 
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functionings113, external114 and combined115 capabilities, as well as the articulation 
of group capabilities116 . Furthermore, the notion of ‘capability thresholds’, 
according to which desirable states of social justice can be satisfactorily fulfilled 
only when certain minimal levels of capability attainment are reached, can also be 
supplemented by that of a ‘capability ceiling’, beyond which further capability 
enablement becomes either superfluous or downright detrimental.117 Finally, the 
capabilities metric can also be refined by the latest corollary concepts of 
‘capability security’, ‘fertile functioning’ and ‘corrosive disadvantage’, 
corresponding respectively to the respective permanence of a capability, to the 
degree by way of which a certain functioning promotes others, and to its flipside 
effect of functioning removal.118 
All these various refinements create a truly multivalent metric which can be 
broadened significantly across a great number of dimensions of human existence 
in order to articulate what it is exactly that is meant by a particular form of 
capability freedom, or what truly happens (or is supposed to happen) when some 
                                                             
113
 Fleurbaey (2006: 306-308); Hinchliffe (2009: 406) 
114
 Foster and Handy (2008) articulate specific background condition types along the lines of external 
capabilities, corresponding to capability enablement made possible by direct connection or relationship with 
another person. 
115
 Mcreynolds (2002) argues that, unlike Nussbaum’s many capability types, Dewey’s capabilities are all of 
the combined (i.e. comprehensive) type. Barclay (2003: 7-8) points out that Nussbaum’s list is essentially a 
list of combined capabilities. Nussbaum (2011a: 20-23) confirms this later on. 
116
 The specific nature of group (or collective) capabilities, as well as the important contribution that they 
play in allowing other full-fledged capability enablement, is discussed by Evans (2002), Iversen (2003), 
Stewart (2005), Ibrahim (2006), Foster and Handy (2008), as well as by Ballet, Dubois, and Mahieu (2007). 
117
 This development is suggested by Holland (2008: 416-421), in addition to the already-existing notion of a 
capability threshold: Nussbaum (2011a: 40-42) 
118
 Nussbaum (2011a: 42-45). Corrosive disadvantage corresponds to the negative conditions for capability 
implementation identified above. 
46 
 
 
such capability becomes distributed to people — at least on paper. However, one 
may ask at this point ‘why need all this complexity’ — Would such a complicated 
and multivalent metric not generate a conceptual load that is simply too heavy to 
render it operational in any tangible sense of the term? While this genuine worry 
has spawned a number of legitimate criticisms which I will examine shortly, the 
simple fact remains that any successful articulation of a tangible capability metric 
simply will need to exhibit a notable degree of complexity. As it turns out, having a 
capability actually involves the creation of a very specific number of ongoing 
states of affairs that render it possible in the first place. Indeed, a capability (in the 
specific sense in which I have interpreted it here) is a freedom to do and to be 
certain things. When one is truly free to do this and to be that, it is implied that one 
is: (a) sufficiently equipped with all required skills, materials, possibilities and 
opportunities to exercise said freedom in question; (b) sufficiently protected from 
all and any forms of nefarious consequences or impediments, whether these be 
natural or man-made119, that may stand in the way of one exercising said freedom. 
This definition of mine is by no means novel, insofar as it is somewhat of a 
refinement of the respective distinction drawn by Isaiah Berlin between the 
notions of positive and negative liberty.120 Berlin understood this distinction to rest 
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between the presence of personal powers for control, mastery and self-
determination, and between the absence of external constraints or interference by 
others.121 His concern was primarily with the political realm, though it is clear that 
this realm is but one amongst many dimensions of human existence wherein some 
things need to be present, and others absent, for it to be said of someone that they 
truly do hold a certain full-fledged freedom to do this and be that. Indeed, as has 
become rather clear to liberty theorists, at this point, it is pretty meaningless to 
refer to only one of these freedom types, when one actually has in mind ‘real 
freedom’ in the sense of the possession of an actual capability. 
To put this into proper perspective, let us consider the example of riding a 
bicycle again, and analyze this specific capability to function in terms of the 
distinction between positive and negative freedoms.122 The act of riding a bicycle 
is a functioning. The freedom to ride a bicycle is the capability corresponding to 
this functioning in question. But what truly needs to be present and what truly 
needs to be absent for it to be said of someone that they presently ‘hold’ such a 
capability freedom-unit in question? The following is an illustration of the manner 
in which one ought to conceptualize such a capability analysis. It is important to 
realize that this is a non-extensive list, insofar as it is the result of a thought 
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experiment, whereby I may have missed some additional salient aspects that 
would have appeared had this been realized as part of a real capabilities analysis. 
It is intended solely as an illustration of the methodology required for proper 
capability understanding: 
 
I. Positive conditions required for possession of capability to ride a bicycle: 
(a) Primary conditions: 
 
a. One needs to be sufficiently able-bodied 
b. One needs to have access to a bicycle 
c. One needs to have practicable surfaces upon which to ride 
d. One needs to have minimally acceptable weather in which to ride 
e. One needs to have allowable time in which to ride 
 
(b) Secondary or extended conditions: 
 
1. To be able-bodied, one needs to be sufficiently healthy, implying that 
one needs to be physically and psychologically sound, which, in turn, 
implies that an individual must be: (i) sufficiently-fed; (ii) 
sufficiently-clothed (depending on climate); (iii) sufficiently-
sheltered; (iv) sufficiently mentally stable; etc. 
49 
 
 
2. To have a bicycle in one’s possession, it must be implied that: (i) 
bicycles are manufactured; (ii), bicycles are sold to made available 
(leased) to the individual in question; (iii) the individual has 
adequate financial resources to purchase or lease said bicycle (if 
unable to borrow one from a friend); (iv) the individual has a 
correspondingly sufficiently large income to allow for the purchase 
or lease of a bicycle; etc. 
3. To have practicable surfaces upon which to ride, it is implied that 
either: (i) the individual lives in an area where natural geography 
allows for the riding of bicycles over untransformed terrain, or; (ii) 
the individual’s environment is sufficiently and adequately 
transformed, so as to render bicycle riding both possible and 
practical. 
4. To have sufficiently good weather in which to ride, it is implied that 
either: (i) the individual lives in an area where the climactic 
conditions allows for the riding of bicycles, or; (ii) facilities are 
provided to the individual wherein bicycles may be ridden despite 
hostile climactic conditions. 
5. To have allowable time in which to ride, it is implied that the 
individual is logistically able to allocate time, energy, resources and 
priorities to riding a bicycle. This can be done in two ways: (i) either 
the individual is able to efficiently combine riding a bicycle with 
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another necessary or desirable activity (such as going to work, or 
riding together with one’s family), or; (ii) the individual has sufficient 
disposable time, energy and resources to herself, wherein she may 
choose to dispose of those extra commodities in the form of the 
activity (functioning) of riding her bicycle. 
 
II. Negative conditions required for possession of capability to ride a bicycle: 
(a) Primary conditions: 
 
One needs to be ‘free’ from: 
1. physical and mental impediments to riding 
2. environmental impediments to riding 
3. logistical impediments to riding 
4. technological impediments to riding 
5. economic impediments to riding 
6. personal impediments to riding 
7. social impediments to riding 
8. cultural impediments to riding 
9. religious impediments to riding 
10. political impediments to riding 
 
 
51 
 
 
(b) Secondary or extended conditions: 
 
By extension, one consequently needs to be free from: 
1. all forms of physical (de-habilitating) and mental conditions (such as 
agoraphobia) undermining one’s effective ability at riding a bicycle 
2. bad weather, shabby or dangerous infrastructure, existing 
infrastructure closed off to cyclists, or absence of practicable 
infrastructure altogether 
3. no time or energy to spare for leisure, due to excessively strenuous 
working conditions  
4. no manufacture of bicycles in the vicinity, or lack of technological 
ability to transport bicycles manufactured elsewhere to the 
individual in question 
5. insufficient funds (for all reasons) for the purchase or lease of a 
bicycle 
6. family obstructions or time-conflicts 
7. social organization and demands negating one’s facility for riding 
bicycles 
8. cultural taboo or otherwise negative perspective on the riding of 
bicycles 
9. religious practice or belief condemning, negating, or otherwise 
undermining one’s freedom to ride a bicycle 
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10. selective or total ban on bicycle riding 
 
 As you can tell from the two lists above (I & II), both positive and negative 
conditions tend to capture a number of similar states of affairs that all need to be 
either present or absent for one to really hold the capability (freedom unit) to ride 
a bicycle. Nevertheless, neither the positive nor the negative list is alone sufficient 
to account for all such required conditions. Both lists need to be drawn out and 
duly examined for the proper assessment of each individual capability that one can 
come to hold. Furthermore, both lists start off with a very basic assessment of the 
first-level (primary) underlying conditions required for the possession of the 
capability to ride a bicycle. Once those are identified, each such condition is then 
further identified for all second-level (secondary) underlying conditions, 
themselves required for the first level conditions to be fulfilled. The breadth and 
scope of first and second-level underlying conditions is a direct function of the 
conciseness with which a certain capability comes to be identified, together with 
the respective complexity associated with its fulfillment. I have used ‘bicycle 
riding’ – a relatively simple functioning – as my example. Even so, it is abundantly 
clear just how many variables need to be taken into account for one to draw a 
proper assessment of its presence for a certain said individual. And this rule 
applies just as well to all capabilities. Finally, the more complex and/or ambiguous 
the capability, the greater the number of possible variables that need to be taken 
into account to properly assess its being held by someone. 
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 The above list also illustrates another important characteristic of capability 
analysis. Each and every capability needs to be invariably assessed along a certain 
set number of dimensions of human existence. In doing so, one is able to perform 
such an assessment in an orderly and logically consistent fashion, insofar as sub-
analysis within each such respective dimension brings to light additional 
conditions and sub-conditions that either assist or impede the possession of said 
capability. Berlin focused primarily on the political dimension, though it is clear 
that a significant multiplicity of such dimensions of human existence is always 
involved in making capability freedoms possible. Here are some of the major ones: 
 
 First-level personal dimension (physical, psychological, spiritual) 
 Second-level personal dimension (family, friends, acquaintances) 
 Social dimension (broader ties, links, arrangements) 
 Cultural dimension (traditions, practices) 
 Religious dimension (beliefs, practices) 
 Environmental dimension (natural, man-transformed, man-made) 
 Technological dimension (chemical, biological, medical, electronic, 
mechanical, etc.) 
 Economic dimension 
 Political dimension 
 And so on… 
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Hence, the identification of the presence of a certain capability 
consequently proceeds by way of the analysis of the respective presence of 
positive and negative freedom conditions, as illustrated above, and as examined 
along each salient dimension of human existence pertaining to said capability in 
question. And one can clearly see how even a relatively simple capability such as 
‘riding a bicycle’ will invariably mobilize a rather intense analytical exercise for it 
to become fully fleshed out in terms of practical applicability. 
 
2.3 Charges of ambiguity and underdetermination befalling the 
capabilities approach 
 
 Though invariably required, the inherent complexity associated with 
capability analysis illustrated in the previous section has caused grave concern 
regarding its applicability — not merely at the practical, but already starting at the 
theoretical level itself. Indeed, the capabilities metric has been beset by a plethora 
of worries ranging from it being too broad, too complex, too ambiguous or too 
underdeveloped to constitute an appropriate object of moral concern for just 
distribution. In this respect, Sen’s capabilities metric has been criticised for 
ambiguity and underdetermination regarding the nature of its various 
components. For example, the concept of a functioning refers to a variety of states 
of existence, corresponding to what Sen calls ‘beings’ and ‘doings’. Its primary role 
is thus as a variable holder in capability analysis, with potentially highly varied 
instances of realization. In other words, what one calls a ‘functioning’ can actually 
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correspond to very many different things that one can be and do, understood very 
broadly. However, it is important to realize that its relationship to the additional 
aspect of freedom that one gains in acquiring the capability to select any said 
functioning within one’s capability set is quite secondary to the very notion of a 
functioning in question. This being said, not all authors seem to have fully realized 
this dissociation, and this is undoubtedly due to the ambiguity with which the 
functioning concept has often been discussed.123 
 To put this into perspective, consider G.A. Cohen’s critique of Sen’s 
functioning concept. Cohen argued in a number of publications124 for the need to 
formulate an additional metric of well-being that he claims has been recognized by 
Sen but not fully identified. This metric he calls midfare125, and he presents it as an 
alternative to Sen’s functioning concept, insofar as midfare is similarly a non-
utility based form of wellbeing that an individual acquires through the 
consumption of various resources. However, unlike Sen’s functionings, Cohen 
disassociates his midfare concept rather strongly from the choice component 
inherent in the selection of functioning bundles126 through one’s capability set, as 
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is proper to Sen’s approach. He illustrates this through an example of the non-
utilitarian wellbeing127 that a baby obtains through the ingestion of food and the 
benefit of being clothed, even though the child does not properly ‘choose’ to eat 
and dress itself in the same manner in which an adult does.128 Cohen chooses to 
denote his alternative wellbeing metric in contrast to Sen’s functionings for two 
main reasons. Firstly, he reproaches the ambiguity incurred by Sen’s broad and 
varied use of the functioning term.129 Secondly, he reproaches what he calls the 
‘athleticism’ implicit in the choice component proper to the capability-functioning 
pair.130 By ‘athleticism’, Cohen refers to what he takes to be Sen’s excessive 
emphasis on the importance of choosing which functionings are to become 
constitutive of one’s state of being, in contrast to his very own ideas regarding the 
fact that he takes this choice component to not be as important for the fulfilment 
of egalitarian justice as Sen makes it out to be. Consequently, Cohen presents his 
midfare concept as placing less emphasis on one’s ability to choose, for it to be 
thought of as an equally important good. Indeed, he points out that: 
 
“No serious inequality obtains when everyone has everything 
she needs, even if she did not have to lift a finger to get it.”131 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
bundle as a possible collection of a select number of these opportunities, as per the natural limitations that 
each opportunity automatically comes to impose on all others, once it becomes exercised. 
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 While Cohen’s critique of Sen’s functioning concept is correct, insofar as 
Sen’s tendency to use this term to denote a great variety of possible activities and 
states of being can induce ambiguity and confusion as to its actual delineative 
borders, his additional reservations do not warrant the formulation of another 
metric altogether. This stems from his unwarranted understanding of Sen’s 
functionings as inextricably tied up with their corresponding capability freedoms. 
However, when examined more closely, Cohen’s midfare concept reveals itself to 
be not that different from Sen’s functionings, insofar as its strict qualities of non-
utilitarian resource-derived wellbeing are concerned. The key difference lies, 
therefore, with the importance accorded to the choice component, which is where 
the two authors disagree — but that is not a feature inherent to functionings (or 
midfare) themselves, but rather to capability sets. And the important question of 
the value of having genuine degrees of freedom of choice (i.e., capability sets) can 
be addressed without touching upon the strict qualities of actual achieved 
wellbeing of this sort, whether it be called functionings, midfare, or whatever 
other name may come to be given to a concept that serves to denote what is 
essentially the same thing. 
 For these reasons, Sen (rightly) points out that Cohen’s midfare concept is 
quite directly equivalent to his functionings.132 And, while arguing that no 
substantial athleticism is in fact implied by all forms of capability freedoms133, he 
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nevertheless reaffirms the importance that freedom to choose does in fact hold in 
assessing general levels of wellbeing, as opposed to simply looking at how people 
are doing at the sole functioning (or midfare) level, without considering how 
things came to be this way134. This being said, one can nonetheless clearly 
appreciate how Sen’s broad and varied use of the term ‘functioning’ led Cohen to 
envisage the need to formulate what he takes to be another more ‘clearly’ defined 
metric.135 
 While the concept of ‘functioning’ corresponds to a certain state of existence 
(as per one’s beings and doings), the concept of ‘capability’ corresponds to the 
effective freedom that one holds in selecting a certain individual functioning or 
functioning bundle. However, some authors have observed that there is significant 
ambiguity regarding the exact type of freedom that is implied by the term 
‘capability’. I have pointed out in the previous section that, as far as my 
interpretation goes, a capability is a special kind of freedom, insofar as it 
necessarily implies the simultaneous endowment of all necessary conditions for 
the realization of the corresponding functioning vectors, together with the absence 
of any and all forms of barring conditions preventing one from doing so (mirroring 
the distinction between positive and negative forms of freedom). However, that is 
not the actual interpretation given by many capability theorists and 
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commentators. Hence, what is precisely implied by ‘capability freedom’ is a matter 
for substantially divergent interpretation, as I illustrate below: 
 Crocker, for instance, points out that Sen’s notion of capabilities can be 
given five possible interpretations. They can be construed as: (i) inclinations or 
desires; (ii) needs; (iii) concrete skills; (iv) general character traits, or; (v) 
possibilities or opportunities.136 Crocker considers each of these, and points out 
(rather rightfully) that Sen’s capabilities concept squares best with interpretation 
(v)137. However, he goes on to say that Sen does not really specify with any 
concrete degree of clarity and concision the actual ‘functional parameters’ of the 
kinds of opportunities that capabilities make available to people.138 By this, he 
means that, while it is rather clear that Sen understands capabilities to constitute 
freedoms in an important sense of the term, he does not fully clarify the ‘how, 
where, and when’ of such freedoms.139 
Indeed, Though Sen’s notion of freedom is closely tied to his capability 
concept, its articulation is not without its own set of problems. Hence, Gasper and 
Staveren140 warn against an overemphasis on freedom by Sen and argue in favour 
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of a more pluralistic characterization, while Prendergast 141  makes some 
observations regarding inconsistencies in Sen’s use of his notion of freedom. As a 
follow-up to this, Vallentyne observes that Sen puts more emphasis on effective 
freedom than on control freedom, which has been challenged by Pettit who 
introduced a third concept, namely favour-independent freedom: 
 
“Favor-independent freedom includes control freedom, 
effective freedom provided by nature, and effective freedom 
provided by others when they have an enforceable obligation to 
provide it. It excludes, however, effective freedom provided by 
others when they have no enforceable obligation to provide it (that 
is, when they are simply doing it as a favor).” 142 
 
 Justice is concerned both with favour-independent and favour-dependent 
freedom, according to Pettit. Indeed, all effective freedoms are valuable, and all 
should be subsumed under capabilities.143 Also, Capability freedom cannot be 
reduced to, or strictly based on, the functionings that it points to, argues 
Vallentyne.144 On his end, Arrow145 demonstrates briefly that the value of freedom 
may not be as high a priority for all amongst the central capabilities, sometimes 
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even voting it out. Against this, Kaufman146 argues (against Cohen, Pettit and 
others) that Sen’s complex account of freedom without control (i.e., freedom 
derived from changes not effected by the person themselves) is, indeed, 
persuasive, both on the weak and on the strong account: 
 
“Under the weak interpretation, the levers of control are 
exercised consistently with the person’s preferences, but not because 
the person would want them to be exercised in that way. For 
example, an international agency over which I have no influence 
implements a policy that I in fact favor that is designed to eliminate 
malaria. The policy satisfies my preferences, but I have exercised no 
control over the decision to implement the policy. Such a case 
involves a phenomenon that is important to quality of life, Cohen 
concedes, but the phenomenon is not a form of freedom.17 Rather 
than realizing the freedom to choose whether or not to live in a 
malaria-free environment, I am, in such a case, a powerless 
beneficiary of a policy implemented by others. The weak 
interpretation of effective freedom, Cohen concludes, does not 
describe a form of freedom at all. 
Under the strong interpretation, a person’s preferences are 
satisfied because they are that person’s preferences; the levers of 
control are exercised in the way that she prefers precisely because 
she prefers that they be so exercised. For example, a proof-reader 
“corrects the text as he does because he knows I would want it to be 
corrected that way.” Such a case, Cohen argues, does not exhibit 
freedom without control, because I continue to operate the levers of 
control. The exercise of control is indirect, but I nevertheless do 
control what is done to my manuscript. As a result, Cohen argues, the 
strong interpretation of effective freedom does not describe freedom 
without control.”147 
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 Ultimately, freedom need only be understood (according to Kaufman) in 
the sense of minimal, if any, input on the part of the agent to bring the freedom-
enabling state of affairs about in the world (opportunity view). 
 Finally, Qizilbash observes that Sen actually ends up giving many different 
interpretations of his capabilities approach in response to criticisms and 
difficulties.148 Furthermore, Sen’s approach is problematic (underdetermined) 
because: (i) he fails to give a list of valuable functionings149; (ii) he provides no 
complete account of interpersonal comparisons; (iii) his means to freedom are not 
given sufficient importance, and; (iv) negative freedom is not given sufficient 
importance.150 Qizilbash also observes that too many capabilities, as can be 
created by Sen’s approach, are not necessarily a good thing.151 This is seconded by 
Sumner who observes that, as recognized by Sen, his very broad construal of a 
functioning as anything we manage to do or to be will yield “an enormous – 
possibly infinite – list, since a person’s activities and states can be seen in so many 
different ways (and can also be persistently subdivided)”.152 This, in turn, can 
make the informational requirements of the capabilities approach extremely 
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high153, though all functionings need to be taken into account in order to avoid 
missing salient features in selecting the valuable ones — even though many 
possible modes of functioning selection do little to clarify the capabilities metric, 
as pointed out again by Vallentyne.154 
 As far as Nussbaum is concerned, Crocker remarks that, while she 
delineates some of these functional parameters better than Sen, her capabilities 
metric is further complicated by the fact that she conceives of various specific 
capability types (basic, internal) that do not, in themselves and alone, constitute 
opportunities, properly speaking as such.155 He also interprets Nussbaum’s notion 
of capabilities as corresponding better to personal powers, and Sen’s to 
opportunities — though he admits that, for capabilities to constitute the kind of 
substantial degrees of freedom that are dear to both authors, they truly need to 
incorporate both aspects, and more.156 Furthermore, both Sen and Nussbaum 
suggest a hierarchal classification of capabilities, though the use of like terms by 
both designating different capability types (such as the term ‘basic capabilities’ 
signifying different things for Sen and Nussbaum) does little to help alleviate 
potential confusion.157 All in all, there appears to be a strange tension between 
what Sen and Nussbaum appear to want their capabilities concept to correspond 
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to, and the way in which they actually articulate what it’s supposed to correspond 
to. This is because, as Crocker rightly identifies, most of our intuitions, together 
with those of Sen and Nussbaum, point to the idea that, for one to hold a complete 
capability, one essentially needs to have all positive and negative conditions of 
freedom enablement realized for one to be truly endowed with the corresponding 
freedom that the concept of capabilities is supposed to endow us with. However, 
he also observes that both Sen and Nussbaum actually tend to vacillate between 
different degrees of capability fulfillment, leaving it unclear as to precisely which 
of these conditions they understand capabilities to fulfill, and which ones they do 
not. This not only induces, but also sustains, a significant amount of ambiguity as 
to the actual freedom type that capabilities are supposed to make possible for 
people. 
The ambiguity befalling the key concepts of ‘functioning’ and ‘capability’ has 
been observed by other theorists as well. Gasper, for instance, considered in much 
greater detail the variety of meanings that can be given to these two key terms, in 
an attempt to alleviate some of the incurred ambiguity and confusion surrounding 
them.158 He even attempted to sketch out two charts indicating the complex 
‘conversion’ relations amongst these.159 While these charts are of some help in 
better understanding the nature of actual conversion processes between 
entitlements, goods, capabilities, functionings, and well-being, they also end up 
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making even clearer just how varied a usage can be given to both these terms, 
even within the ‘narrowed’ confines of the capabilities approach at large. 
Furthermore, Gasper remarks that the term ‘capability’ has also been used to refer 
to opportunities and skills – and not to full-fledged capabilities – and that this has 
been done by capability theorists themselves, without further explanation or 
comment as to why they had performed such inconsistent and puzzling semantic 
shifts.160 Finally, he (once again) points out that the term ‘functioning’ can also be 
given a similarly broad meaning161, and these problems, in turn, generate further 
ambiguity as to the way in which capabilities can actually correspond to various 
sorts of freedoms, understood in terms of one’s exercise of genuine choice.162 This 
being said, Gasper is nonetheless sympathetic towards the capabilities approach 
as a whole. However, he rightfully recognizes that these important problems 
befalling its metric need to be resolved for this approach to make proper headway 
in the future. 
 Other authors have also made similar observations, though in more cursory 
form, regarding the ambiguity befalling the capabilities metric. Laderchi et al. 
provide us with a chart illustrating the specific problems associated with 
capability operationalization which makes things quite clear.163 Bertin and Sirven 
point out that the multidimensional nature of capabilities makes them very 
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difficult to measure, hindering its usefulness for the analysis of social capital.164 
Vallentyne argues that there are many options (and problems) with attempting a 
proper valuation of capabilities.165 Dowding makes remarks similar to Crocker 
above, concerning the exact meaning that Sen and Nussbaum have in mind, by way 
of their understanding of the main components proper to the capabilities 
metric. 166  Finally, Pressman and Summerfield, while conceding that Sen’s 
ambiguity does permit flexibility, drew the following stark observation in 2003: 
 
“Although the capability approach has been expanded and 
refined over the years, its vagueness plagues researchers. Graduate 
students in fields such as economics find that their advisors do not 
accept the approach as a legitimate methodology for their theses; 
reviewers for journals often state that the capability approach is 
unnecessary in an article; proposals that have to be based on a 
formal model have to look elsewhere, such as to utility maximization, 
which Sen elaborately critiques. This is the juncture at which we 
presently find ourselves. Many people recognize the capability 
approach as a major contribution to economic analysis, but they all 
recognize that there are problems in the present construction of the 
approach.”167 
 
This was also echoed by Robeyns the same year: 
 
“However, while the capability approach has developed 
considerably in recent years, much work needs to be done, and I 
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certainly would not want to claim that it is a framework that is ready 
to give us guidance on all questions of justice. But I do feel that it is 
the most promising normative framework we have at present, and a 
rapidly increasing number of scholars, activists, and policymakers 
feel the same.”168 
 
 Given these numerous examples, it should be clear, by now, that the 
ambiguity befalling the capabilities metric cannot simply be a case of misreading, 
misinterpretation, or bad faith on the part of the significant number of important 
authors who have all arrived at similar conclusions. The fact that many of them 
remain sympathetic towards this approach in general is an indication that the 
perceived lack of conciseness and clarity at the root of the capabilities metric is 
simply the result of an honest recognition of a significant problem that has not 
been satisfactorily dealt with, as of yet. And it is quite clear that Nussbaum’s 
foundational project, relying squarely on the capabilities metric as well, 
consequently finds itself in the same boat as far as the first major hurdle that it 
needs to overcome for it to become a viable partial theory of justice is concerned. 
 
2.4 Various attempts at operationalization 
 
Despite the numerous problems identified with the capabilities metric in 
the previous section, attempts at operationalization have flourished over the past 
decade, with more recent advances indicative of a substantial concerted effort to 
finally construe a working conceptual model for this approach. This is not to say 
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that such attempts arose solely during the past ten years or so. A number of such 
propositions for standardization were already formulated by Sen himself and by 
other capability theorists in their earlier works in the form of a variety of algebraic 
formulations169 or schematic layouts170. Other examples of early endeavours can 
be found in Chakraborty’s proposed solution to functioning vector ranking171, in 
Herrero’s idea for a model of capability operationalization devised by way of tying 
a capability index together with Rawlsian and utilitarian theory172, as well as in 
Alkire’s proposal to operationalize Sen’s capabilities approach along Natural 
Law173. Later accounts include Fukuda-Parr detailed description of the practical 
applications of Sen’s capabilities approach within the UN’s Human Development 
Reports, in terms of his views regarding human development as capability 
expansion, as well as the philosophical path taken by Sen to get there (i.e., 
philosophical basis and critiques of resourcism and welfarism). 174  Other 
endeavours include Anand et al’s contribution to the operationalization and 
testing of the capabilities approach by using data from the British Household Panel 
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Survey in conjunction with a list of substantial values posited by Martha 
Nussbaum175, as well as Qizilbash and Clark’s exploration of the pros and cons of 
operationalizing the capabilities approach by way of fuzzy poverty measures and 
their production of a number of tables intended to illustrate exactly how this 
works.176 More recently, Gaertner and Xu suggested the use of Lancaster’s 
characteristics approach to consumer theory by combining it with Sen’s concept of 
functionings in order to measure the standard of living available either to an 
individual or household or to a whole nation, when the direction of the 
development of society represented by a reference functioning vector is 
uncertain177, while Qizilbash examined in depth how issues pertaining to the 
contextualized operationalization of Sen’s capabilities approach (due to his 
respect for pluralism) are closely linked to social choice theory.178 Furthermore, 
Martins attempted to employ Tony Lawson's structured ontology in order to 
improve the capabilities approach’s weakness regarding the recognition of 
diversity between individuals in welfare analysis 179 , while Krishnakumar 
proposed a structural equation econometric model intended to operationalize the 
capabilities approach along the latent variable approach, which considers the 
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different dimensions of capability or human development as unobserved variables 
(factors) manifesting themselves through measurable indicators.180 Other authors 
who have also overseen contemporary operationalization attempts or who 
contributed to them directly include Gore181, Comim182, Fleurbaey183, Robeyns184, 
Farina et al.185, Srinivasan186, Dowding187, Burchardt188, and Frediani189. 
As we gradually approach the year 2011, discussions pertaining to the 
operationalization of the capabilities approach, together with proposed models 
and contributions thereto, keep on increasing. Hence, Vizard discussed the use of 
human rights to develop and justify central human capabilities190, while Alkire et 
al. all discussed specific ways in which the capabilities approach can or already 
has been operationalized191. Echávarri and Permanyer proposed an innovative 
approach for ranking profiles of capability sets on the basis of equity192, while 
Chiapperro-Martinetti and Roche reviewed specific techniques and problems 
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related to the operationalization of the capabilities approach193. Anand et al. 
‘operationalized’ the capabilities approach by developing a survey instrument to 
elicit information about capabilities at the individual level194, while Smith and 
Seward proposed one approach to understanding and integrating the social nature 
of capabilities by basing themselves on the emergence of an individual’s 
capabilities from the combination and interaction of individual-level capacities 
and the individual’s relative position vis-à-vis social structures that provide 
reasons and resources for particular behaviours195. Finally, Hinchliffe further 
refined functionings along the type and token distinction (multiple realizability 
discussed above), and proposed a type-token line of reflection in order to select 
them, basing himself on Taylor’s concept of a strong evaluator196, while Burchardt 
and Vizard devised a new two-stage procedure for deriving a successful capability 
list, challenging the sceptical position by suggesting that ‘operationalizing’ the 
capability approach is both ‘feasible’ and ‘workable’197. 
The purpose of the extensive tally above is to show that, despite all the 
difficulties enumerated earlier, far from becoming abandoned or lost in a 
quagmire of conceptual complexity, the capabilities approach has, in fact, already 
become operationalized (for better or worse) in a variety of ways and in a number 
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of contexts, and that ongoing efforts towards the creation of an optimal model of 
the capabilities metric constitute a very real and recognizable work in progress. 
 
2.5 Towards a standardized account of the capabilities metric 
 
 Nevertheless, some important observations need to be made regarding the 
requirements that a standardized account of the capabilities metric intended for 
specific employment within Nussbaum’s foundational project needs to fulfill. 
While it does need to retain the critical core constituted by the functioning-
capability pair, together with the relationship between functioning vectors and 
capability sets, it does not actually inherit some of the difficulties proper to Sen’s 
version. This is due to three distinct characteristics that effectively shield it from 
them. First of all, the number of possible capabilities is limited solely to 
Nussbaum’s central list, together with any possible sub-capabilities and 
functionings that may exist along its many layers, as required strictly for full 
operationalization. Secondly, there is no problem related to multiple lists and 
capability ordering, valuing, and weighing in order to organize them along a 
proper hierarchal scale, insofar as all capabilities present on the list remain 
incommensurable, irreplaceable (no trade-offs) amongst themselves, and are all 
required as a set for proper minimal levels of social justice to be attained. Thirdly, 
valuation exercises are simply not needed, seeing as how the central human 
capabilities list is already considered to be, in itself, morally justified (though this 
claim is explored in depth in the next chapter). Hence, the dreaded scenario of a 
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quasi-unlimited number of possible capabilities spread across a significant 
number of mutually-incompatible capabilities lists, all requiring proper valuation 
and positioning along hierarchal orderings, is simply not something to be 
envisaged for Nussbaum’s foundational project.198 
 Despite these inherent advantages, some specific reservations remain in 
order. First of all, since the original intent had been for a capability to correspond 
to a genuine unit of freedom, it is truly inappropriate (and needlessly confusing) to 
utilize the very same term to designate states of affairs that are clearly either 
different or lesser than that. Examples of this involve states of affairs where there 
are varying degrees of potential for a certain freedom unit to be present, but 
where this freedom unit is not, actually, fully realized.199 Hence, I fail to see the 
benefits brought to the capabilities concept by Nussbaum utilizing the same term 
to refer to what are essentially capacities, potentialities and background 
conditions, just as she has done with her distinction between basic, internal and 
external capability types.200 The reasons for this have been made clear previously, 
insofar as her ‘basic capabilities’ correspond to nothing more than latent potential 
to develop a certain actual full-fledged capability type later on in life, whereas her 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ capabilities correspond to two different kinds of 
foreground and background conditions that are both necessary, but alone 
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insufficient, for someone to hold a certain actual capability-freedom. In fact, one 
realizes that Nussbaum only refers to a real capability freedom-unit by way of 
what she later calls combined capabilities.201 And that is the only concept that the 
respective term ‘capability’ out to correspond to. 
 Secondly, the combined vagueness and thickness of Nussbaum’s list, though 
initially presented as an advantage against charges of imperialism and paternalism 
(to be explored in the next chapter) actually implies, not only that the dimension 
of multiple realizability will necessarily apply quite heavily to her list, but also that 
it will create possibly insurmountable problems related to the significant selection 
exercises required to choose one possible instance of any one of her central 
human capabilities over any other.202 Thirdly, some authors have expressed doubt 
regarding just how exemplary of genuine capabilities Nussbaum’s list truly is203, as 
well as claiming that Nussbaum does, in fact, engage in an exercise of hierarchical 
ranking and classification of her list, despite her claims to the contrary204. Finally, 
some serious doubts have been raised regarding the practical ability of 
impoverished governments at fulfilling the rather stringent minimal requirements 
of all of Nussbaum’s central human capabilities simultaneously to all individuals, 
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especially when dealing with severely deficient individuals or when resources 
become especially strained during natural disasters.205 
 My response to these various worries is as follows: Though the first 
objection above can be rather easily overcome by sticking to only one definition of 
capabilities (as I argued here extensively), it is the second and fourth objections 
that represent, in my view, the greatest conceptual and practical challenges to the 
successful application of the capabilities metric towards the operationalization of 
Nussbaum’s foundational project. This is because the third objection is more 
dependent on the kind of interpretation that is being made of Nussbaum’s 
foundational project, and can thus be more easily circumvented by better 
clarifying some of its functional parameters. As for the second objection, though 
the significant multiple realizability of Nussbaum’s list of central human 
capabilities does constitute an unavoidable conceptual hurdle and additional 
burden placed on anyone attempting to operationalize it, at least the act of 
choosing amongst them can be successfully circumvented by demonstrating that 
any such choice being made ends up morally moot, which I explain at length in the 
following chapter. The fourth objection I am forced to concede can, in effect, 
render the foundational project unrealizable at times, given certain very specific 
personal or environmental circumstances.206 
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Conclusion: 
 
Operationalization problems related to the capabilities approach in general 
and to the foundational project in particular can be traced back to three key 
factors. These include (1) the writing styles of Sen and Nussbaum, which make it 
rather difficult to piece back together their respective versions of the capabilities 
approach, (2) their somewhat inconsistent and confusing use of the various 
capabilities-related terms, as well as (3) the great number of directions that 
further refinements to the central conceptual core of the capabilities metric can 
undertake. This makes the capabilities metric a rich and highly flexible one, yet 
one that can end up beset by a very heavy conceptual load, threatening to render 
practical operationalization impossible. While analysis of the very nature of 
capabilities has shown that their successful operationalization does invariably 
require such an imposing load, due to the high variety of foreground and 
background conditions that need to be properly identified and enabled for the 
genuine possession of capabilities by individuals, fears of conceptual overload can 
and already have been alleviated by a number of salient factors. Firstly, much of 
the identified ambiguity and confusion can be overcome by reducing the very 
concept of ‘capability’ squarely down to that of a full-fledged freedom unit, thus 
avoiding the comingling of this notion with any aspects proper to the 
aforementioned foreground and background conditions in question. Secondly, 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
development for proper implementation. The case of natural disasters, however, remains a possible 
exception to the successful implementation and preservation of her foundational project. 
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because of the specific parameters proper to Nussbaum’s foundational project 
(namely the restriction of possible salient capabilities to a central list), many of the 
drawbacks befalling Sen’s original version of the capabilities approach, upon 
which Nussbaum’s version is still heavily based, simply do not apply. Thirdly, 
significant progress has been made in the last decade towards the creation of a 
successful capabilities metric, and a variety of studies illustrate that the 
capabilities approach actually already has, for all intents and purposes, been 
operationalized for some time now, to greater or lesser degrees of fidelity to its 
original spirit. This, in turn, implies that proper operationalization of Nussbaum’s 
foundational project presently has at its disposal a remarkable framework to work 
with, which can serve as an effective launching pad for further development. 
This being said, the two main recognizable areas where operationalization 
of the foundational project can still flounder include the very broad multiple 
realizability implicit by the ‘thick and vague’ nature of Nussbaum’s central human 
capabilities list, together with the fact that severe cases of disability, as well as 
resource-crippling natural disasters, can come to seriously undermine its 
effectiveness. And even then, problems related to the first area can be overcome 
by at least reducing the very need to choose amongst the numerous options 
available for central capability actualization at a moral level (explained in the next 
chapter), together with the observation that problems pertaining to the second 
area, though duly recognized and acknowledged, remain of a purely practical as 
opposed to a strictly theoretical nature, and do not actually represent the standard 
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model for habitual human environments. In other words, the very idea of 
distributing central human capabilities to all remains conceptually sound — thus 
overcoming the first major hurdle needed for Nussbaum’s foundational project to 
be considered practically viable. Now, the all-important question of the very 
possibility of morally justifying a practical implementation of her foundational 
project, together with an analysis of the probable outcome of such an inquiry, is 
dealt with in the following chapter. 
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Chapter 3: Moral justification for the foundational project 
 
Introduction: 
 
 The preceding chapter served to show how the primary obstacle to the 
practical realization of the foundational project can be overcome. It has been 
argued in the latter parts of chapter two that the foundational project’s proposed 
distributum, namely ‘capabilities’, requires the adoption of a minimally 
standardized conceptual frame in order to avoid the charges of ambiguity and 
underdetermination that have been levelled against it, due to inconsistencies 
present in its current formulations in the salient literature. Furthermore, reliance 
on existing attempts at operationalization promise to satisfy the specific work 
required for the implementation of Martha Nussbaum’s central human 
capabilities. Hence, barring some residual recognizable worries, it has already 
been shown that the very idea of using capabilities as a distributum in something 
like the foundational project can become a very real possibility. 
 That the use of capabilities as distributum in the foundational project 
becomes a practical possibility does not, however, automatically entail that this 
also makes the foundational project a morally good idea. It only serves to illustrate 
that realizing the project would not be an impossible thing to do – hence, serving 
only to validate it for actual moral assessment at this point, by allowing it to avoid 
the rather fatal caveat of failing to fulfill Kant’s famous principle of ‘ought implies 
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can’207. The significant task of satisfactorily demonstrating the moral worthiness of 
the foundational project represents the next major obstacle in its complete 
endorsement, and my assessment of this task will occupy the entirety of this 
chapter. 
 Attempts at morally justifying the foundational project already exist in the 
form of a number of argumentative strategies that have been employed to try and 
persuade the reader of its moral preferability. Before I assess these strategies in 
turn, however, I will spend some time on an ethical theory which I believe serves 
as the unofficial and sometimes quite tacit basis for these strategies in question. In 
examining the relationship between this theory and moral justification for the 
foundational project, I plan to accomplish three important things: (I) I plan to 
show how this theory can be utilized in order to bring about practical evaluative 
exercises of the moral status of various states of affairs, so that an actual practical 
moral assessment of the foundational project could then be made; (II) I plan to 
illustrate the need for moral defenders of the foundational project better to align 
their argumentative strategies along the lines of this theory, as this would only be 
to their benefit; (III) I will attempt to assess the probable overall moral desirability 
of the foundational project, basing myself on the evidence collected thus far. The 
theory I have in mind here is called the ‘ideal observer theory’. 
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3.1 The general contents of ideal observer theory 
 
 The term ‘ideal observer theory’ actually corresponds to a group of theories 
sharing a number of similar characteristics. Ideal observer theory belongs to the 
class of normative-explanatory ethical theories (in contrast to solely explanatory 
or meta-ethical ones), in that it proposes positive (if not necessarily definitive) 
answers to a number of important normative questions that have long plagued 
ethicists208, as well as provide an additional explanatory basis for semantic209 as 
well as ontological210 questions, pertaining to the nature of moral behaviour. 
Earlier proponents of ideal observer theory include Adam Smith211 and David 
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practical impossibility of completely fulfilling conditions of ideal observation and, hence, to us being unable 
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 Smith discusses a number of conditions required for ideal observation in The Theory of Moral Sentiment 
(Smith (2002 [1790])). Though the actual role played by ideal observation in Smith’s theory is up for debate, 
his overall contribution to ideal observer theory, by way of his recognition of these important conditions 
above, is rather undeniable (Carson (1984: 181n39)). 
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Hume212, as well as a few other well-known philosophers213, whom one would not 
have initially envisaged as advocating conditions of ideal observation. More 
contemporary proponents of ideal observer theory include Roderick Firth214, 
Richard Brandt215, Thomas Carson216, Peter Railton217, David Lewis218, R. M. 
Sainsbury219, and Linda Zagzebski220, to name a few. Other contemporary authors, 
whose theories resemble closely, or rely on principles similar to those of, ideal 
observer theory, include R. M. Hare221, Kai Nielsen222, and John Rawls223. Overall, 
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despite not having attracted as much general attention224 as other prominent 
competitors, ideal observer theory has nevertheless seen its respectable share of 
interest, and it proposes a tantalising way of looking at how we may come to see 
and deal with moral problems. 
 Ideal observer theory’s main proposal is that we assess morally-laden 
situations by examining what a being endowed with certain key non-moral 
properties would ‘do’225 in our place. Despite a lack of definitive consensus226 
regarding the nature and content of these properties in question, one can actually 
identify the main recurring ones by looking at Firth’s original formulation, and 
using it as a starting benchmark. Thus, according to Firth, an ideal observer is to 
be:227 
 
1. Omniscient with respect to non-ethical facts 
2. Omnipercipient 
3. Disinterested 
4. Dispassionate 
5. Consistent 
6. Normal in other respects 
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The origins of these six properties can be traced back to what is commonly 
taken to represent a general understanding that we hold of moral failing, and of 
the variety of causes that are responsible for it. Hence, one need only look at the 
opposite conditions corresponding to each one of these six properties to get a 
handle on why we would think a being endowed with them would make a better 
moral judge than the average person.228 Amongst the variety of conditions that are 
generally identified as causes for undermining good moral judgment, one can 
include: lack of adequate information (~1); lack of empathic understanding of the 
plight of others (~2); biased or partial attitudes (~3); being improperly swayed by 
emotional infection (~4); inconsistency in one’s reasoning and actions (~5), and 
finally; various forms of ‘abnormality’229, causing one to be unable to fully grasp all 
the intricacies of the human condition (~6). Thus, so long as one believes that 
conditions ~1 to ~6 really do represent actual defects in the quest for good moral 
judgment, one will also become naturally drawn to the six positive conditions of 
ideal observation listed above, as tantalizing goals that promise to allow one to 
overcome these limitations, and finally become able to draw good moral 
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judgments.230 But just how tangible is this prima facie appeal of ideal observer 
theory? As we shall see below, things are not as simple as they first appear to be. 
 
3.2 The optimal use for ideal observer theory 
 
Despite the initial pull that ideal observer theory may exercise on us, by 
way of the appeal of its conditions of ideal observation, it is beset by a number of 
significant problems that all need to be addressed, if it is to be conceivable as an 
adequate theory for the moral defence of the foundational project. Before I 
examine the various criticisms levelled against ideal observer theory, however, I 
need to specify what I believe this particular theory can and cannot do for us. This 
is because I hold the principal utility of ideal observer theory to reside in a 
specifically delineated objective — one that puts me at some significant odds with 
the majority of authors who have concerned themselves with this theory — and a 
clear and concise formulation of this objective will also serve to predetermine 
which criticisms levelled against ideal observer theory apply to my specific 
version of it, and in which manner. 
 Traditionally, ideal observer theory had been conceived as a theory that 
promised to give us moral guidance in our everyday dealings and actions. It was 
believed that by either (i) trying to place ourselves under conditions of ideal 
observation (usually by way of intense mental exercises or even 
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‘psychotherapy’231), or (ii) divining the will of actual (or hypothetical) ideal 
observers, we would then become capable of reacting in a manner that would be 
morally efficacious, when faced with various morally-laden situations. This noble 
goal, however, is wrought with two sizeable difficulties, which present formidable 
challenges to anyone attempting to utilize ideal observer theory in this way. 
The first difficulty (as we shall soon see) involves the fact that conditions of 
ideal observation place such heavy requirements on everyday human beings that 
it appears highly unlikely, if at all possible, that they could all become realized, to a 
sufficiently satisfactory degree, within the kinds of ‘everyday scenarios’ involving 
morally-laden situations in which it was initially believed ideal observer theory 
would be of some benefit to us. As I shall soon argue, the heavy demands 
associated with fulfilling conditions of ideal observation (to a sufficient degree) 
can only be effectively realized by way of a collective exercise, following specifically 
delineated rules and procedures. The second difficulty stems from research 
performed into the phenomenon of irresolvable tragic dilemmas or ‘hard choices’, 
whereby many morally-laden situations actually leave us with no fully-acceptable 
avenues of choice or action, seeing as how no matter what we do, we would still 
incur a moral remainder or moral loss, for which no further utilitarian calculus or 
deontic principle could be invoked in order to ‘reason the remainder or loss out of 
existence’.232 The consequences of the existence of this phenomenon imply a 
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further stifling of the effectiveness of ideal observer theory as an everyday tool for 
moral guidance, insofar as it would do little good for individuals confronted with 
hard choices to appeal to ideal observer theory, even if they were capable of 
fulfilling the heavy conditions of ideal observation, as the universal standpoint 
(state of ideal observation) would still leave them with the unenviable conclusion 
that they are effectively ‘morally trapped’ by the strings of fate.233 
Despite these two sizeable difficulties above, the basic idea behind ideal 
observer theory is still good. However, because of them, the true utility of ideal 
observer theory rests, not with its role as an everyday morally-guiding process, 
but rather with its role as a basis for developing planned procedures for assessing 
the moral desirability of various states of affairs, all things considered. By ‘all 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
with a ‘primer’ for this phenomenon. Macintyre (1990) points out the significant scope of discussion 
engendered by this topic — a testimony to its extensive reach and to the great concern solicited by it. 
Hursthouse (1995) and Hursthouse (1999: 43-87) fleshes out the hard choices phenomenon with an 
explication of the various afferent terms related to it (resolvable dilemmas, irresolvable dilemmas, tragic 
dilemmas, moral remainder, and moral loss). Nussbaum (2000b: 1005-1036), Nussbaum (2003b: 415-416), 
and Nussbaum (2011a: 36-39) discusses how this phenomenon plays into her conceptualization of the 
central human capabilities as unalienable rights for all that cannot be morally and effectively weighed 
against one another or traded off — in response to which Dorsey (2008: 426-432) argues why this very same 
phenomenon actually undermines our practical abilities at fully implementing the foundational project. Sen 
(2009: 208-221) provides us with a related discussion to this topic. Statman (1996) illustrates the significant 
importance that a proper understanding of hard choices holds for legal theory. Finally, Brandt (1955a: 422) 
explains the impact of this phenomenon on ideal observer theory, while Postow (1978: 120-121) and Firth 
(1978: 122-123) provide us with a concrete example thereof. See also Lewis (1989: 126) on this 
phenomenon. 
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 This is not to say that one does not encounter many everyday morally-laden situations that do not 
involve hard choices of the sort. In such cases, provided that one could overcome the first difficulty 
(information gathering and processing), it is conceivable that ideal observer theory might, in some cases, 
come in handy, by offering guidelines for at least some such situations. However, this would still limit the 
effectiveness of ideal observer theory to those situations only, and, given the remaining heavy requirements 
for realizing conditions of ideal observation, one wonders whether one would not end up better served in 
their everyday dealings by adopting a set of imperfect but ultimately more practical and realistic general 
moral principles (such as general principles of civility, courtesy, common-sense, and respect for others, for 
instance), rather than burden oneself with attempting to reach the universal standpoint in each individual 
case, as it arises. 
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things considered’, I am referring to an exercise whereby the general desirability 
of a state of affairs would be assessed in relationship to what the world could be 
like, given (i) the complete state of our knowledge regarding how the world 
presently is, and (ii) the complete state of our knowledge regarding what we could 
make it out to be, following a complete and realistic assessment of all of our 
powers of worldly modification and alteration. We ought therefore to develop 
ideal observer theory’s conditions of ideal observation into ‘principles of ideal 
observation’, which would then serve as the basis for performing actual practical 
exercises of just this type, determined by way of ‘procedures for ideal 
observation’234. These procedures for ideal observation would then be regrouped 
under a ‘project for the ideal moral assessment of states of affairs’ (PIMASA), 
which would serve the important role of helping us to try and effectively assess 
the actual overall moral value of various states of affairs, in order to then draw out 
policy recommendations, as to which states of affairs ought to be brought about, 
which ought to be eliminated, and which ought to be maintained.235 
Since this proposed use of ideal observer theory would not be so burdened 
by the two sizeable difficulties above, insofar as it could mobilize sufficient time, 
energy and resources to ensure proper realization of conditions of ideal 
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 The crucial role of procedures for ideal observation is twofold: (i) ensure proper data gathering and 
sharing amongst participants, all the while; (ii) ensuring that all other conditions of ideal observation are 
maintained for all participants at all times. 
235
 Putting this project into place would not actually be that complicated, insofar as many of the social 
institutions and research bodies required for its realization are already in existence, and would only require 
‘moderate modifications’ to be brought into line — a task highly facilitated by modern means of information 
exchange. Admittedly, the greatest hurdle resides with the public relations aspect of a PIMASA, insofar as its 
avowed purpose flies (rather blatantly, I may add) in the face of what people generally like to believe about 
their autonomy and self-determination, in terms of them being ‘left free’ to make their own moral choices. 
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observation, and insofar as it would serve to make policy recommendations aimed 
at long-term moral gain, as opposed to immediate individual actions and reactions, 
it stands as a significantly preferable alternative to the originally suggested use for 
ideal observer theory. However, it is important to interject at this point, by 
pointing out that, even though policy recommendations derived from a PIMASA 
would carry an effective moral ‘stamp of approval’, putting them into practice 
would still invariably entail important transitional problems.236 Hence, despite the 
aims of a PIMASA being framed in terms of long-term goals of moral improvement, 
hard choices would not be fully done away with, and this in turn entails that, even 
if the theoretical idea behind the foundational project can be morally defended by 
‘running it through’ a PIMASA, actually bringing the foundational project about 
would still require giving some measure of accountability for the number of hard 
choices that this would inevitably require.237 In the meantime, however, I will now 
return to ideal observer theory and to the variety of criticisms that have been 
levelled against it, in order to assess them against the optimal use for ideal 
observer theory that I have just formulated above. 
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 Transitional problems are classified under two main headings. The first includes the ‘challenge of the 
Realpolitiker’, or the necessity of making hard amoral choices now in order to reach virtuous ends later. The 
second includes historical considerations of rights and entitlements (Nozick (1974)), in making sure that 
these are fully taken into account in the practical implementation of a PIMASA-approved policy.  
237
 Menon (2002) identifies a number of these problems (including various forms of ‘state coercion’ and ‘use 
of excessive force’) associated with the practical implementation of the foundational project. They are 
examined in greater depth in chapter five. 
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3.3 Criticisms of the conditions of ideal observation 
 
Omniscience and omnipercipience 
 
The six conditions of ideal observation enumerated in section 3.1 above 
have each attracted their own respective set of criticisms. The first two joint-
conditions238, namely omniscience and omnipercipience239, are beset by two major 
problems: 
 
I. The conditions of omniscience and omnipercipience place 
insurmountable requirements on human beings. Given our natural 
limitations, no one could know all at any given point in time, in order to 
fulfill these conditions of ideal observation.240 
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 I treat these two conditions as ‘joint’, seeing as how they essentially reflect two sides of the same 
requirement, namely the ‘abstract’ as well as the ‘empathic’ aspects of ‘full information gathering’. Indeed, 
if it were not for our largely culturally-induced dichotomy between the concepts of ‘reason’ and ‘emotions’, 
both conditions could be simply subsumed under the overarching title of ‘omniscience’. 
239
 The importance of accurately representing the emotional reactions of others to oneself, in fulfilling the 
condition of omnipercipience, is elaborated upon in some detail by Carson (1984: 58-65, 98-100). In doing 
so, Carson points out the overriding importance of having lived similar emotional experiences, in order for 
us to be capable of adequately representing them in others (63-4). This entails that these conditions most 
certainly cannot be adequately fulfilled by conserving a ‘stoic frame of mind’. Indeed, the crucial role played 
by emotions in allowing one to fully grasp all salient aspects of various situations (whether moral or not), as 
they relate to human beings, has been argued for by a number of prominent authors (Nussbaum (1990a), 
Nussbaum (2001a), Sherman (1997), Hursthouse (1999), Tappolet (2000)), such that the role of ‘emotional 
infection’, as it relates to proper data gathering pertaining to the lives of human beings is, by now, largely 
recognized. 
240
 This limitation is observed by Carson (1984: 65), Sayre-Mccord (1994: 218), Rosati (1995: 314-324), 
Kawall (2006: 361), and Zagzebski (2004: 354-355). 
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II. Even if we could (somehow) achieve them, doing so would cause our 
perspective to shift so far away from our normal human sphere of 
experience that we would no longer be capable of fully appraising the 
moral meaning of all of this newfound knowledge for our ‘mere mortal 
existence’.241 
 
I will begin by addressing the first problem (I), insofar as its resolution also 
entails a solution to the second one. One possible suggestion that has been brought 
forth for overcoming the unrealistic demands of conditions one and two is to 
simply bypass these requirements altogether, and identify the will of either an 
existing, or a hypothetical, ideal observer. If this could be done effectively, one 
would then need only to follow their will, in order to function in the world in 
morally efficacious ways. This proposed solution, however, is hopelessly flawed. If 
there is no existing ideal observer, then there is no one’s will to follow.242 Our only 
option then involves attempting to divine what a hypothetical ideal observer 
would will. This, however, brings us right back to the beginning, with regards to 
our abilities at divining an ideal observer’s will. There (probably)243 being no 
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 The possibility of this occurring is recognized by a number of authors, namely Brandt (1955b: 409-410), 
Harrison (1971: 174-176), Carson (1984: 57, 75-76), Railton (1986: 174n15), Lewis (1989: 124-125), Walker 
(1991: 765-766, 768-773), Sobel (1994: 792-807), and Rosati (1995: 308-314). 
242
 Harrison (1956: 256-258) makes this remark. Harrison (1971: 151-152, 172) believes that, there being no 
ideal observers, we cannot simply ‘query one’, regarding the moral status of our actions. 
243
 This hinges on one’s belief in the existence of God as a benevolent ideal observer. Naturally, even if this 
were to be the case, one would still remain saddled with the burden of being capable of recognizing God’s 
will accurately, and furthermore, being certain of this. 
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actual ideal observers, the only remaining solution for us is to fulfill conditions of 
ideal observation ourselves, to the best of our abilities.244 
Luckily for us, the stringent conditions of omniscience and omnipercipience 
can be lightened significantly by employing three distinct strategies. The first 
strategy involves limiting the amount of information that is actually required to 
properly ascertain the moral value of some state of affairs.245 Indeed, there is no 
good reason for believing that one needs to know ‘everything about everything’ in 
order to draw adequate moral judgments.246 One only needs to acquire all salient 
data pertaining to the impact of some state of affairs on the world, in order to 
produce an accurate assessment of its moral worth. A number of actual proposals 
have been made for how this could be achieved, all the while seeking to truncate 
the requirements of data gathering, such that one not end up in a situation where 
one would be required to gather essentially the same amount of data as before, 
due to one needing to assess all data in order to filter out the salient from the non-
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 Garner (1967: 619); Brandt (1955b: 410-411) 
245
 Brandt (1955a: 422-423) proposes that this be achieved by ‘hedging’ the omniscience requirement, and 
reducing it solely to ‘salient features’ of worldly states of affairs, determinable by way of a procedure, 
whereby such features are examined in terms of whether they would alter the ideal observer’s moral 
judgment, or not. In doing so, only those that would have an impact on the outcome of the moral judgment 
would come to be retained under the ‘omniscience’ requirement. Firth (1955: 417-418) acknowledges the 
‘ingenuity’ behind this proposal, despite erroneously anticipating what he takes to be a rather fatal difficulty 
(due to his failure to recognize that conditions of ideal observation necessarily eliminate ‘false beliefs’). 
Harrison (1971: 173, 180-181) proposes a very peculiar ‘analogy’ for understanding how we may approach 
conditions of ideal observation, and know it. Carson (1984: 58) provides us with a very simple but elegant 
principle for determining what counts as a salient fact or not. His principle roughly states that “any data is to 
be considered salient if its absence or inclusion would come to affect, in some way or another, the moral 
value-judgment placed upon a state of affairs”. 
246
 This observation has been made sporadically by various authors advocating ideal observer theory. 
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salient.247 Thus, so long as a reliable method can be developed for pre-selecting 
and filtering data in a manner that preserves saliency, all the while ending up less 
informationally-taxing than complete fulfillment of the omniscience-cum-
omnipercipience requirements, we can come one step closer to fulfilling these first 
two conditions of ideal observation. Development of such a method, however, 
would require cross-disciplinary endeavours which would constitute one of the 
key working components of a PIMASA. 
The second strategy involves truncating the requirements of omniscience-
cum-omnipercipience even further, by reducing the required information down 
from all salient data that would inevitably require gathering, to an anticipation or 
intuition of the outcome of such data.248 Admittedly, this strategy is riskier and 
more error-prone than the first one above, insofar as the first-level truncation 
from complete omniscience-cum-omnipercipience avoids the potential problem of 
data shortage, so long as all the gathered data is, indeed, of the salient type, and 
none ends up omitted. However, since all attempts at intuiting something, as 
opposed to judging (perceiving, recognizing) it, necessarily entail some data 
paucity somewhere, the likelihood of error (of omitting some salient aspect 
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 Two examples of this include the Lehrer (1985: 109-120) method of seeking to sufficiently (realistically) 
fulfill the condition of omniscience, by maximizing the probability of informational accuracy, in order then to 
anticipate consensual probability, and Sainsbury (1998: 153-155, 157) proposing that, if one considers the 
combined conditions of omniscience and omnipercipience along the lines of Hume’s definition of a ‘frame’, 
sufficient fulfillment of these conditions would be attained when no further addition or alteration made to 
said frame would change an ideal observer’s general moral disposition. A similar, though less accurate 
suggestion, is also provided by Lewis (1989: 123-125). 
248
 This suggestion is pressed forth by Kawall (2006: 363-371) and (to some extent) by Walker (1991: 764-
765). See also Harrison (1971: 152-153) and Lewis (1989: 122-123) on this. Carson (1984: 100-102) suggests 
that this strategy could serve as a possible solution for intuitionists, in an attempt to defend their theories 
(by arguing for an attempt to intuit outcomes deriving from conditions of ideal observation). 
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thereof) necessarily appears as a direct function of the general ‘quality’ of the 
intuition in question. This second strategy, therefore, is to be understood as a ‘fall-
back’ strategy, to be employed when the (already-reduced) requirements of 
salient data collection simply cannot be met, for whatever reason. However, given 
its natural defects, it is important to realize that the outcome of any assessments of 
the moral value of states of affairs made under this strategy amounts to a moral 
intuition, and not to an actual moral judgment, insofar as one remains aware of 
one’s uncertainty that all salient data has been duly captured thereby. For obvious 
reasons, such an outcome holds lesser authoritative weight than the more ‘ideal’ 
outcome stemming from procedures for ideal observation that limit themselves 
solely to data truncation at the first level, and its authoritative force is 
consequently directly proportional to the respective ‘quality’ of the intuitions that 
it derives from. 
The third strategy I have already alluded to in my earlier remarks that 
conditions of ideal observation can only be effectively realized by way of a 
collective exercise, following specifically delineated rules and procedures. Given 
the reasons above for why ideal observer theory is poorly equipped to serve as an 
everyday moral guide, it also stands to reason that achieving the requirements of 
omniscience-cum-omnipercipience, even under their truncated forms, necessarily 
involves a collective ‘meeting of the minds’ (many minds in this case). Indeed, the 
complexity of our world is such, and our accumulated body of knowledge has 
grown so large, with so many specializations required to even make sense of the 
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various fields of knowledge, that a proper assessment of the moral value of various 
states of affairs (especially complex ones) invariably requires the undertaking of 
significant collective exercises, by way of procedures for ideal observation. No one 
mortal person, no matter how ‘gifted’, could gather and process all that data by 
themselves.249 And it is precisely here that the advantages of the PIMASA come 
into perspective, in terms of its ability at overcoming the natural limitations of 
lone individuals, preventing them from fulfilling these first two conditions of ideal 
observation. 
Hence, the first major problem besetting the first two conditions of ideal 
observation, namely omniscience and omnipercipience, can be alleviated by doing 
the following: (1) Reducing the informational requirements of omniscience-cum-
omnipercipience by truncating the data down to salient data only, and even 
further if need be, by relying on moral intuitions as opposed to moral judgments; 
(2) ‘boosting’ the cognitive, informational, and empathic powers of our human 
observers by transforming the singular act of ideal observation into a large-scale 
collective endeavour, by way of a PIMASA. 
I will now look at the second major problem (II) threatening to beset those 
who would achieve the first two conditions of ideal observation. This problem 
illustrates a genuine concern which cannot be done away with that easily — for it 
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 For it is indeed a peculiar feature of ideal observer theory that its many proponents have not paid 
sufficient attention to this rather evident problem (Walker (1991: 767-768)) — a particularity which can 
probably be traced back to an excessive reliance on the power of the omniscient-cum-omnipercipient 
requirements, with insufficient attention paid to what is actually practically required to attain them. 
Friedman (1989: 649n13) made a similar claim, regarding the need for ‘dialogical’, as opposed to 
‘monological’ approaches to moral reasoning (in terms of the need for information sharing and pooling). 
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is indeed highly conceivable that individuals who have participated in procedures 
for ideal observation will come out of the experience drastically altered in terms of 
their worldviews, being faced now with significant discrepancies between what 
they initially took to be morally valuable, vs. what they now take to be morally 
valuable, after the fact. But does this reasonable assumption likewise forebode a 
transformation potentially ‘so extreme’ that participants in procedures for ideal 
observation may come to lose their bearings in terms of what morally matters for 
‘mere mortal’ human beings? There are several reasons for why this would not be 
the case. Firstly, procedures for ideal observation only entail information 
gathering (and exposure) up to a maximal degree required to cover all salient 
aspects proper to the moral evaluation of states of affairs. Individuals exiting 
procedures for ideal observation would consequently not come to know 
‘everything’, as a truly omniscient God would (though they would certainly leave 
the project significantly more informed than before). Secondly, such an experience 
would not truly transform its participants into Gods in any shape, way, or form. 
They would still remain ‘just as mortal’ as before, beset by all of life’s woes and 
tribulations (though their perspectives on said woes and tribulations would 
probably be significantly different now). Thirdly, since the specific purpose of the 
PIMASA is to advance a long-term ameliorative project by way of the overall moral 
valuation of the collection of states of affairs presently making up our world, the 
realizations arising from it would not impinge the same kind of fatalism as might 
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befall a lone ideal observer, seeking moral guidance in their everyday actions, 
when faced by seemingly insurmountable odds.250 
This being said, however, it is nevertheless necessary to concede the 
possibility that the empathic component of the omniscience-cum-omnipercipience 
pairing may, indeed, lead to some significant emotional trauma for the previously 
uninitiated.251 But this, in itself, does not really entail a wholesale crippling of 
moral sensibilities for the individuals involved, barring some significantly 
disturbing discovery along the way. Quite on the contrary, intense cathartic 
experiences, despite their unsettling qualities, can (if done right) actually lead to 
emotional (and hence, moral) erudition.252 The second major problem threatening 
participants in procedures for ideal observation is consequently not really a 
‘problem’ at all. 
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 This would remain the case, so long as the outcome of procedures for ideal observation itself does not 
also reveal fatalism regarding the present existence of morally heinous states of affairs! 
251
 Carson (1984: 65-66) examined this possibility of the omnipercipience condition causing an ‘emotional 
breakdown’ for an ideal observer, though he actually ends up seeing this as ultimately beneficial for them, 
in terms of a kind of ‘emotional erudition’ that it would eventually entail. Possible examples of this occurring 
(my examples) involve grasping, for the first time, the disturbing origins and circumstances surrounding such 
seemingly innocuous products as processed meat and ‘blood diamonds’. A pre-procedures for ideal 
observation individual may see their initial moral value as being quite high (after all, meat is tasty and 
nutritious and diamonds are ‘pretty’), but come to experience significant emotional trauma (and moral re-
evaluation) once they realize how these products are made and where they come from. It is both crucial, as 
well as disturbing, to recognize the fact that the same applies to the existence of very many of our products 
today. 
252
 This is also a claim upheld by many authors advocating the intelligence of emotions. 
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Disinterestedness and dispassionateness (impartiality) 
 
So much for the criticisms levelled against the first two conditions of ideal 
observation. The next two conditions, namely disinterestedness and 
dispassionateness, are a bit more complicated, insofar as the criticisms levelled 
against them also tend to be enmeshed in a number of misunderstandings 
regarding their meaning and intent. By beginning with a clarification of conditions 
three and four, we can therefore alleviate a significant portion of the scepticism 
surrounding them. 
The original intent of the conditions of disinterestedness and 
dispassionateness was to guard against the kind of partiality that may render an 
ideal observer’s judgments biased in an unacceptable manner.253 In this respect, 
both disinterestedness and dispassionateness can be understood as prerequisites 
towards achieving the general condition of ‘impartiality’, insofar as they have been 
formulated in an attempt to wholly support it. However, because of the apparently 
stoic implications of these two conditions, some authors have expressed concern 
that fulfilling them may also cause one to lose one’s humanity254, albeit for reasons 
quite opposite255 to the ones expressed in relation to the first two conditions of 
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 Not all bias is considered detrimental to fulfilling conditions of ideal observation. According to Carson 
(1984: 76-79), for example, only bias that skews an ideal observer’s judgment in favour of one’s selfish 
needs, at the expense of the well-being of others, is considered to be of an ‘unacceptable sort’. 
254
 Brandt (1955b: 411-412); Harrison (1956: 260); Bailiff (1964: 427) 
255
 Whereas it was previously argued that the omniscience-cum-omnipercipience conditions would cause 
one to lose one’s humanity in virtue of the individual becoming overwhelmed by emotional data, it is also 
believed that the conditions of disinterestedness and dispassionateness (on their stoic interpretation) pose 
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ideal observation. But this assumption betrays an erroneous understanding of 
them. These two conditions simply entail that an ideal observer cannot be 
subjected to situations where any unwarranted personal interest or emotive 
pressure would exist that would draw the ideal observer’s judgments away from 
assessing the moral value of states of affairs all things considered, towards 
formulating proposals that would actually benefit some individuals at the expense 
of others. They do not entail that the way to achieve this is for the ideal observer to 
somehow become effectively ‘numbed out’ or ‘desensitized’ to the emotive aspects 
that give meaning to human existence — for this would clearly violate the 
condition of omnipercipience which, it has been argued above, stands as a 
necessary partner to omniscience, in grasping the real moral impact that various 
states of affairs have on the world. This being said, however, it would probably be 
better to actually subsume disinterestedness and dispassionateness under the 
general overarching condition of ‘impartiality’ insofar as they exist as its genuine, 
albeit somewhat misleading, prerequisites. 
Fair enough, but what to make of this general overarching condition of 
impartiality then? For such a prima facie clear notion, it has attracted a significant 
amount of discussion, and many authors hold varying views regarding, not only 
it’s meaning256, but also its role257, as well as its feasibility258, as one of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
a similar risk, albeit this time by effectively numbing or locking out all emotional affects required for proper 
appraisal of the moral value of states of affairs, as they relate to human beings. 
256
 The general ambiguity surrounding this term, as well as the difficulties entailed by varying interpretations 
of it, have been observed by Bailiff (1964: 425-426), Schlecht (1971) and Dreier (1993: 29-30). Brandt (1959: 
174) suggests that it involves a ‘lack of involvement on the part of special individuals or groups in morally-
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conditions of ideal observation. Nevertheless, the extent to which so many cases of 
injustice have been linked to partial considerations by the parties involved, 
together with the concern that our various social institutions express in 
attempting to present themselves with an impartial image of fairness and equal 
consideration, serves as an indication of the profound importance that this notion 
does indeed hold for us, in our dealings with one another — whether this be in the 
context of ideal observer theory or not. How best to actually understand the 
condition of impartiality therefore has already been implied by my proposal for 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
laden situations’ (he writes “A person is ‘impartial” with respect to a particular reaction if the reaction is not 
influenced by the fact that some special individuals or groups are involved in the situation to which he is 
reacting”). Harrison (1971: 165-166) holds a pretty ‘standard’ definition of impartiality, comparing it with 
the idealized workings of a judge in a tribunal. Pollock (1986: 515) suggests that we understand it in terms of 
concrete vs. abstract thinking. Hence, when examining a concrete situation, we abstract away from it 
whatever may link it to us in any possible way. It is important to remark that, despite the differences 
amongst these various definitions, they all appear to converge on the central notion that impartiality entails 
the absence of any kind of favouritism towards any specific individual, beyond what is normally accorded to 
persons in terms of the dignity conveyed upon then by virtue of their humanity. 
257
 Carson’s case is somewhat peculiar. On the one hand, he initially denies that impartiality need constitute 
one of the conditions of ideal observation, and argues against Firth on this point. On the other, he suggests 
that one aspect in the fulfillment of conditions of ideal observation involves avoiding all cases of self-
deception, such as ‘emotional displacement’, ‘sour grapes’, or ‘making a virtue out of necessity’, for the 
obvious reason that these are all exemplars of potentially partiality-inducing phenomena (Carson (1984: 70-
75)). Furthermore, many of the other conditions of ideal observations related to impartiality discussed by 
Carson can be found in Firth’s formulation, despite him sometimes arguing against them (Taliaferro (1988: 
129-130)). This leads Carson to regret his earlier decision to argue against the need for impartiality (Carson 
(1984: 123-124)), by apparently failing to realize how strongly partiality can generate just the kind of 
emotional displacement which he himself cautions against (77-79). All in all, Carson’s bout with impartiality 
seems to rest more at the terminological than at the conceptual level, insofar as his writings betray a 
genuine concern for the problem that partiality causes for moral inquiry (Taliaferro (1988: 128-129)). 
258
 Walker (1991: 759, 62-63) believes this requirement places very heavy demands on the ideal observer 
(though she actually seems to be conflating the requirement of impartiality with all the other requirements 
of ideal observation). Following her criticism of the dehumanizing effects of omniscience, she proposes that 
alternative conceptions to the ideal observer, such as that of the disinterested judge or the third-person 
observer, can fulfill the requirement of impartiality (as understood by her) without ‘dehumanizing us’ in the 
process (pp. 768-70). Friedman (1989: 649-656) believes that, even given the desirability of this requirement, 
we have no sure-fire way of determining if it has ever been fully achieved, assuming it can ever be achieved 
to begin with (which she believes it cannot). Her proposed solution to this conundrum involves identifying 
the positively recognizable conditions of partiality (in order to try and avoid them, to the best of our 
abilities), as opposed to attempting a vague and general negative characterization of impartiality. 
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the preferred use of ideal observer theory, in terms of the realization of a PIMASA, 
in order to assess what states of affairs would constitute a morally preferable 
world. One immediately realizes that, under such a project, the first level of 
partiality is done away with, insofar as one is not forced to make ‘hard choices’ (as 
of yet, anyway), by being forced to face irresolvable moral dilemmas. This is not to 
say, however that partiality is thus fully done away with, insofar as complete 
removal of all partiality-inducing factors relies directly upon the actual 
effectiveness and efficiency of our procedures for ideal observation.259 And this 
brings us to another important concern, associated with the incorporation of this 
condition into a PIMASA. 
Actually achieving impartiality for individuals participating in procedures 
for ideal observation represents a whole challenge onto itself. Two possible 
avenues exist towards this goal. The first assumes an unavoidable corruptibility 
and essential selfishness to the individual, invariably requiring information 
hedging, in order that a fine balance be struck between all required data for 
achieving the omniscience-cum-omnipercipience conditions, all the while carefully 
avoiding exposing our ideal observers to the wrong type of data that would come 
to ‘tickle their selfish fancy’. Rawls’ original position, together with its veil of 
ignorance, is a prime example of a strategy based on this first avenue.260 The 
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 Various attempts can be made to sabotage the intended outcome of procedures for ideal observation. 
Examples of these can include incentives such as bribes or privileges, as well as coercion such as blackmail. 
These aspects are dealt with in chapter five. 
260
 In the case of Rawls’ proposal, there is some disagreement as to the amount of data that needs to be 
removed in order to reach impartiality. Hare (1973: 151-152) suggests that very much information can be 
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second avenue assumes that by simply realizing the conditions of omniscience-
cum-omnipercipience, this would itself be ‘sufficiently moving’ for the ideal 
observers, such that no actual information hedging (beyond the truncation 
required to make the data manageable) would be required to avoid the pull of 
partiality, due to selfish motives (the standard assumption under ideal observer 
theory). Which of these two strategies is the preferred one, however, remains to 
be seen. A decisive answer will need to base itself heavily on our knowledge of the 
features of human psychology, as well as on our organizational abilities at creating 
the kinds of conditions required to generate the impartiality sought by way of 
procedures for ideal observation. In any case, the significantly superior 
capabilities brought about by a PIMASA make the task of producing partiality-
alleviating conditions a much more attainable goal, when compared with cases of 
lone individuals attempting it for themselves. 
 
Consistency 
 
 Criticism of the next condition, namely that of consistency, can be done 
away with more readily than for the other conditions examined above. Because 
the general purpose of ideal observer theory is to offer an acceptable solution of 
many of our moral problems, it stands to reason that an ideal observer needs to be 
consistent in terms of their moral judgments. Some authors, however, have 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
retained, and only the crucial data allowing one to recognize one’s place in the world needs to be hidden 
(hence, only a very economical veil). 
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anticipated a possible lack of consistency, insofar as changing contexts may lead, 
even ideal observers, to come to value things differently than under other 
contexts.261 While this objection is directly consistent with what may occur for an 
ideal observer under the initially conceived goal of utilizing ideal observer theory 
as an everyday moral guide when faced with hard choices or irresolvable moral 
dilemmas, we have clearly seen that my suggested optimal use of ideal observer 
theory within a PIMASA largely does away with these problems. This being said, 
however, proper consideration of the consistency condition does hold some 
important normative consequences for the PIMASA. In particular, it serves to 
reinforce the need to fulfill the first two conditions of ideal observation 
adequately, insofar as each new assessment of each new state of affairs needs to 
be done in full cognizance of its complete impact on all other states of affairs, and 
vice-versa. In this respect, the PIMASA cannot function by way of an atomistic 
‘stacking’ of the moral valuation of each new state of affairs upon the others, as in 
doing so each new valuation may come to undermine the previous results. Rather, 
a PIMASA must invariably entail a holistic counter-examination of all pertinent 
states of affairs one against the other, such that a complete valuational result of all 
possible desirable states of affairs considered together come to be achieved. 
Naturally, this implies that, as new data emerges and flows into the PIMASA, the 
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 Harrison (1971: 170-171) envisages this possibility, and believes this to be one of the main reasons for 
rejecting ideal observer theory (p. 180). However, one realizes that Harrison’s reasoning is somewhat 
erroneous on this point, insofar as he fails to seize the extent to which the condition of omniscience actually 
serves to override the informational paucity which he takes to be a key cause for inconsistency. And he 
furthermore attempts to combine ideal observer theory with moral principles for everyday conduct, all the 
while failing to capture the problem of ‘hard choices’ or ‘irresolvable moral dilemmas’, which can, indeed, 
cause a semblance of inconsistency. 
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previously-determined moral value of many states of affairs may need to be 
reassessed, making the PIMASA a particularly intense, tedious, and ongoing 
project. But this is simply unavoidable, insofar as the requirement of consistency is 
a genuine condition of ideal observation, and insofar as it needs to be incorporated 
into the PIMASA, for it to be successful. 
 
Normality 
 
The ‘normality’ condition is probably the most difficult of all conditions of 
ideal observation to fulfill properly and without engendering unacceptable 
consequences. This condition harks back at the need for the ideal observer to be 
‘sufficiently human’, in order to understand the impact that various states of 
affairs have on our mortal existence. Regarding the ‘preservation of normality’, I 
have already discussed above how this condition can be maintained for 
participants in procedures for ideal observation, in my description of the realistic 
requirements for achieving omniscience and omnipercipience. This being said, 
however, any actual attempts at defining ‘normality’ need to be made with the 
utmost of care. To begin with, it has already been made clear that individuals who 
participate in procedures for ideal observation will not emerge truly ‘normal’ from 
the experience, insofar as their entire worldview, along with their complete set of 
moral values, may end up drastically different from that of pre-procedures for 
ideal observation individuals. But that is not the kind of ‘abnormality’ that we have 
in mind here, insofar as such individuals would still be physically and, in many 
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respects, psychologically the same as before, and would still be enmeshed in the 
social and cultural trials and tribulations of their daily lives. Rather, the kind of 
abnormality that usually worries proponents of ideal observer theory is the kind 
that would make a creature’s life ‘too unlike our own’ for said creature to 
understand the moral plight of our existence, even if this creature were to 
participate in procedures for ideal observation. Hence, Gods, Martians, and silicon-
based life-forms would probably count as such abnormal beings, whereas all 
members of the human race would not, so long as they could be attributed all 
required properties and characteristics, in order to be capable of understanding 
what it is like to live a full human life. 
The problem, however, resides with the fact that, even within the human 
community, there are significant observable differences. Certainly, we are all in 
many ways alike, but no standardized physical and psychological mean or average 
would do to define our ‘normality’, insofar as such a definition would be too 
culturally specific and too irrespective of the significant variety of conditions that 
otherwise ‘normal’ individuals experience throughout their lives, depending on 
such qualifiers as their age, gender, body build, socio-cultural and economic 
circumstances, natural perks and flaws, outcome of the natural lottery, and so on. 
In this respect, it would be more efficacious, following Carson, to drop the 
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‘normality’ condition altogether262, and replace it with another one, which I will 
call here the ‘humanity’ condition. 
Though this simple name change apparently brings little in the way of 
immediate benefits, its implications are considerable: requiring that an ideal 
observer be fully capable of understanding what it is like to be ‘human’ entails a 
complete comprehension of the aggregate conditions and possible combinations 
thereof, indicative of the complete diversity of all and any possible forms of human 
existence and experiences263, whereas requiring that an ideal observer be solely 
capable of understanding what it is like to be ‘normal’ would invariably force them 
to break it down to some standardized physical and psychological mean or 
average which, as I have explained above, will simply not do, insofar as it would 
violate the omniscience-cum-omnipercipience conditions. Therefore, it is highly 
important that participants in procedures for ideal observation be fully capable of 
fulfilling the condition of ‘humanity’, as I have explained it here.264 
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 These difficulties lead Carson (1984: 79-80) to discard the normality requirement from the list of 
conditions of ideal observation. 
263
 Note that in formulating the humanity requirement in this manner, said diversity implies the inclusion of 
disabled and malformed cases of human existence as well — a very important (and somewhat difficult) 
component if ideal observer theory is to be successful in providing a basis for the moral defence of the 
foundational project. The question of adequately addressing disability needs is a key aspect of the 
foundational project (and a significant basis for its critiques of resourcism and welfarism, as we will see in 
the next chapter), as explored in Nussbaum (2002a), Nussbaum (2003a), Nussbaum (2003b), Nussbaum 
(2006: §§ 2 & 3), Nussbaum (2007b). On this, see also Terzi (2005b), Terzi (2005a), and Khader (2008). 
264
 It is interesting to note that, in formulating the ‘humanity’ condition in this manner, this does not actually 
entail that the participants in procedures for ideal observation need be human, but only that they be 
capable of fully seizing what it is like to be fully human, and that their ‘inhumanity’ not prejudice, nor make 
them partial in any way, shape or form, in terms of the goals of PIMASA. However, since it is unlikely that we 
would come to see Gods, Martians, or silicone-based life-forms volunteer to partake in a PIMASA, I believe 
this worry can be ignored, for the most part. 
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Granted, some would argue that fulfilling this ‘humanity’ condition, as I 
have defined it above, is already, ipso facto, entailed by the omniscience-cum-
omnipercipience conditions above. In that case, iterating it here simply serves to 
clarify even further what is fully contained in these first two conditions of ideal 
observation. And, this being the case, the ‘humanity’ condition may even be 
dropped as a standalone condition of ideal observation, if all of its specific 
implications are truly fully subsumable under the omniscience-cum-
omnipercipience conditions. 
 
3.4 Criticism of the general appeal of ideal observer theory 
 
 The previous section served to illustrate how the various criticisms of the 
six standard conditions of ideal observation can be given a satisfactory rebuttal, 
and how much of this rebuttal rests with developing ideal observer theory’s 
conditions of ideal observation into procedures for ideal observation, to be utilized 
within a PIMASA. There remains one major overarching criticism of ideal observer 
theory, however, which requires our undivided attention. It is the problem of the 
original justification of ideal observer theory as an adequate standard for 
assessing the moral value of states of affairs. I stated at the beginning that 
conditions of ideal observation derive their appeal from the fact that they 
represent attempts at overcoming a variety of situations that are generally 
understood to undermine good moral judgment. But what warrants this appeal in 
the first place? Since it is believed that conditions of ideal observation place us in a 
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situation from where we can make good moral judgments, what allows us to 
assess and identify the reliability and effectiveness of these conditions in the first 
place? 
Two possibilities have been formulated in an attempt to answer this 
question — both of them highly problematic. The first possibility suggests that 
only ideal observers can fully warrant the validity of conditions of ideal 
observation. But this is hopelessly circular, insofar as it amounts to saying that 
ideal observers essentially end up validating themselves, in their own moral 
authority.265 The second possibility assumes that conditions of ideal observation 
can be validated by individuals who are not ideal observer. But this brings us right 
back to the problem of explaining how individuals who are not blessed with the 
powers of ideal observation can safely ascertain that conditions of ideal 
observation are, indeed, the correct path to moral enlightenment. If all they have 
going for them are moral intuitions (as opposed to actual moral judgements, which 
are only the purview of ideal observers), then how can they be sure of the quality 
(and hence, reliability) of their intuitions.266 In any case, we appear to be caught in 
a very real ‘catch-22’, from which no clear avenue of escape appears on the 
horizon. 
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 Henson (1956: 392, 394-395) takes this crucial realization to render Firth’s entire program “wrong in 
principle”. Harrison (1971: 152-154) expresses this circularity in a somewhat less convoluted fashion, and 
even believes it to give us sufficient grounds to ultimately reject ideal observer theory (178-179). This 
problem is also identified by Brandt (1979: 155, 227) and Tappolet (2000: 51). Note that the strategy of 
moral self-validation is a favourite amongst tyrants, who may claim that whatever they decree to be the law 
derives directly from them and them alone having attained conditions of ideal observation, and seen the 
‘eternal moral truth’: Henson (1956: 393-394); Bailiff (1964: 426-427). 
266
 See my discussion of the second strategy for reducing the informational requirements of the 
omniscience-cum-omnipercipience conditions in section 3.3 above, and its implications. 
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I will be the first to admit here that no clearly satisfactory solution exists to 
this problem. However, there is a strategy which holds some promise, in that it 
avoids the two extreme possibilities mentioned above, by focusing on a middle 
route. According to this strategy, moral erudition occurs as a gradual process, 
insofar as there exists a constant interplay between individuals acquiring more 
data, better cognitive and emotive skills, and their coming to realize just how 
important conditions of ideal observation are in being able to draw good moral 
judgments. This occurs because their personal improvements reflect an actual 
gradual semi-realization of conditions of ideal observation, as well as a clearer and 
better understanding of what is implied by such an attainment.267 Under this 
scenario, there is no solipsistic self-validation of conditions of ideal observation by 
the validator (which would understandably lead to suspicion of fraud or personal 
gain), and there is no attempted validation of conditions of ideal observation by 
‘fools’ (which would undermine the credibility of conditions of ideal observation). 
Moral erudition occurs progressively, whereby the outcomes, as well as the 
validity of the employed method, are both propped up by one another, and both 
gradually achieve better and greater levels of authority and success. 
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 Talbott (2005: 47-87) illustrates just how such a gradual process of moral erudition might occur, in his 
account of the meeting of two hypothetical characters, a Spanish conquistador and an American Native, 
whose tumultuous encounters and interactions eventually lead both to fill the voids in their respective 
worldviews, and correspondingly alleviate their respective moral blind spots, such that they both end up 
closer to the universal standpoint (i.e. the state of ideal observation) by the end. Furthermore, in discussing 
the origins of their blind spots, Talbott (68-75) also identifies a number of phenomena strikingly similar to 
the cases of self-deception discussed earlier, such as ‘sour grapes’ and ‘making a virtue out of necessity’, 
which have been clearly identified as amongst the many causes preventing one from adequately fulfilling 
conditions of ideal observation. 
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If the above strategy accurately reflects a general process of cognitive, 
emotional, as well as moral, erudition, then it also holds some important 
implications for the PIMASA, insofar as it implies that principles of ideal 
observation’ are not fixed and set in stone, but remain open to revision. Granted, 
some preliminary groundwork would need to be done in order to start off a 
PIMASA with the best understanding we have of the requirements needed to 
attain and maintain the good-running of procedures for ideal observation. But we 
should also build in a feedback-loop, so that individual participants in a PIMASA 
would also be capable of feeding any data pertaining to the best way to attain and 
maintain conditions of ideal observation back into the project itself. This would 
constitute a secondary function of the project, following its first and primary 
function, which would still remain the moral assessment of various states of 
affairs. Needless to say, all such feedback mechanisms would need to be fully 
shielded and duly guarded from the hazards of external as well as internal 
corruption of the project. 
 
3.5 Interpreting the probable outcomes of a PIMASA 
 
 In the previous sections, I have shown why it would be a good idea to utilize 
ideal observer theory’s conditions of ideal observation as principles of ideal 
observation’, by way of procedures for ideal observation, under a PIMASA, in order 
to assess the moral value of various states of affairs. I have argued that the variety 
of arguments formulated against ideal observer theory can either be done away 
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with by fully incorporating ideal observer theory into a PIMASA, or could 
eventually be done away with by following a number of promising additional 
investigative avenues that would need to be followed, in order that the meaning 
and scope of each of the six conditions of ideal observation be properly fleshed 
out. In passing, I have also made some important observations regarding the 
implications that my investigations would hold for some of the key characteristics 
of a PIMASA. 
For the time being, however, I will assume that the PIMASA is both 
realizable, as well as a good idea. What to make of the probable outcome of 
individuals participating in it? The problem is that, whereas disagreement 
amongst ideal observers was not initially envisaged by the original formulators of 
ideal observer theory268, it was soon demonstrated, by a number of authors269 that 
such a possibility needed to be seriously taken into account. Hence, a number of 
possible outcomes have come to be quite realistically anticipated for hypothetical 
participants in a PIMASA. Carson states them as follows: 
 
“(II) A Favorable moral judgment about something is correct for all 
human beings if and only if all human ideal observers would 
have a favorable attitude about it. An unfavorable moral 
judgment about something is true or correct for all human 
beings if and only if all human ideal observers would have an 
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 Firth (1952: 318-319) originally saw it this way, and maintained this view (Firth (1955: 414-420)), claiming 
that this was the reason for characterizing his analysis as ‘absolutist’, as opposed to ‘relativist’. 
269
 Brandt (1955b: 408) writes “The facts of ethnology and psychological theory suggest that there could 
(causally) be two persons, both “ideal observers” in Firth’s sense, who could have different or even opposed 
reactions (approval, experience, of apparent requiredness) with respect to the same act, say on account of 
past conditioning, a different system of desires, etc.” For later examples of ideal observers disagreeing, see 
Brandt (1959: 154, 175-176), Carson (1984: 51-56), Pollock (1986: 507), Tappolet (2000: 50-51). 
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unfavorable attitude about it. If all ideal observers would be 
indifferent to something, then it is correct (in a sense that is 
opposed to mistaken) for all humans to be indifferent to it. If 
different ideal observers would have conflicting attitudes 
about x, some having a favorable attitude about it, some 
having an unfavorable attitude, and others being indifferent, 
then there is no moral judgment about x that is correct for all 
human beings.”270 
 
What are we to make of these possible outcomes? There is an immediate 
interpretative difficulty regarding states of affairs upon which no final collective 
moral consensus can be reached, even under perfectly realized conditions of ideal 
observation. In such cases, if we are to follow Carson’s interpretation above, the 
best way to classify the value of such states of affairs is in terms of personal value-
judgments271, as opposed to actual overarching moral truths.272 For obvious 
reasons then, a PIMASA cannot emit policy recommendations regarding what 
ought to be done about states of affairs upon which no overlapping consensus of 
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 Carson (1984: 82-83) was the first to develop them in a clear and concise manner. For similar results, see 
also Lewis (1989: 114, 127-129). 
271
 Hence, what would be right for me may not be right for you, and what would be right for you I may be 
indifferent to, and so on, all in perfectly good legitimacy. 
272
 Carson makes the mistake of attributing the title of ‘moral-judgment’ to all of these possibilities, 
exposing him to charges of inconsistency — Gorr (1989: 111-116). This is because Carson (1984: 94-97, 104-
105, 121-131). goes on to argue that two or more ideal observers who disagree regarding the moral value of 
some state of affairs are all, in effect, ‘correct’ in terms of their moral judgments, from their respective 
points of view. In doing so, he effectively seeks to combine moral objectivity and absolutism (states of 
affairs upon whose value all ideal observer would converge) with relativism (states of affairs upon whose 
value various ideal observers would disagree) — Taliaferro (1988: 132-133). This inconsistency can be 
alleviated by following my suggestion here, that only judgments that have been shown to be universal (i.e., 
agreed upon by all ideal observers) deserve the true title of ‘moral judgment’, whereas all other judgments 
upon which no such consensus exists be relegated to the status of (personal) value-judgments, pending 
potential verification by way of a PIMASA. 
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this sort exists.273 However, this still leaves the PIMASA with the significant 
authority to produce imperatives in terms of what is to be done about each and all 
state of affairs upon which consensus has, indeed, been reached. Hence, while the 
realization of probable disagreement amongst ideal observers does indeed limit 
the effective scope of the PIMASA, it does not actually undermine its overall use as 
an optimal tool for practical application of the ideal observer theory. 
 A final precision ought to be made at this point. Each and all states of affairs 
benefiting from an overlapping consensus under a PIMASA, regarding its final 
moral value, can also be interpreted in terms of urgency. Urgency corresponds to 
the respective degree of desirability and undesirability that the collective moral 
assessment bestows upon each examined state of affairs. Hence, the more 
desirable a state of affairs, the more urgent the need to bring it about, improve or 
maintain it — whereas the more undesirable, the more urgent the need to prevent 
its appearance, to stifle or diminish it.274 Naturally, the pressings of urgency need 
to be counterbalanced with due consideration for the transitional problems that 
would be engendered by putting into practice a PIMASA’s policy recommendations 
regarding the state of affairs in question, as will be discussed in the last chapter. 
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 A practical example of this particularity in action is discussed briefly by Cameron (2000: 1041-1043), 
regarding what is to be done (if anything) at the upper end of income distribution. 
274
 This is discussed in significant depth by Scanlon (1975: 660-669). 
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3.6 Final assessment of the utility of ideal observer theory 
 
 The above discussion illustrates the fact that ideal observer theory, if it is 
properly incorporated into a seriously developed project for the assessment of the 
moral value of various states of affairs (as I have suggested that it can be, by way 
of the PIMASA), holds the promise of providing us with rather definitive and 
universal moral appraisals of at least some states of affairs, upon which 
participants in a PIMASA would converge, in terms of their resulting moral 
judgments. Such cases of ultimate convergence, or overlapping consensus, would 
hold the normative weight required for us to then recommend that present states 
of affairs be modified in order better to align them with the respective judgments 
of our ideal observers. Thus, once all transitional problems would be duly taken 
into account, we would have a sure-fire way of knowing what things we could 
safely alter in our world, in order to make it a morally better place. 
I will now examine, in the next sections of this chapter, how the variety of 
arguments for the moral preferability of the foundational project relate to ideal 
observer theory and to the PIMASA, and how said arguments could be respectively 
strengthened by better aligning them with the central tenets of ideal observer 
theory and of procedures for ideal observation. I will end with an assessment of 
the current state of moral desirability of the foundational project, followed by an 
informed guess as to its final probable moral value, once the particular state of 
affairs it proposes to bring about (universal distribution of central human 
capabilities) pass the scrutiny of an actual existing PIMASA. 
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3.7 Ideal observer theory and the many argumentative strategies 
available for moral justification of the foundational project 
 
 The foundational project proposes a unified answer to many moral 
questions posed within a number of distinct fields of research, having seen 
important development and attracted considerable attention in the last few 
decades. In particular, it claims that, once one adequately aggregates the questions 
examined in these fields, one will also arrive at the necessary conclusion that their 
combined resolution would entail bringing about a state of affairs equivalent, or 
very similar to, complete and global distribution of central human capabilities. 
While a thorough and optimal assessment of this claim would require running all 
salient data through a PIMASA, and is consequently significantly beyond the scope 
of this present text, a preliminary assessment of the argumentative strategies 
employed in defence of the foundational project will nevertheless allow us to gain 
a reasonably accurate glimpse at the probable outcome of such an endeavour. This 
is because the respective quality of the strategies involved can serve as a credible 
proxy for the end result — albeit this would still leave us with a highly informed 
guess, and not an actual final judgment of the overall moral value of the 
foundational project. But that is the best we can do right now, with what we have 
at our disposal. 
 The argumentative strategies in favour of the foundational project can be 
classified under three main headings. These are articulated chiefly by Sen and 
Nussbaum, but also by many other authors sympathetic to the foundational 
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project, or to the capabilities approach in general. Under the first heading, one 
finds strategies which attempt to ‘tacitly align’ our moral intuitions with the 
central tenets of the foundational project, by either causing us to fulfill, or 
convincing us of the need to fulfill, various conditions of ideal observation275, and 
then seeking to show that this would then cause us to morally endorse the 
foundational project.276 Under the second heading, one encounters four types of 
counterarguments levelled against the foundational project, as well as proposed 
rebuttals. These rebuttals are based on a twofold ‘give-and-take’ approach: (1) 
demonstrate that the formulators of these rebuttals fail to take into account 
crucial drawbacks and presuppositions in their argumentation (something whose 
importance becomes clear to any proponent of ideal observer theory); (2) concede 
important implications that their concerns nevertheless hold for the foundational 
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 This being said, these strategies do not explicitly invite us to fulfill conditions of ideal observation (their 
authors do not even mention ideal observer theory, or barely so), but what they propose essentially 
amounts to just that, as I will argue here. 
276
 In relation to this, it is somewhat difficult to anticipate accurately what Sen’s reaction to a proposed 
PIMASA would be — though it is fair to assume that it would probably involve a notable degree of sceptical 
weariness, if his previous writings are any clear indication (he rejected Nussbaum’s idea of a central 
capabilities list (Sen (1993a: 46-48); Sen (2004)), in favour of more ‘localized’ ones). This, however, betrays 
an inconsistency in Sen’s overall views, insofar as his writings also contain many discussions pertaining to 
the need to overcome specifically local or limited evaluative particularities (and their many causes), in order 
to arrive at an apparently universal moral assessment of the overall desirability of such things as human 
rights (Sen (1999: chapter 10)), and the overall undesirability of such conditions as poverty and famines (Sen 
(1982c); Sen (1984g); Sen (1984f); Sen (1999: chapter 4)) or family and gender-related causes of inequality 
(Sen (1984e); Sen (1984g); Sen (1984a); Sen (1985c); Sen (1990b); Sen (1999: chapter 8)). Therefore, if Sen 
truly does, in fact, tacitly endorse the need to realize something like conditions of ideal observation in 
overcoming the damaging and dangerous effects of parochialism, why does he also seem to reject (or at 
least remain silent regarding) the possibility of at least some moral values becoming universally agreed upon, 
even by all ideal observers, as per Carson’s hypothesis above? This topic has already been approached in a 
circumspect manner by Yamamori (2003) and, to be fair, Sen (2009: 44-46, 96-105, 108-109, 123-138, 155-
173) does discuss to great extent Adam Smith’s version of ideal observer theory in connection to the 
transcendental framework envisaged under Rawls’ contractarianism, but he ignores more recent work on 
this topic of the kind discussed here. Furthermore, he argues against the need for perfect justice in order to 
recognize blatant cases of injustice, though this possibility is refuted by Kamm (2011). 
117 
 
 
project, and for its moral justification. Under the third heading, one encounters 
strategies of a different nature, insofar as these seek to compare the capabilities 
approach (and, by extension, the foundational project) with resourcist and 
welfarist variants, and demonstrate that this approach is overall superior to these 
alternatives. In doing so, this third group of strategies attempts to win a kind of 
‘default judgment’ in favour of the capabilities approach, by illustrating that no 
presently existing alternative is superior to it. I will now assess each of these three 
groups of argumentative strategies in turn. 
 
3.8 Nussbaum’s four approaches to moral reasoning 
 
 Nussbaum’s many methods of moral argumentation have been carefully 
identified by Jaggar.277 More specifically, Nussbaum either employed or endorsed 
four actual approaches to moral reasoning in her various publications, in an 
attempt to justify the foundational project. These include the ‘Aristotelian 
approach’, the ‘narrative approach’, the ‘morally-constrained proceduralist or 
informed-desire approach’ and the ‘non-Platonist substantive-good approach’. 
 
The Aristotelian approach 
 
 The Aristotelian approach appears in Nussbaum’s earlier works, where she 
performs the preliminary groundwork pertaining to her theory, and where her 
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discussions are still strongly enmeshed in Aristotelian thought.278 The specific 
purpose of this approach involves overcoming parochial and limited points of view 
(i.e. beliefs), in order that the all-important question of ‘what makes us human’ be 
given a satisfactory answer — the idea being that, once this question is adequately 
resolved, the answer can then be utilized in order to determine what form of 
political organization for human beings is optimally aligned with the generalized 
attainment of eudemonia for all. Since it is usually agreed that parochialism, 
informational paucity, and limited access thereto, are nefarious to the 
accomplishment of this task at hand, this is to be corrected “by examining a wide 
variety of self understandings of people in many times and places.” 279 
Furthermore, any error or malformation pertaining to the information at hand is 
to be corrected by making use of Aristotelian practical reasoning, or “the exchange 
of reasons and arguments by human beings within history”, aimed at correcting 
the reliability of beliefs by way of critical refinement.280 Though Nussbaum initially 
placed great hopes in the ability of this approach at morally justifying her theory, a 
number of severe flaws have been identified in its actual abilities at reaching this 
intended goal.281 First, the approach begins, not with information whose accuracy 
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 Nussbaum (1988); Nussbaum (1990b); Nussbaum (1991); Nussbaum (1993); Alexander (2008: chapter 6). 
The ‘Aristotelian approach’ is discussed in Nussbaum (1992) and in Nussbaum (1998) specifically. 
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 Nussbaum (1992: 215) 
280
 Ibid (213); Jaggar (2006: 305) 
281
 Benhabib (1995: 254-255); O'neill (1995: 144-145); Qizilbash (1996a: 150-151); Ackerly (2000: 102-110); 
Clark (2002: chapter 3); Jaggar (2006: 305-306). Furthermore, Ackerly (2000: 102-103, 105), following 
Williams (1995a: 194-202) and Wolf (1995: 107-110), also argues that Nussbaum’s particularly ‘convenient’ 
interpretation of the Aristotelian approach allows her to ‘slip in’ her own culturally-specific views (including 
her liberal values) into her capabilities approach, and then claim that “her values are foundational for 
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and reliability is already verified and fully ascertained, but rather with ‘deep 
beliefs’ (i.e., deeply engrained ideas), whose ‘deep-seatedness’ (rigidity) implies no 
guarantee whatsoever that they be accurate and error-free.282 Second, no true 
provision is made under the approach for complete collection of all salient 
information pertaining to the task at hand.283 Third, the approach proposes no 
safeguards against misreading and misinterpretation of the collected information 
in question.284 Fourth, the approach seems to overlook or ignore the infamous ‘is-
ought’ problem, as it applies to its underlying chief premise.285 Hence, while some 
authors have suggested that such an approach, once fully developed, could 
potentially be successful286, it appears that the Aristotelian approach, as it 
presently stands, is too severely flawed as a tool to help morally justify 
Nussbaum’s theory. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
ethics”. She does this in a way which is, in fact, consistent with the Aristotelian approach (according to 
Ackerly), making this approach’s legitimacy highly doubtful, as per its intended role. Finally, Wallach (1992: 
628) similarly claims that Nussbaum effectively ‘dehistoricizes’ and ‘depoliticizes’ Aristotle’s actual ethical-
political views, to make them compatible with her own. 
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 Ackerly (2000: 103-104) 
283
 Ibid (109) 
284
 Ibid (104-106) 
285
 Indeed, the problem with ‘Aristotelian essentialism’ (on which the approach is based) is that such 
essentialism, if it were to be accurately discovered, does not suffice to transform said discovery into a 
normative proposal in itself — that is, unless the normative component is somehow contained and derived 
from reasoning aspects inherent to this essentialism in question (see Watson (1990), Williams (1995a) and 
Alexander (2005) on this important topic). Nussbaum is not entirely clear on this aspect of her approach. 
286
 Alkire and Black (1997) argue that the Aristotelian approach can be refined by drawing on Finnis' broadly 
parallel ethical system, in order to develop it in a manner so as to avoid these specific problems. Moody-
Adams (1998) provides us with arguments for how this may be accomplished, together with a general 
defence of Nussbaum’s overall use of Aristotle. Nussbaum (2000c: 108-124) attempts to address some of 
these concerns in a particularly long and dense article. Finally, Jaggar (2006: 306) writes “It may be possible 
to develop the Aristotelian method so as to avoid these problems but Nussbaum does not address this in 
her more recent work; instead she suggests several alternative approaches to moral reasoning.” 
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The narrative approach 
 
The narrative approach is intended to emphasize “the political importance 
of the imagination and the emotions”287. It involves narrating accounts of various 
people’s lives, in order that their experiences come to be shared by us, through 
imagination, in the most vivid and accurate manner possible. In this respect, it is 
clear that this is not really an actual approach to moral reasoning per se. 
Nevertheless, it serves a very important heuristic function, insofar as it can be 
utilized as a tool for information gathering, sharing and distribution that may then 
be used by other approaches better to morally defend Nussbaum’s theory. 
Furthermore, this approach promises to be particularly efficacious in its ‘support 
role’, insofar as it can convey information about the experiences of others quite 
effectively (by way of the written word, as opposed to having lived the actual 
experience), with great efficiency (by way of electronic means of communication 
and distribution), and with ‘great empathic vivacity’ (depending, naturally, on the 
imaginative and representative abilities of the reader). However, there are a 
number of serious caveats associated with this approach. Mainly, the potential for 
information alteration — whether by way of misinterpretation, 
miscommunication, or even disinformation — is great. As a highly pertinent 
example, consider that Nussbaum devoted a significant portion of her Women and 
Human Development to this method, whereby she “… introduces readers to two 
poor Indian women, Vasanti and Jayamma, returning to them constantly and 
                                                             
287
 Nussbaum (2000e: 15) 
121 
 
 
seeming to confirm her ideas about human capabilities against their 
experience.”288 Upon reading this, one cannot but feel suspicious regarding the 
actual objectivity of the accounts conveyed thereby. And Nussbaum has, in fact, 
been criticized by Okin and others, on grounds that the accuracy with which the 
life experiences of these two women have been conveyed has been altered by her 
own interpretative biases (whether intentional or not), stemming from her 
cultural background, and clear stake in ‘finding’ in their stories some support for 
defending her theory.289 Nevertheless, it is important to point out that this 
observation does not invalidate the utility of the narrative approach per se, so long 
as such clear cases of biased reporting are kept properly in check.290 However, it 
shows that its actual use by Nussbaum thus far, in an attempt to help morally 
defend her theory, is rather dubious at best.291 
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The morally-constrained proceduralist or informed-desire approach 
 
The morally-constrained proceduralist or informed-desire approach  
appeared as the result of Nussbaum (and many others) recognizing the significant 
problem that uninformed, unreliable, unstable, or ‘offensive’ desires can play in 
moral reasoning. This made her “reluctant to rely on “preference based” 
approaches to moral reasoning, which validate moral claims and principles by 
reference to existing desires.”292 However, it is also clear that preferences and 
desires cannot be fully done away with, if we are to make any sense of moral 
reasoning at all. For this reason, Nussbaum sought to accept some reference to 
desires in her moral reasoning, though proposing that said preferences and 
desires be ‘filtered’ by way of an approach that would seek to eliminate corrupt or 
mistaken ones.293 How such an approach is practically intended to function, 
however, is left rather nebulous by Nussbaum.294 She draws her inspiration from 
well know philosophers, whose methods vary considerably, without making clear 
how their views are supposed to square together into a unified conception of this 
approach.295 Furthermore, Nussbaum, is rather unconvinced by the effectiveness 
of this approach at fulfilling its goal, and believes that it “provides some “limited 
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and ancillary” support for the capabilities” at best.296 Given these reservations, she 
prefers to ‘place her bets’ on the ability of the next approach (the non-Platonist 
substantive-good approach) at morally justifying her theory. 
This being said, Nussbaum’s lack of faith in this approach is ill founded, 
insofar as the worries she expresses regarding its abilities are premature.297 The 
actual source of these worries is made clear by Jaggar: Nussbaum’s liberal 
convictions (following Rawls) lead her not to want to cut off all people’s 
preferences and desires at the onset from participation in moral discourse, despite 
some of them being very likely corrupted and nefarious to moral inquiry. She 
therefore hopes that, by implementing her theory first, the amount of problematic 
desires will drop overtime298, and that this will allow people to draw better 
judgments about what political system they would truly prefer (namely, one 
incorporating her central capabilities)299. But then, moral justification for her 
theory would already need to be achieved at some other level, before it could do 
the job of ‘cleaning up’ problematic preferences and desires to begin with — a job 
for which Nussbaum believes the non-Platonist substantive-good approach is 
better suited. Nevertheless, Jaggar points out that more sophisticated versions of 
proceduralism promise to accomplish this task without the need for 
implementation of her theory beforehand, or reliance on another approach 
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altogether. In particular, this could be done by articulating a number of methods 
for weeding out problematic desires or preferences, within specifically delimited 
activities of public discussion.300Furthermore, Nussbaum’s additional reason for 
distrusting proceduralism on grounds that this method is not 100% foolproof is 
likewise no legitimate reason, insofar as no method for moral inquiry is 100% 
foolproof, and sufficient reliability is all that’s really needed (and all that we really 
have, in the end) to get us going.301 Ultimately, Jaggar points out that the morally-
constrained proceduralist or informed-desire approach is, in fact, the most 
tangible of the four options proposed by Nussbaum thus far.302 
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The non-Platonist substantive-good approach 
 
 The final approach, and the one Nussbaum places the most faith in303, is also 
the most problematic. This approach seeks to justify the foundational project by 
appeal to our collective understanding of the human condition, arising from a 
conception of truly human functioning that we (apparently) all share, itself arrived 
at by a state of reflective equilibrium reached between our political principles and 
our most ‘secure intuitions’.304 This makes this approach a version of intuitionism, 
and Nussbaum’s use of intuitionism is highly problematic, as we will now see. 
Firstly, as discussed in section 3.3 above, intuitions are inherently inferior 
to actual judgments, insofar as they essentially constitute an ‘informed guess’, 
regarding some state of affairs, as opposed to a ‘clear idea’.305 Secondly, the non-
Platonist substantive-good approach starts off with what Nussbaum calls our most 
‘secure intuitions’. What makes these intuitions ‘secure’ however is by virtue of 
people refining their initially naïve intuitions until they reach a state of reflective 
equilibrium or mutual consistency.306 This leads to the following problem: 
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“Establishing that a set of intuitions or preferences is in 
balance shows only that the set is internally coherent. Unless the 
individual or group creating the set has considered all available 
intuitions, it remains possible that anomalous intuitions may have 
been excluded or that other equilibria, expressing alternative moral 
perspectives, may exist. Since the reflective equilibrium approach 
offers no guidelines for preferring one of these possible alternative 
equilibria to the others, it does not dispel the specters of 
subjectivism, if the coherent set of intuitions is held by an individual, 
or of relativism, if the set is held by a community.”307 
 
Thirdly, Nussbaum further compounds the problem by stating that not all 
intuitions ought to be incorporated, because she distrusts some of them. In that 
case, what allows her to choose which ones are ‘reliable’ and which one ‘aren’t’? 
Apparently, ‘reliable intuitions’ are those held by people who share the views 
advanced by her foundational project — making this a blatant case of circular self-
validation.308  Nussbaum attempts to avoid this problematic conjuncture by 
alleging that the views expressed in the foundational project have already been 
‘validated’ by very many people around the world.309 However, if such a state of 
collective validation truly does exist (a proposition examined in section 3.9 
below), it would still need to be made on proper grounds, in order for Nussbaum 
to avoid making a mere argumentum ad populum. And if this turns out to not really 
be the case after all, can the non-Platonist substantive-good approach actually 
                                                             
307
 Ibid (315-316). This is further developed by Drydyk (2011: 47-51). 
308
 Nussbaum (2000e: 149); Mcreynolds (2002: 148-149); Jaggar (2006: 316-320) points out that “Ultimately, 
Nussbaum’s test for determining whether or not a desire is informed seems to be precisely whether or not it 
can be interpreted as a desire for one of the items on her list.” This is also remarked by Skerker (2004: 
391n35), with regards to religiously-minded individuals and the automatic disregard of their more 
‘incompatible’ preferences by Nussbaum’s approach. 
309
 Nussbaum (2000e: 115) 
127 
 
 
allow for individualized validation of the foundational project? Here I side with 
Jaggar’s final conclusion that this approach is seriously inadequate as an 
independent method for moral validation of the foundational project. This is 
because, if interpreted correctly by Jaggar and its other critics, it truly does end up 
serving the significantly illiberal role of allowing philosophers to attribute to 
themselves the power to validate only those views that are in accordance with 
their own theories, under the disguised cloak of some additional ‘objective’ 
justificatory criteria.310 
This troubling conclusion notwithstanding, is there still something that can 
be salvaged from the non-Platonist substantive-good approach, in helping to 
morally defend the foundational project? Not much, upon close examination. As 
mentioned before, the idea of utilizing intuitions for moral justification (even 
‘refined’ or ‘secured’ ones) is problematic, insofar as the authority of intuition-
based moral views is directly proportional to the actual quality of the underlying 
intuitions in question. Such intuitions, if we are to make effective use of them, 
consequently need to be ‘optimised’, requiring verificatory procedures stretching 
well beyond the individually attainable state of internal consistency, reached by 
way of reflective equilibrium. In fact, as Jaggar rightly points out: 
 
“…unless the process is also intersubjective and inclusive, the 
nonplatonist substantive-good approach will manifest the same 
defect as the Aristotelian approach, namely, the defect that 
Habermas calls “monologism.” Insofar as the non-platonist 
substantive-good approach lacks both a requirement that 
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philosophers check their own intuitions against those of non-
arbitrarily selected others and a procedure to ensure that this 
checking is done fairly, it is unable to assure philosophers that they 
are not projecting their own ideas on to other people and simply 
rationalizing their own pre-existing values.”311 
 
 We can thus safely say that the best possible defence of the foundational 
project would eventually need to move beyond making use of intuitions at all, 
towards actual judgments or ‘clear ideas’ about what we are talking about, and 
that this invariably requires proper hedging against the enchanting allure of 
monological justificatory methods and their corresponding siren calls. Though 
internal data-processing is a necessary and clearly respected aspect involved in 
drawing moral judgments, the need to maintain due contact with the community 
of others and with the objective world can never be underestimated, nor 
overlooked, less we fall into the trappings of solipsism. 
 
Nussbaum’s four approaches accurately reflect all concerns 
proper to ideal observer theory 
 
My discussion of Nussbaum’s four approaches to moral reasoning above 
illustrates the fact that they all arose out of a number of concerns held by her, 
regarding the variety of ways in which moral reasoning can go astray. The 
Aristotelian approach draws our attention to the important fact that a proper 
understanding of the nature of our human condition is an unavoidable (and quite 
natural) prerequisite to us being able to determine how we ought to organize 
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ourselves together, in order for each of us to be able to reach eudemonia or ‘the 
good life’, in the variety of ways in which this can be accomplished for various 
individuals. This approach also reflects (though somewhat crudely) that this 
invariably requires some aspects of data gathering and verification amongst 
ourselves. The narrative approach picks up on this need for data recording and 
sharing, suggesting that literary devices can be an efficient and effective means of 
achieving this. The morally-constrained proceduralist or informed-desire 
approach is the first approach on the list taking a truly ‘direct stab’ at the 
significant problem of faulty data, suggesting, not only that this problem needs to 
be addressed by correcting the data in question, but also that this requires 
designing and undertaking discursive projects amongst ourselves, intended to 
effectively protect us, as well as the process at hand, from a variety of nefarious 
influences (inequality, self-interest, bullying, coercion, etc.) that may all conspire 
to sabotage it. Finally, the non-platonist substantive-good approach illustrates a 
misguided attempt to overcome the same essential worries that have prompted 
Nussbaum’s articulation of the morally-constrained proceduralist or informed-
desire approach in the first place, and its mistakenly preferred role for Nussbaum 
stems from a combination of her misinterpretation of the true abilities of the 
morally-constrained proceduralist or informed-desire approach, together with her 
failure to realize the problematic ways in which the non-platonist substantive-
good approach can actually serve to self-validate one’s own unproven moral 
intuitions. 
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An examination of the respective failings and drawbacks of these four 
approaches is also highly instructive. The Aristotelian approach is beset by 
inadequate and insufficient requirements for data gathering, together with 
ineffective means for filtering out the good data from the bad. The idea behind the 
narrative approach is commendable, though it needs to be used with caution, in 
order to avoid misinterpretation, misreading, or personal goals corrupting the 
processes of data recording and transmission. The only true flaws in the morally-
constrained proceduralist or informed-desire approach are those related directly 
to the natural limitations of the discursive procedures required by it, and their 
corresponding abilities at sharing and conveying unbiased objective data. Finally, 
the non-platonist substantive-good approach fails in virtue of it actually violating 
all of the concerns which prompted Nussbaum’s articulation of these four 
approaches to begin with. 
A closer look at these concerns also reveals that they bear a striking 
similarity to conditions ~1 to ~6 enumerated in section 3.1 above. In this respect, 
Nussbaum’s articulation of her four approaches reflects an actual tacit attempt to 
convince us of the need to fulfill conditions of ideal observation, in order that we 
may see that the foundational project is, indeed, morally justified. To illustrate that 
this is so, consider the following formalization of Nussbaum’s overall arguments 
for the moral defence of the foundational project, and its connection to the six 
conditions of ideal observation: 
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I. First of all, we need to be able to understand our humanity 
(condition 6). 
II. To understand our humanity, we need to gather clear and accurate 
data regarding it, to the full extent of saliency (conditions 1 & 2). 
III. To gather clear and accurate data to the full extent of saliency, we 
need to share, parse, verify and filter it through and through, to make 
sure that it makes sense and that it holds together (condition 5). 
IV. To be able to share, parse, verify and filter our data through and 
through, we also need to make sure that our methods allow for 
optimal data flow, all the while safeguarding against all 
contingencies and nefarious influences that may damage, usurp, 
corrupt or nullify the process at hand (conditions 3 & 4). 
 
Taking all this into account, I conclude that it would be significantly more 
effective and promising for Nussbaum to actually argue for moral justification of 
the foundational project along the lines of ideal observer theory, by running it 
through a PIMASA, as described above, as opposed to arguing in a somewhat dis-
unified manner along four distinct strategies, each beset by its own specific 
problems and drawbacks. This would not entail discarding these four strategies at 
all, as she could simply strip each of them down to its bare-boned essentials, so 
that all positive aspects of each that are found to be favourably conducive to the 
realization of procedures for ideal observation be incorporated into an actual 
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PIMASA, and all negative aspects naturally discarded. This would give a notably 
greater unity and flow to the overall moral justification of the foundational project 
than what presently exists in terms of isolated discussions revolving around these 
four strategies above. 
 
3.9 Has the foundational project already been morally justified? 
 
 Nussbaum’s defence of the foundational project employed two more 
strategies worth reviewing. The first strategy involved claiming that the views 
expressed in the foundational project have, in fact, already been largely ‘validated’ 
by very many people around the world.312 When this proved to be too strong an 
assertion to make, however313, she ‘toned it down’, arguing instead that there are 
good reasons for believing that the foundational project could eventually be 
globally validated in the future. On the face of it, both these strategies appear to 
offer little additional support, insofar as ‘appeal to popularity/belief’ is a poor 
argumentative basis in itself for defending one’s views. But there is naturally more 
at stake here than just a mere case of argumentum ad populum, seeing as how the 
underlying idea is not only that most people did/would agree with the 
foundational project, but also that it was/would be for good reasons. As a matter of 
fact, the possibility of a global overlapping consensus on the moral desirability of 
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the foundational project constitutes a crucial aspect of one being able to defend it 
adequately, as I will explain shortly. In the meantime, however, I will examine the 
tangibility of Nussbaum’s first claim, regarding an already existing consensus of 
this sort. 
Upon close examination, there is no conclusive evidence that anything like a 
global overlapping consensus on the moral desirability of the foundational project 
presently exists. The first clue comes from the fact that there is presently not even 
a consensus regarding the items to be included on the list, even amongst 
proponents of a universal capabilities list (the core aspect of the foundational 
project), let alone other highly learned and well-respected individuals.314 The 
second clue comes from the fact that, if such a consensus is to arise by way of 
adequate procedures for public discourse (for it to be legitimate), then one needs 
to make sure that all aspects of these procedures have been duly implemented, 
checked and verified. This entails the impartial inclusion of all participants who 
have something pertinent to say. Whereas Nussbaum certainly claims that her list 
is derived from drawing “both on the results of cross-cultural academic discussion 
and on discussions in women’s groups themselves designed to exemplify certain 
values of equal dignity, non-hierarchy, and nonintimidation”315, she also admitted 
that her discussions required interlocutors to speak a ‘common language’ (a 
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perfectly reasonable assumption). However, this is especially problematic in light 
of the significant disparity between Nussbaum and the many poor Indian women 
interviewed by her, who allegedly ‘agreed’ with the items on her list, as well as the 
many other unexamined individuals who may have had something important to 
contribute, but who were left out because of ‘incompatibility’ of just this sort, 
making achieving a ‘common language’ especially difficult. This leads us to 
question who was really chosen to participate in these conferences and for what 
reasons?316 
The third clue comes from the fact that the crucial requirements of equality, 
fairness and non-coercion, characteristic of good proceduralism, have simply not 
been achieved in the projects in which she participated. This leaves one doubting 
whether the answers given by the other ‘less powerful, influential and 
authoritative’ participants at the conferences were not, in some way, staged, 
prepared in advance, or given under duress.317 The fourth clue comes from the fact 
that Nussbaum’s interlocutors were simply not provided with the same kind of 
information, time, means and resources that she and other researchers and 
philosophers had at their disposal to thoroughly analyze and assess the overall 
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desirability of something as complex as the foundational project. While this does 
not invalidate the pertinence of the somewhat ‘parochial’ points of view of these 
interlocutors for the discussions at hand (they still had genuine experiences and 
concerns to bring to the table), it does lead one to question the actual capacities 
that were made available to them, in order to fully and clearly assess all of the 
distinct implications of the foundational project, before (allegedly) giving it the 
‘stamp of approval’. The fifth and final clue comes from the already discussed fact 
that Nussbaum reserved for herself the ultimate authority to decide what goes on 
the capabilities list and what doesn’t — exposing her to the criticisms examined 
above, relating to her preferred use of the non-Platonist substantive-good 
approach.318 
These five clues above serve as a clear indication that there is presently no 
global overlapping consensus regarding the moral value of the foundational 
project. The importance of reaching such a future consensus is undeniable 
however, insofar as it would grant the authority needed for the foundational 
project to be backed with the complete powers of the state and various other local 
and international agencies and institutions. This is because such a consensus, so 
long as it arose out of a legitimate process (such as the PIMASA), would equate 
with the highest and most respectable moral judgment possible, namely one 
passed by all ideal observers and agreed upon by all of them, as per Carson’s 
interpretation in section 3.5 above. Importantly, such a consensus would not 
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actually imply a direct unanimous agreement by everyone, but rather a direct 
agreement only by those who have participated in a PIMASA, followed by an 
indirect agreement (by way of deference to the decision of the PIMASA 
participants) by all others. Indeed, the idea that all could simultaneously agree on 
such a thing as the foundational project is highly dubious and unrealistic, for 
obvious reasons: (Putnam 2008: 385-387). Use of a PIMASA as an intermediary 
step thereto is therefore a more realistic approach. 
The actual evidence for the possibility of such a global consensus being 
reached in the future will be examined in the last section of this chapter. In the 
meantime, however, we need to look carefully at one more strategy for the moral 
defence of the foundational project. It involves considering the implications of four 
counterarguments formulated against it. 
 
3.10 Four counterarguments to the foundational project 
 
 Nussbaum’s defence of the foundational project also involved formulating 
rebuttals against four ‘relativistic’319 counterarguments to her theory. These 
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include the charges of imperialism and paternalism, and the arguments from 
diversity and culture.320 
 
The charge of imperialism 
 
The charge of imperialism claims that the foundational project is nothing 
more than a form of neo-colonialism, bringing in distinctly foreign ideas and 
values, simply unsuited to another culture, and (possibly) attempting to slip on a 
new noose of oppression or class domination on the indigenous population, by 
proposing an appealing yet wholly inadequate ethical-political theory of the 
good.321 The first claim behind this argument, namely the importation of foreign 
ideas and values, can be done away with rather swiftly, by pointing out that many 
of these allegedly ‘western’ concepts are not truly western at all, and can be found 
in many of the colonized cultures, sometimes at an earlier date and at a higher 
degree of development than in the West.322 Furthermore, one can also point out 
that such ‘anti-western rhetoric’ is a favourite amongst political regimes and 
various groups that have a vested interest in resisting the importation or 
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appearance of any ideas that would undermine their power and privileges.323 
Therefore, the charge of imperialism, while stemming from a genuine worry (given 
the West’s colonial past), actually starts off with highly dubious premises, and 
moves towards an even more dubious conclusion, given a proper historical and 
contextual understanding of the real ‘multicultural origins’ of the constitutive 
ideas behind the foundational project. 
 
The charge of paternalism 
 
The charge of paternalism states that (reasonable) people can make up 
their own minds about what is good for them, and that a theory such as the 
foundational project, which imposes a universal core of human capabilities on 
them (whether they want it or not), shows a lack of respect for their autonomy as 
free and responsible agents in the world. Nussbaum shows some uneasiness when 
dealing with this argument, arguing on the one hand for the many ways in which 
the foundational project, by distributing central human capabilities for all, actually 
improves and augments their powers of personal autonomy, while on the other 
illustrating how critics of the foundational project’s paternal implications are often 
themselves steeped in cultures and traditions that are highly paternal, and where 
they often tend to have vested interests in the preservation of these paternalistic 
tendencies in question.324 This uneasiness stems (as discussed in section 3.8 
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above) from the tension Nussbaum experienced between her strong liberal values, 
emphasizing an important place for personal autonomy and freedom of choice, 
and her realization of just how intertwined said ‘choice’ can be with preferences 
and desires that are highly problematic in themselves, due to many of them 
appearing under the influence of psychological mechanisms for adaptation to 
circumstances that are otherwise widely recognizable as rather nasty and 
nefarious to good human living.325 
From a strictly technical point of view, the argument from paternalism 
starts off with the flawed premise that many individuals and groups truly are in a 
position of complete (or at least sufficient) competence in order to be capable of 
formulating for themselves a comprehensive doctrine of the good that ought to be 
respected by others and by the state. Notwithstanding the fact that a significant 
degree of autonomy and freedom of choice in making life decisions constitutes a 
perfectly acceptable opportunity to be granted to fully-mature and responsible 
adults, the fact that such freedom requires some hedging is an unavoidable and 
likewise perfectly understandable reality of social life and the world we live in.326 
Therefore, so long as proper safeguards are kept in place to ensure that arguments 
for paternalism are not employed as simply another tool for raw political 
domination over others327, there is truly no valid reason to claim that a moderate 
and reasonable form of paternalism, such as the one entailed by the foundational 
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project, somehow offends the genuine autonomous rights of various and diverse 
peoples and groups in unacceptable ways.328 The underlying objective, once again, 
is to find a happy balance between excessive state interference and control, 
leading to injustice and tyranny, and letting everyone run wild with what they 
believe they ought to be left free to do.329 In light of this, arguing against the 
foundational project simply by appealing to one’s right to self-determination on 
nebulous grounds is a poor argument indeed. To be successful, the charge of 
paternalism needs to demonstrate clearly and thoroughly: (1) why one’s 
autonomy rights as delineated are indeed valid; (2) on what grounds they are 
valid, and; (3) how implementing the foundational project would violate them in 
unacceptable ways. So far, despite some genuine concerns relating to the very real 
possibility of the foundational project ‘running amok’, nothing like this has been 
successfully achieved. 
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 Deneulin (2002: 516-517). Note that this still leaves unresolved the thorny issue of determining what is 
truly constitutive of ‘human autonomy’ (personal, collective or otherwise), given the important 
metaphysical and normative presuppositions entailed by this term, making an unambiguous and trouble-
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possible partial, albeit normative and non-metaphysical theory of autonomy, insofar as concrete central 
human capability distribution simultaneously provides both the material from which to function in an 
autonomous fashion, together with a specific restrictive space within which said functioning can come to be 
exercised. The bicycle riding example from the previous chapter, together with its scope of multiple 
realizability, as transferred over onto Nussbaum’s list of central human capabilities, illustrates what such 
‘central human capability autonomy’ would practically consist in. On the role of personal autonomy in 
Nussbaum’s foundational project, see also Dorsey (2008: 434-440), Alkire (2005a) and Hinchliffe (2009). This 
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The argument from culture 
 
The argument from culture claims that suitable norms for living worthwhile 
lives that are fundamentally incompatible with the foundational project can be 
found around the world. If these norms truly are ‘suitable’ and truly are 
‘fundamentally incompatible with the foundational project’, then we have a big 
problem on our hands, insofar as we would be forced to admit that there are many 
states of affairs that can all be wholly morally adequate (one involving the 
foundational project), yet mutually exclusive.330 However, the evidence for this is 
shaky at best. Nussbaum goes to significant lengths to illustrate how many of these 
norms are steeped in thick layers of cultural oppression, power struggles and 
vested interests, and how their alleged ‘goodness’ is often claimed by those who 
benefit from their existence, as opposed to those who find themselves at the ‘short 
end of the stick’, so to speak.331 Furthermore, she points out that cultures are a 
dynamic and ever-changing phenomenon, and not a static force immune to 
external and internal influences and shifts in perspective, despite the efforts of 
some to try and make it so.332 Therefore, any ‘argument from culture’ would be 
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highly dubious, insofar as there are no truly distinct, separate and isolated cultures 
around the world anymore, and none that reflect customs and practices that are 
eternally fixed in time.333 And even if there were, one would still need significantly 
better grounds for justifying the legitimacy of their various norms in allowing one 
to construct ‘equally-valid comprehensive theories of the good’, than mere 
references to tradition, religion or culture, or some such other forms of appeal to 
authority.334 
 
The argument from diversity 
 
 The argument from diversity is closely related to the one from culture, 
insofar as it stems from the belief that there is genuine intrinsic worth in the 
cultural diversity encountered around the world today, and that stifling this 
diversity, as would be invariably entailed by the constraints set forth in bringing 
about the foundational project, is simply indefensible.335 Two replies can be given 
to this argument. First of all, though the concerns raised by the effacement of 
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cultural diversity by the processes of globalization are quite genuine, it is highly 
irresponsible to argue for a merely blindsided preservation of said diversity, 
without due examination of the respective value of each of its constitutive 
practices and customs. As with the rebuttal to the argument from culture above, 
just because some practices or customs arose and exist today, does not mean that 
they should continue to do so into the future.336 Secondly, as explained clearly in 
the preceding chapter, the foundational project not only allows, but also enables, 
significant cultural diversity, thanks to the very broad scope of multiple 
realizability entailed by the highly generalized formulation of the central human 
capabilities, and by the further fact that any additional practices and customs that 
are not incorporable under the requirements of the human capabilities, but that 
are likewise no impediment to the foundational project itself, see no proscription 
placed on them from the point of view of the foundational project. Ultimately, the 
argument from diversity is therefore a case of non-sequitur, insofar the 
foundational project is not against diversity per se, but only against certain 
elements contained therein that can be universally ascertained as morally 
unacceptable. 
 
Final reflections on the four relativistic counterarguments 
 
Thought the four relativistic counterarguments ultimately fail to 
demonstrate the moral undesirability of the foundational project, they 
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nevertheless point quite strongly at the very real risks and possibilities of the 
foundational project being easily subverted into another justificatory tool for 
fascist and totalitarian regimes. This is because, by carefully manipulating which 
capabilities are made available, it would not be too difficult to move from a theory 
aimed at enabling the attainment of eudemonia for all, to an Orwellian nightmare 
(given the significant impact that capabilities hold on the formation of people’s 
preferences and desires). In this respect, the charges of imperialism and 
paternalism, as well as the arguments from culture and diversity, actually reflect 
deep-seated and quite genuine worries that the foundational project may simply 
be promoting another ethical-political ‘product’ that is simply ‘too good to be true’. 
And its detractors are quite right to express strong reservations against it, in light 
of the West’s colonial past, less they believe we later experience a particularly 
nasty case of ‘buyer’s remorse’ down the road. Though I believe these worries can 
be ultimately alleviated by thoroughly safeguarding the foundational project 
against such possible cases of derailment, the problems entailed by this are 
sufficiently severe that I explore this topic in much greater detail in the last 
chapter. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
 In writing this chapter, I took a somewhat different approach than the one 
usually encountered in the capabilities literature. Rather than begin with an 
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overview of one or many of the presently existing argumentative strategies for the 
moral validation of the foundational project, followed by an examination of its 
respectively delimited perks, flaws and implications, I chose to undertake a meta-
analysis of the overall strategies employed in attempting to morally defend the 
foundational project. My reasons for doing so are clear: The many argumentative 
strategies in favour of the foundational project actually contain a tacit underlying 
hypothesis according to which three things would happen: (1) one would 
individually come to see the moral goodness of the foundational project for 
themselves, following sufficient fulfillment of conditions of ideal observation; (2) a 
collective endorsement of the foundational project would follow by way of an 
overlapping consensus amongst all such resulting ideal observers, regarding its 
universal moral worth; (3) said collective endorsement would play a crucial role in 
ultimately validating its global implementation.337 
Since these three claims entail that ideal observer theory could serve as an 
effective means to accomplishing all this, I began with an examination of ideal 
observer theory’s actual ability in allowing a collection of individuals to draw 
universal moral judgments. Following due consideration of the many difficulties 
and drawbacks facing ideal observer theory itself, I concluded that this could only 
be accomplished successfully by incorporating its principles and ideas into a large-
scale collective project for the moral assessment of states of affairs, all things 
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considered. Such a project, which I termed ‘PIMASA’, represents the most 
authoritative approach that we could possibly devise in determining which states 
of affairs are truly morally optimal in our given world. It would therefore be 
ideally suited to assess the true moral value of the specific state of affairs that the 
foundational project proposes to bring about. 
 Having this clear basis to work with, I then proceeded to examine the 
variety of argumentative strategies employed by Nussbaum and many other 
capability theorists in order to morally justify the foundational project, as well as 
an additional number of existing counterarguments to the foundational project. 
Examination of Nussbaum’s strategies revealed some very interesting results. 
Whereas these strategies were all deemed to be ultimately unsatisfactory in 
allowing her to defend the foundational project, the reasons for this were always 
due to their inability at guaranteeing the realization of one or many conditions of 
ideal observation by those who would attempt to utilize them to the letter. This is 
ironic, insofar as the very purpose of these argumentative strategies was precisely 
to overcome just the kind of disinformation, partiality, bias and dubious 
preferences and desires that arise under conditions of imperfect observation, and 
that are taken to undermine the position of the many detractors of the 
foundational project. 338  Similarly, Nussbaum’s earlier allegation that the 
foundational project had already been globally justified failed for the very same 
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reasons, in that the many projects she participated in which were intended to 
support this claim did not fully achieve the conditions required under procedures 
for ideal observation, and were consequently unable to ensure the truthfulness, 
impartiality, and overall tenability of the information gathered thereby.339 Finally, 
examination of the four counterarguments against the foundational project reveals 
that they start off with highly problematic and dubious premises, and ultimately 
serve to provide little real evidence against the foundational project, if it be only to 
remind us that proper care needs to be taken to prevent severe cases of abuse 
down the road, and that cultural diversity plays an important part in determining 
just how broadly central human capabilities can actually come to be realized, 
without unduly curtailing valuable cultural practices in the process. 
 But where does this leave us now? While Nussbaum’s argumentative 
strategies failed to provide us with definitive moral justification for the 
foundational project, her many critics were likewise ultimately unsuccessful in 
providing us with a knock-down definitive argument against the foundational 
project. To be sure, empirical evidence does suggest that the foundational project 
provides us with a list of moral goods which human beings usually take to be 
valuable in a rather universal fashion, provided that these individuals are 
sufficiently informed, mature, responsible and sane, and that they live in a socio-
political, cultural and economic environment which does not place undue 
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hardships or difficulties on their lives, and which does not attempt to poison their 
minds with nefarious ideologies.340 Hence, so long as one subscribes to the 
fundamental notion that individuals need to achieve something like conditions of 
ideal observation in order to gain the authority required to pass good moral 
judgments, we also find ourselves with at least some preliminary and (certainly) 
non-negligible evidence that something like the foundational project can 
eventually become the object of a global overlapping consensus, by the collective 
action of all individuals adequately disposed to judge it as such, and freely 
available to do so. 
  This being said, some reservations are in order at this point. Given the 
evidence examined thus far, there are strong reasons for believing that, while an 
implemented foundational project will include something like Nussbaum’s list of 
central human capabilities, the final list need not be identical, item per item, with 
Nussbaum’s. Rather, some divergence is not only conceivable, but also to be 
expected. Furthermore, though some significant degrees of freedom are likewise 
to be realistically anticipated, the role of freedom in people choosing which central 
capabilities to exercise and how will actually see some notable curtailment, insofar 
as complete multiple realizability is only available at the purely theoretical level, 
and would actually be limited under the practical choices that need to be made, in 
choosing to channel resources to some projects of social significance, at the 
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expense of others.341 Finally, the very real possibility of a potential high-jacking 
and corruption of the foundational project towards nefarious ends will result in 
significantly stronger protective mechanisms being built around it — namely ones 
that rely on a less ‘idealized’ view of the role of big government, organizations and 
industries in implementing, spreading and sustaining the foundational project 
around the world. Ultimately, the final verdict regarding the true moral value of 
the foundational project not only will, but also should, depend on the results 
gained by running it through an adequately developed PIMASA. Such an exercise 
would provide us, not only with a clear moral value associated with it, but also 
with the determinate final form that a practically implemented foundational 
project would eventually come to adopt. Now, the further and highly important 
corollary question of how the capabilities approach fares against its resourcist and 
welfarist competitors, in light of what has been said here, is taken up in the next 
chapter. 
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Chapter 4: The foundational project vs. resourcism and welfarism 
 
Introduction: 
 
The two main founders of the capabilities approach, namely Amartya Sen 
and Martha Nussbaum, have devoted considerable time and energy arguing 
against other distributive theories of justice, classified by them under the two 
main headings of ‘resourcist’ and ‘welfarist’ approaches.342 This has been done in 
an attempt to show that the capabilities approach is overall superior and 
preferable to these. However, analysis of the argumentative strategies employed 
by them reveals two key items of interest. First, a recurring pattern emerges, 
whereby the respective conceptual contents of the competing theories are 
analyzed according to three key desiderata. These include: (a) the inherent 
desirability of the proposed distributive object itself; (b) the acceptability of the 
consequences incurred by distributing said object in some fashion or other; (c) the 
compatibility of the proposed distributive scheme with (what is taken to be) an 
optimal notion of personal agency and autonomy. Second, capability theorists tend 
to ‘strawman’ the competition, with either: (i) the proposed distributive object and 
distributive patterns (or spreads) depicted in a caricatured, primitive, or 
somewhat oversimplified manner, or; (ii) an unwarranted equivocation being 
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resources vs. utilities debate is, in itself, sufficient to drive the point home. 
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made between early proposed versions of said object and spreads as the only and 
final ones in existence, disregarding (or ignoring) later attempts at refinement. 
While reliance on desiderata (a-c) in order to assess the robustness of the 
competition constitutes a perfectly legitimate move on the part of capability 
theorists, their subsequent use of ‘strategies’ (i-ii) results in an artificially inflated 
impression of the superiority of the capabilities approach (and, by extension, the 
foundational project), over its rivals. In light of this, corrections and refinements 
made by a number of later observers and commentators unveil a picture of 
possible resourcist and welfarist alternatives that promise to satisfy desiderata (a-
c) quite successfully, and that show that the multiple arguments formulated by 
capability theorists against the competition end up, in fact, significantly weaker 
than they first appeared to be. Furthermore, it is important to note that said 
process of corrections and refinements also entails the appearance of a number of 
additional consequences and observations. The most important (and striking) of 
these concerns their now properly understood distributive object gaining ever 
greater conceptual likeness to central capabilities — which, in turn, bears 
significant implications for the original ‘capabilities vs. resources vs. utilities’ 
debate. Indeed, I argue here that, while this debate is fundamentally flawed, 
insofar as it ultimately amounts to a ‘false trilemma’, capability theorists 
nevertheless earn an indirect albeit quite real victory, since available evidence 
strongly suggest that the competition ends up conceding the minimal distribution 
of what conceptually corresponds to some form of basic human capabilities. In 
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passing, I also observe that much of this process makes reference to the use of 
ideal observer theory — which, in turn, reveals some additional natural 
limitations proper to any tangible distributive theory of justice that relies on it, in 
order to articulate and defend its proposed distributive principles. Finally, some 
problems surrounding specific metaphysical presuppositions made by capability 
theorists regarding the notion of the ‘person’ are also brought up. These various 
aspects are all discussed towards the end of this chapter. 
 
4.1 From crude to refined resourcism 
 
 The term ‘resourcism’ serves as a particular categorical identifier for 
capability theorists, pointing towards a specific class of distributive theories of 
justice. As its name implies, resourcism proposes that key issues of social justice 
can be successfully addressed by distributing a variety of ‘resources’ to individuals 
in a variety of ways. Actually, capability theorists utilize this term in a somewhat 
overbearing capacity, encompassing theories that can vary rather significantly in 
terms of their conception of the ‘resource object’ in question, as well as the 
proposed distributive spread.343 Nevertheless, a tentative grouping of a select set 
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points out that a broad enough definition of ‘resources’ (i.e., economic goods) entails that all theories of 
distributive justice are, by definition, resourcist. This is further reinforced by Sen (2009: 264-268) who 
discusses Dworkin’s theory, and points out that Dworkin also foresees a possible collapse between his 
resourcism and the capabilities approach — though envisaged on Dworkin’s terms. This illustrates the 
(somewhat excessive) flexibility that the term ‘resourcism’ can take on. In light of this, I stick here 
specifically (and rather exclusively) to the commodities approach, the basic needs approach, and to Rawls’s 
theory, as principal exemplars of this approach. 
153 
 
 
of resourcist theory types can be achieved by classifying them along the respective 
level of abstraction that characterizes their distributive object. This results in the 
grouping of possible candidates under three main categories. The first category, 
exemplified by the commodities approach, encompasses theories that propose a 
rather direct distribution of actual goods and services, determined by rather 
crude, basic, or generalized measurement and distributive requirements.344 The 
second category, exemplified by the basic needs approach, encompasses theories 
that also propose a distribution of goods and services, albeit filtered now by way 
of the more abstract, yet also more demanding, notion of fulfilling such things as 
‘basic needs’.345 The third and final category, exemplified by such diverse theories 
as those of Dworkin and Rawls, encompasses approaches that filter the transition 
of goods and services to individuals by even more abstract normative 
requirements, focusing on the promotion of such things as ‘broadly-defined (social 
and internal) resources’, or ‘primary goods’, depending on the theory type. Hence, 
by observing the natural change in the resource object proper to the commodities 
approach, the basic needs approach, and Rawls’ theory (as a key example of a 
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 These include the use of such indicators of development (and assumed living conditions) as income (GNP), 
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sophisticated resourcist346), we can see how said object progressively overcomes 
the many objections formulated against it, and how it also incidentally comes to 
conceptually resemble more and more the capabilities object. While this specific 
exercise does not capture all possible resourcist alternatives ‘presently available 
on the market’, I judge it sufficient to drive the point home with regards to the 
manner in which these have generally been depicted and dealt with by capability 
theorists as a whole. 
 
The commodities approach 
 
 The observable transition from concreteness to progressively greater 
abstraction in the various conceptual reformulations of the resource object can be 
understood as the natural result of trying to move away from a variety of 
counterarguments that ‘crude resourcism’ — namely the commodities approach 
— has first attracted. The commodities approach, developed shortly after the end 
of World War II, rests on the presupposition that a proper distribution of actual 
physical goods (i.e. commodities) is the key and end to establishing appropriate 
minimal levels of social justice and living standards for all — hence its designation 
here as a ‘crude’ resourcist approach.347 Though originally convincing, this 
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approach has since been exposed to the ‘inherent value argument’, the ‘commodity 
fetishism argument’, the ‘interpersonal variability argument’, the ‘many-one 
correspondence argument’, and the ‘social/environmental interdependence 
argument’.348 An explication of each of these, along the three key desiderata (a-c), 
brings to light the concerns expressed thereby, and lays the groundwork for a 
subsequent examination of how later resourcist variants attempted to overcome 
said difficulties, and how successful they were: 
 
First desideratum (a) (inherent desirability of distributive object) 
 
1. The ‘inherent value argument’ states that resources (in this case direct 
physical goods and tangible services), though clearly required for 
development and improvements in living conditions, constitute merely a 
means to an end, and cannot be transformed into an end in themselves.349 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
physical well-being solicited in policy makers. Indeed, more ‘abstract’ concerns such as social-psychological 
indicators of general life satisfaction were simply not given top priority at the time, given the situation at 
hand. 
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 A good overview of these is provided by Crocker (1992: 590-599), Stewart and Deneulin (2002: 61-62), 
and Dowding (2006: 327). 
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 The inherent value argument is explained in, Sen (1984h: 510), Sen (1985b: 19), Sen (1985a: 15-16), Sen 
(1990c: 115-116, 120-121), Basu (1987: 71-72), Nussbaum (1990b: 210), and Nussbaum (1992: 233). Note 
that this argument is in no way affected by how successfully a certain optimized distribution of said 
resources achieves its desirable ends. 
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Second desideratum (b) (acceptability of distributive consequences) 
 
2. The ‘commodity fetishism argument’ is closely linked to the inherent value 
one. It points out that, not only does an obsession with crude resources 
distract one from their ultimate purpose as means to an end, but also that 
such an obsession can engender other nefarious consequences, such as 
‘bringing out the worst in people’, and leading to a ‘commodification of 
parts of the self’.350 
 
3. The ‘interpersonal variability argument’ points out that different 
individuals have different resource requirements based on their age, 
gender, body mass, etc.. Hence, one cannot adopt a standardized 
distribution model that does not take these features into account, if one 
wishes to attain similar or equal valuable end-states for all.351 
 
                                                             
350
 The commodity fetishism argument is recognized in Sen (1984h: 510) and Sen (1985b: 19, 37-38), and its 
many other nefarious consequences are explored more in-depth in Nussbaum (1986: 339-340), Nussbaum 
(1990b: 210, 249n20) and Nussbaum (1992). This argument is also closely linked to the ‘expensive tastes 
objection’, with regards to resources (Dowding (2006: 327)). The problem concerns, not only the fact that 
people tend to become ‘resource hoarders’, but also that they increasingly come to see themselves and 
those around them essentially as ‘physical resources’, to be used and exploited in a variety of ways, leading 
to a form of pathological materialism. Though an exaggerated extreme, Charles Dickens’ Ebenezer Scrooge 
character illustrates quite eloquently most all vices and personal consequences associated with someone 
who has ‘wholeheartedly embraced’ commodity fetishism. 
351
 The interpersonal variability argument is explored in Sen (1984h: 511), Sen (1985d: 198-199), Sen (1985b: 
6, 17), Sen (1985a: 16), Sen (1988b: 277), Sen (1990c: 116, 118), Sen (2009: 255, 258-260), Nussbaum 
(1990b: 211), Nussbaum (1990a: 62), Nussbaum (1992: 233), and Pereira (2006: 56). It illustrates the 
undesirable consequences of attempting crude resource distribution schemes without paying due attention 
to what said resources actually end up doing for people. This topic is discussed in greater detail by 
Rosenbaum (1999). 
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4. The ‘many-one correspondence argument’ points out that, due to 
differences in personal abilities at resource conversion, different 
commodity bundles can produce the same valuable end-states in various 
individuals.352 
 
5. The ‘social/environmental interdependence argument’ points out that 
cultural as well as environmental differences entail requiring varying 
quantities and kinds of goods in order to attain similar valuable end-states, 
depending on various cultural and natural specificities. Hence, attempting a 
merely crude general uniform determination of required goods betrays bad 
sensitivity to these crucial differences.353 
 
Third desideratum (c) (distributional compatibility with respect for personal 
agency) 
 
 Though not directly discussed here, the pertinence of this topic shows up 
later in Sen and Nussbaum’s discussion of Rawls’ theory, as we shall soon 
see below. 
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 The many-one correspondence argument is discussed by Sen (1984h: 28n87, 513-514) and Crocker (1992: 
591). It serves to emphasize, once again, the need to focus on the end-state as the actual desired 
distributum, as opposed to the means (resources) thereto. 
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 The ‘social/environmental interdependence argument’ is discussed in Sen (1984h: 27-28, 332-338, essay 
14), Sen (1985a: 18), Sen (2009: 255-257), Nussbaum (1992: 235-241), and Nussbaum (1993). Sen’s 
favourite example refers to Adam Smith’s observation regarding the need for expensive clothing (linen shirt 
and leather shoes) in order to avoid public shame in 18
th
 century England — though other examples relating 
specifically to environmental variants exist as well. 
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One quickly notices that the key theme proper to the five counterarguments 
above indicates that these multiple drawbacks to the commodities approach 
derive principally from said approach failing to realize that what is truly required 
of an appropriate resourcist distributive theory of justice is the distribution of 
resources conceived of as certain end-states of human existence, as opposed to the 
numerous and highly variable means for reaching said end-states in question (as is 
the case with commodities). Realizing this, subsequent resourcist theories relied, 
therefore, on formulating their conception of the resource object as more directly 
equivalent to some such end-state in question. The response by capability 
theorists with regards to these new contenders has been as follows: on the one 
hand, they have been praised for seeing beyond the limitations of crude 
commodities distribution, and proposing resource types that are more accurately 
aligned with enabling certain levels of agency and autonomy freedom in 
individuals; on the other, any remaining drawbacks associated with their resource 
object have usually been tied to said object still failing to measure up in some way 
to the kind and degree of agency and autonomy freedom that capability theorists 
have in mind — namely the kind enabled by central capability distribution.354 I 
will illustrate this fact by focusing now on the specific responses elicited by the 
basic needs approach, and by Rawls’ theory. 
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 Indeed, these correspond to the agency and autonomy freedom made directly possible by the respective 
capability sets that end up distributed to individuals, of which the many complex parameters have been 
illustrated by my discussion of the bicycle riding example in section 2.2 of chapter two. 
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The basic needs approach 
 
The basic needs approach, introduced in 1976 by the International Labour 
Organization, attempts to define an absolute minimum level of resources required 
for long-term physical well-being. While still relying heavily on an essential core of 
largely physical goods (such as food water and shelter), it distinguishes itself from 
the commodities approach by also branching out into the postulation of more 
abstractly-defined goods, such as education, sanitation and healthcare. Because of 
this, the basic needs approach has been praised by Sen for (i) recognizing the 
drawbacks of crude resourcism and welfarism in failing to focus on human beings 
themselves and the lives that they are capable of living355, as well as for (ii) the fact 
that economic growth (and subsequent improvements in quality of life) is not 
incompatible with meeting basic needs, since they are, in fact, intertwined, one 
requiring the other to advance356. However, Sen also claims that this approach is 
deficient along the following five characteristics:357 
 
1. First, it (allegedly) lacks a developed conceptual foundation for explaining 
and defending what constitutes ‘basic needs’, which leaves it at risk of 
collapsing into crude resourcism or welfarism.358 
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 Sen (1985a: 24-25) 
356
 Sen (1984h: 515) 
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 Resumed by Crocker (1992: 603-607). 
358
 Sen (1984h: essay 20) and Sen (1988a: 19-20) suggests that a possible solution is to interpret them as 
basic capabilities. 
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2. Second, the basic needs approach often does collapse into a commodities 
approach, subjecting it to the critique of commodity fetishism above, and all 
of its afferent criticisms.359 
 
3. Third, the basic needs approach needs to take into account cultural and 
environmental variance (the ‘social/environmental interdependence 
argument’), because basic needs can be met differently in different cultures 
and environments, and the same need can be met by way of different 
commodity bundles (the ‘many-one correspondence argument’).360 
 
4. Fourth, the basic needs approach is too restrictive, focusing only on basic 
needs for deprived individuals and poor countries, which can leave 
individuals in developed countries feeling that their obligations to the 
individuals of such other countries are met, once basic needs are attained 
by them.361 
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 Crocker (1992: 603) 
360
 Sen (1984h: 514) 
361
 Ibid (515). Basic capabilities, on the other hand, are more inclusive of the individual’s potential for 
achieving complete well-being, as opposed to simply focusing on whether an individual has reached some 
such minimal level of well-being 
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5. Fifth, the basic needs approach conceives of individuals as passive 
recipients, as opposed to active agents, in need of opportunity creation (by 
way of capabilities).362 
 
Most importantly, Sen alleges that the basic needs approach suffers from 
these numerous flaws, not due to some fundamental and ultimately fatal 
underlying problem (as befalls crude resourcism and welfarism), but rather due to 
theoretical underdevelopment and a lack of clear specification of the basic needs 
approach mandate. As a matter of fact, he proposes that this can be rather 
effectively remedied by ‘converting’ the basic needs approach into a 
subcomponent of his capabilities approach: 
 
“What is needed is to take the basic needs approach out of the 
arbitrary narrow box into which it seems to have got confined. To 
see it as just one part of the capabilities approach — to which it is 
motivationally linked — would do just that.”363 
 
How is a basic needs approach advocate to respond to these five 
allegations? There are a number of strategies available to salvage the basic needs 
approach. Simply rejecting the relevance of Sen’s five criticisms would be 
problematic, as this would be tantamount to denying that these five 
counterarguments bear any weight at all. Indeed, none of the responses 
formulated against capability theorists claim that their basic observations 
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 Ibid (514). This argument only threatens cruder versions thereof, as a properly-developed basic needs 
approach can, in fact, cover such needs: Crocker (1992: 607). 
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 Sen (1984h: 515). See also Crocker (1992: 604). 
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regarding the drawbacks of crude resourcism and welfarism are somehow 
fundamentally flawed. Rather, each candidate seeks to demonstrate that their 
approach can answer their many objections successfully, by either refining their 
theories, or indicating that said theories already hold the conceptual refinements 
required to accomplish this task. Therefore a more productive strategy (pursued 
by Streeten, Stewart, Crocker, and Stewart and Deneulin) involves conceding the 
relevance of Sen’s five criticisms, though only with regards to crude versions of the 
basic needs approach, all the while maintaining that refined versions thereof are 
better capable of dealing with them.364 Indeed, further refinement to this second 
strategy (pursued by Alkire and Reader) consists in actually demonstrating, by 
way of numerous examples, how refined versions of the basic needs approach can 
successfully counter these five criticisms. And the way this is done is by 
illustrating that refined basic needs approaches are actually much more careful 
and attentive in terms of their understanding of individuals’ basic needs revolving 
around something like basic human capabilities, as opposed to mere crudely 
distributed commodities.365 It is therefore unsurprising that these authors, as well 
as others, have also observed a very strong conceptual affinity between a carefully 
refined basic needs approach, and the capabilities approach.366 
Ultimately, the many important discussions surrounding the actual 
effectiveness of the basic needs approach in constituting a viable theory of 
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 Streeten (1984); Stewart (1989); Crocker (1992: 606); Stewart and Deneulin (2002). 
365
 Alkire (2005c: 166-170); Alkire (2006: 246-249); Reader (2006) 
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 Streeten (1984: 974-975); Alkire (2005c: 170); Clark (2005a: 2-3); Reader (2006: 342-345, 347-349) 
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distributive justice (as well as an approach to development) can all be linked back 
to one key question: is the basic needs approach candidate of the ‘crude’ or 
‘refined’ type? If it is of the crude type, it collapses into the commodities approach 
or crude welfarism, and inherits all of their respective problems and drawbacks.367 
If it is of the refined type, however, it actually ends up corresponding to something 
like the foundational project, and avoids these many problems, thanks to its now 
significantly greater conceptual density. It is this inherent ambivalence in the basic 
needs approach that positions it between crude and highly-refined resourcism, in 
terms of the way in which its resource object ultimately comes to be 
conceptualized and understood. In a way, the basic needs approach can be seen as 
serving as a ‘gateway’ theory to the next category of even more sophisticated 
resourcist contenders. 
 
Rawlsian resourcism 
 
 Rawls’ theory of justice has solicited a different set of discussions on the 
part of capability theorists. In particular, his formulation of the resource object as 
‘primary goods’ differs significantly from the one proper to the commodities and 
to the basic needs approach, in that primary goods actually serve as ‘background 
means or materials’, by way of which individuals are then to select principles of 
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 Crocker (1992: 605) refers to this as Sen’s ‘two-horned dilemma’, with regards to the basic needs 
approach. It is interesting to note that a similar dilemma was formulated by Dworkin against Sen’s version of 
the capabilities approach, due to its inherent ambiguity (Dworkin (2002: 285-303); Williams (2002: 24-39)) 
— though this dilemma is less effective against the foundational project, as has been explained in section 
2.5 of chapter two. 
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justice and fundamental aspects of the social-political organization of their society. 
Primary goods include social as well as natural types, and they corresponds, for 
Rawls, to such abstractly delineated items as “rights, liberties, and opportunities, 
and income and wealth”, as well as to more concrete ones, such as “health and 
vigor, intelligence and imagination”.368 As for the exercise of selecting principles of 
justice and fundamental aspects of the social-political organization of society, this 
is to be performed from within an ‘original position’ with specific limitations 
placed on the information available to participants (veil of ignorance), in order 
that personal interest not sway their judgment in the establishment of a social 
contract that is conducive to a state of mutual advantage for all.369 There is a dual 
purpose implicit in this exercise. On the one hand, individuals endowed with 
primary goods can then make use of their reasoned judgments in order to devise 
sophisticated personal life-plans, exemplified in their formulation and pursuit of 
comprehensive doctrines of the good. On the other, these doctrines need to be 
minimally ‘compatible’ with one another, within the framework of the practical 
needs of social living, insofar as they cannot overreach one another, in terms of the 
preservation of basic aspects of liberty, equality, and fairness for all. Hence, the 
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 Rawls (1971 [1999]: 54-55, 79). Both types of primary goods are to be distributed to all, based on the 
preliminary justification that these constitute “things which it is supposed a rational man wants whatever 
else he wants” (79) — though distribution of the natural variety will invariably be more limited than the 
social ones which permit greater flexibility. 
369
 In this sense, there is a notable connection between Rawls’ theory and ideal observer theory, as 
recognized by a number of authors and indicated at the beginning of section 3.1 of chapter three. The main 
difference rests with the fact that a PIMASA seeks to overcome the specter of personal interest upsetting 
the process at hand, not by containing certain information types, but rather by relying on procedural forms 
of power-equilibrium in order to overcome their nefarious influences. Hence, it also endorses a form of 
information-induced enlightenment that Rawls’ theory remains sceptical of. 
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political space within which said doctrines interact is arrived at by way of an 
overlapping consensus, delimiting the effective point of ‘compromise’, indicative of 
the natural limitations of any such doctrine, if it is to be practicable in civil 
society.370 
Consequently, Rawlsian primary goods play a significantly greater role in 
terms of what it is that they enable individuals to accomplish, when compared to 
the fulfillment of basic needs or simple distribution of commodities. Given this 
notable sophistication, it is not surprising that Rawls’ theory has attracted much 
praise on the part of capability theorists, insofar as it focuses on the distribution of 
highly valuable (and substantial) means for freedom and social organization, and 
because it takes the central role of human agency, autonomy, and the need for self-
determination into much greater account than its predecessors.371 The main gripe 
that capability theorists express with Rawls’ theory is that it does not go far 
enough. 372  This is made explicit by the following four counterarguments 
formulated against Rawlsian resourcism: 
                                                             
370
 These various aspects and components of Rawls’ theory are discussed in a number of his publications, 
namely in Rawls (1971 [1999]), Rawls (1980), Rawls (1982), Rawls (1987), Rawls (1988), and Rawls (2005). A 
good overview of them is provided by Crocker (1992: 592-595). 
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 Sen (1979b: 218); Sen (1984h: 279-280, 308, 339); Sen (1990b: 52); Nussbaum (2000e: 65-67) 
372
 Another gripe which has also generated important discussion concerns the alleged neutrality or ‘thinness’ 
of Rawls’ theory: Sen (1990c: 112, 114, 117); Sen (1990a: 54); Sen (1991b: 20); Nussbaum (1988: 179-181); 
Nussbaum (1990b: 227, 248n73); Crocker (1992: 597-599); Nelson (2008: 107-114). Notwithstanding any 
implications that this may hold for the other counterarguments formulated against Rawlsian resourcism, the 
very question of theoretically moral or metaphysical neutrality bears no concern for us, insofar as I have 
already endorsed the use of ideal observer theory as the principal means for assessing the moral tenability 
of any proposed distributive theory of justice — a decidedly non-neutral move, though one motivated by 
very good reasons (see the first half of chapter three on this). 
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1. The ‘crudeness argument’ alleges that Rawls’ primary goods, though 
notably better than commodities or basic needs, are still too ‘crude’ to 
enable the kind of full-fledged freedom made possible by capabilities. This 
is brought to light by (i) applying the ‘interpersonal variability argument’ to 
primary goods, and by (ii) claiming that Rawls focuses exclusively on 
negative freedom, at the expense of positive freedom — whereas both stand 
as clear preconditions for full-fledged freedom enablement.373 
 
2. The ‘selection procedures argument’ claims that Rawls’ proposed method 
for choosing adequate principles of justice and social organization is 
inherently flawed, due to the limiting constraints on, and presuppositions 
regarding, the specific kinds of participants who engage in deliberation in 
his original position. More accurately, because of the contractarian nature 
of his theory, he allegedly ends up taking inadequate account of the 
disabled, old and ill, which undermines his basic contract and the ensuing 
‘four-stage sequence’.374 
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 Sen (1979b: 215-216); Sen (1990a: 49); Sen (1990c: 115-116, 120-121); Sen (2009: 65-66, 299-309). Also, 
see section 2.2 of chapter two, regarding this important aspect in properly conceptualizing the capabilities 
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 Sen (1982d: 30); Sen (1990a); Sen (1990c: 116-117, 117n18); Sen (1991a: 19); Sen (2009: 69-72, 126-128, 
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3. The ‘power-relations argument’ claims that differences in the respective 
‘weight’ that can be brought to bear by more powerful and affluent 
individuals over weaker ones is largely overlooked by Rawls’ analysis, 
despite the fact that this can severely impede the adequate conversion of 
commodities into ‘capabilities’ (or ‘post-original position-defined universal 
resources’) for all.375 
 
4. The ‘incompleteness argument’ claims that Rawls has actually already 
moved into the space of capabilities, albeit in an incomplete, vacillating and 
misleading way.376 
 
Now, a proper defence of Rawls’ theory against these four 
counterarguments would require significant analysis of his position with respect 
to each of the claims advanced thereby. In this sense, there exists some ambiguity 
regarding Rawls’ primary goods, as well as the degree to which they can become 
‘extended’ by the many other components of his theory to cover all salient aspects 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
conflicting ideas (and discussions) regarding what ought and ought not to be included in the later ‘partly-
lifted’ veil. Indeed, this is a highly complex argument, and it is developed at significant length, especially by 
Nussbaum. Though I cannot go into further detail here, regarding the peculiarities of contractarianism as it 
applies to the discussion at hand, a good overview of her overall argument, together with a proposed 
rebuttal, is provided by Fitzpatrick (2008: 84-98). Clark (2009b: 586-587, 592-597) also discusses this to 
some extent. 
375
 Crocker (1992: 596, 611n22). This argument is closely tied to the ‘selection procedures’ one (see also the 
references from the previous footnote). In connection to this, a thorough examination of the problem of 
power relations with regards to the practical implementation of the foundational project is provided in the 
next chapter. 
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dear to capability theorists. It is therefore is not unreasonable to state that even 
Rawls’ theory could be given a cruder, as well as a more refined, reading — with 
correspondingly lesser and greater degrees of success in overcoming the four 
counterarguments enumerated above.377 However, I take the more important 
issue here to be, not whether Rawls’ theory truly ‘fails’ to go far enough, but rather 
whether a properly fleshed out resourcist approach, possibly very akin to Rawls’, 
truly can go far enough. Indeed, this highly important question has spawned a 
significant string of discussions attempting to provide an answer for it. 
It began with Pogge writing a long article defending the ability of resourcist 
approaches at successfully answering the many concerns of capability theorist, as 
well as questioning some of the claims made by capability theorists themselves.378 
In particular, he argued that (1) both Sen and Nussbaum make strawmen out of 
resourcist views in order better to defend the preferability of their capabilities 
approach379, that (2) many examples show that refined resourcism actually takes, 
or can take, all salient factors into account, in suggesting a just resource 
distribution scheme, thereby avoiding the blind-spots that generate the 
distributional-consequence-based counterarguments against it 380 , that (3) 
resourcists can easily grant that resources only have an instrumental value381, that 
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380
 Pogge (2004: 17-33). An example thereof involves conceptualizing capabilities as powers and 
subsequently as ‘resources’: Dowding (2008). 
381
 Pogge (2004: 34-35) 
169 
 
 
(4) resourcism truly is nuanced enough to accommodate compensation stemming 
from weaknesses caused by natural endowment (four elaborate examples given, in 
terms of income compensation, natural diversity vertical inequality compensation, 
The Specificity Required of a Workable Public Criterion of Social Justice, and The 
Political Import of the Transition to a Capability Metric)382, and finally that (5) (i) 
the Human Development Index (HDI) is actually inconsistent with the capabilities 
approach, upon which it is allegedly based, as illustrated by the fact that (ii) two of 
its components are plainly resourcist, and that (iii) it also betrays a number of 
other important flaws (leading to an oversight of various kinds of capability 
failures), which puts it at significant odds of the original intent promulgated by the 
capabilities approach383. 
 In response to these various claims, Pogge’s article engendered a counter-
reply by a number of authors.384 Indeed, it has been counter-counter argued that 
(1) Pogge’s arguments in favour of resources employ a selection procedure which 
actually references to something like welfare or capabilities, in determining actual 
resource distribution, which makes his theory structured in the same way as 
welfarism or the capabilities approach385, that (2) Pogge’s resourcism actually 
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runs aground of healthcare distribution386 and of the special needs of women 
brought about by the biological facts of pregnancy and birth387, that (3) Pogge’s 
allegation that resourcism can compensate for past social injustices by way of 
compensation through resources is untenable, insofar as Pogge’s idea of 
compensation is different from that held by capability theorists (compensating for 
injustices by way of trade-offs vs. helping to develop capabilities), and his idea of 
compensating by way of resources risks running aground of the Aristotelian 
argument against acquiring resources for their own sake (commodity 
fetishism)388, and that (4) Pogge himself makes a strawman out of the capabilities 
approach, and seriously misinterpreted it at times, by (i) failing to realize that 
functionings and capabilities have intrinsic value, as opposed to merely 
instrumental ones, like resources (resources, even ‘sophisticated ones’, remain but 
means to an end, such as functionings, whereas functionings and capabilities were 
never intended to be merely instrumental)389, (ii) failing to realize that capability 
achievement is not engendered simply or wholly by resource distribution (in the 
crude sense of resource), but by a more integral modification to the whole 
environment, spanning beyond mere resource distribution390, (iii) overlooking the 
role of individual empowerment (Sen’s agency, Nussbaum’s practical reason) in 
enabling capabilities, and claiming that resourcist schemes are no less able to 
                                                             
386
 Bojer (2006: 4-5) 
387
 Ibid (7-9); Berges (2007: 19-20) 
388
 Berges (2007: 20-23) 
389
 Keleher (2004: 4-7) 
390
 Ibid (7-13) 
171 
 
 
settle issues of gender differences and other personal heterogeneities391, and by 
(iv) falsely limiting the goals of the capabilities approach to resource-distribution, 
which leads Pogge to claim that the two approaches are, in fact, quite similar, 
reducing the true preferability of one over the other. Also, it is argued that his 
allegation that the capabilities approach requires a vertical ranking of all physical 
and mental features is highly erroneous, stemming from a gross misunderstanding 
of the kind of compensations that are meant to be achieved by capability 
distribution, and that he fails to account for the essential aspects of individual 
empowerment (agency and/or practical reason), and the valuation process392. 
The million-dollar question brought up by these discussions is as follows: 
which of these two possible interpretations of the true abilities of refined 
resourcism is to be endorsed — Pogge’s or that of his critics? Clearly, a thorough 
answer would require a careful and rather lengthy examination of all of the 
relevant literature — something that lies well beyond the scope of this present 
chapter. Nevertheless, I tentatively propose the following partial answer, based on 
the indications observed in the argumentative patterns recognized thus far: on the 
one hand, Pogge sought to demonstrate that a properly fleshed out resourcist 
approach ultimately can answer the many counterarguments formulated by 
capability theorists against the commodities approach, the basic needs approach, 
as well as Rawlsian resourcism; on the other, his detractors have argued against 
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this contention — though apparently not on the grounds that this is something 
that resourcism can allegedly never accomplish, but rather because Pogge, despite 
his best efforts, has simply still not refined it far enough. In light of this, the key 
reoccurring theme here is that a truly optimally refined resourcist variant — one 
that would successfully rebut all of the counterarguments formulated by capability 
theorists against each progressively more refined class of resourcist approaches 
thus far — would be one that ultimately makes its resource object conceptually 
equivalent to capabilities. As further evidence for this, Keith Dowding writes: 
 
“For what it is worth, I suspect that any egalitarian account of 
how society should be ordered could be described in the language of 
choice-based utility, resources, opportunities or capabilities. And I 
suspect that no matter which language might at first appear 
rhetorically preferable in answering antiegalitarians’ criticisms of 
that society, careful enough analytical investigation will allow the 
same anti-egalitarian responses.”393 
 
 Such a move would certainly go a long way towards showing that resourcist 
approaches truly can distribute in a fully-refined manner. And it would also 
highlight the evolutionary process and end-state reached by advocates of 
resourcism, in moving from lesser to greater levels of abstraction, in countering 
the respective objections raised against the commodities approach, the basic 
needs approach, and Rawlsian resourcism. Hence, if the foundational project truly 
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does constitute an optimal partial theory of justice (as I argue here that it does), 
then it is only natural that a resourcist equivalent would seek to distribute, at the 
very minimum, ‘resources’ that in fact conceptually correspond to central human 
capabilities, all other things considered.394 
 
4.2 From crude to refined welfarism 
 
 Just as with the term ‘resourcism’ examined in the preceding section, the 
term ‘welfarism’ also acts as a particular categorical identifier for capability 
theorists, pointing towards a specific class of distributive theories of justice. 
However, some important preliminary clarifications are in order, seeing as how 
this term has both a broader generic meaning, as well as a narrower much more 
precise meaning, and how it is the narrower meaning that serves as the actual 
target of criticism for capability theorists. Hence, under its broader generic 
meaning, welfarism is simply understood as a form of consequentialism. L.W. 
Sumner writes: 
 
“Generic welfarism. The judgement of the relative goodness of 
states of affairs must be based exclusively on, and taken as an 
increasing function of, the respective collections of individual 
welfares in these states.”395 
 
                                                             
394
 This being said, distribution of any other remaining resources would, interestingly enough, need to rely 
on external (non-moral) reasons, and could essentially become ‘up for grabs’, so long as said action not 
interfere with the distribution (and preservation) of the central ones. This peculiar aspect of a foundational 
project-based resourcist approach is due to its ultimate justification being arrived at through a PIMASA, and 
is discussed more in depth with regards to welfarism in the next section. 
395
 Sumner (2006: 3) 
174 
 
 
 Note that this definition makes no further specifications regarding (i) the 
specific nature of the ‘welfares’ in question (leaving them free to correspond to 
actions, policies, rules, states of affairs, etc.), nor (ii) the way in which said 
‘welfares’ are grouped (leaving it open to a variety of possible measurement and 
aggregation mechanism). Admittedly, this leaves us with a rather sizeable number 
of possible theory types that could fit the bill. However, the actual theory types 
that are criticized by capability theorists under the banner of ‘welfarism’ 
constitute a significantly narrower spread, as they refer to a number of variants on 
utilitarian theory, applied by economists to a variety of possible distributive 
schemes. For Sen, welfarism corresponds, therefore, to what he claims to be the 
second central principle of utilitarianism.396 He writes: 
 
“Utilitarianism provides a convenient point of departure in 
examining moral issues. Utilitarianism can be factorized into the 
following constituent parts. 
 
1. Consequentialism: The rightness of actions – and (more 
generally) of the choice of all control variables – must be 
judged entirely by the goodness of the consequent state of 
affairs. 
2. Welfarism: The goodness of states of affairs must be judged 
entirely by the goodness of the set of individual utilities in the 
respective state of affairs. 
3. Sum-ranking: The goodness of any set of individual utilities 
must be judged entirely by their sum total.”397 
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 Sen (1979a) and Sen (1980a) provides us with a thorough explication of his views on a variety of 
utilitarian variants, as well as their connection to welfarism. However, Sumner (2006: 2-3) identifies the 
specific commitments that Sen actually attributes to utilitarians at large, by framing their key principles in 
this restricted manner. Together with a subjective notion of utility, this serves to sketch out a tighter model 
of what is actually available under utilitarian theory, broadly understood as such. For all intents and 
purposes, Nussbaum ends up adopting Sen’s views regarding these utilitarian variants on welfarism, when 
she refers to welfarism in a ‘generic sense’ in her writings. 
397
 Sen (1984h: 277-278) 
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Sen also provides us with a thorough explanation of his understanding of 
‘welfarism’, and of its many afferent characteristics.398 However, it is clear from 
the above description that the key modification brought to the generic variant 
thereof clearly resides with the adoption of the utility object as the selected 
distributum. This utility object can be classified under two main headings. Under 
its classical variant, it corresponds to pleasure or happiness.399 Under its more 
modern variant (as endorsed by a number of prominent economists400), it 
corresponds to revealed preference, choice, or desire-satisfaction, depending on 
the theory put forth. In any case, it remains ‘thoroughly subjectivist’, dealing with 
the production, endorsement, or relatedness of economic activity, to a variety of 
mental states. The purpose of welfarism clearly becomes utility ‘optimization’ 
(maximisation)401, such that distribution be handled in such manner as to produce 
the end-state in which the final utility spread is the best achievable. Furthermore, 
since welfarism functions as an informational constraint, it is claimed that no 
additional data — other than actual utility data — is required to ensure that the 
resultant state of affairs be wholly ‘morally non-offensive’.402 
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 Sen (1979a: 471-487) 
399
 Classical examples include the theories of Jeremy Bentham and John Stuart Mill. 
400
 Prominent names include Alfred Marshall, Oskar Morgenstern, Paul Samuelson, and Kenneth Arrow. 
401
 I use the term ‘optimization’ here, insofar as general utility maximization can be achieved by way of a 
variety of proposed distributive schemes. Sen (1979b) discusses leximin, maximin, and total utility equality, 
as constituting three possible examples thereof. See also Atkinson (1999: 174-177), for a brief overview of 
this topic. 
402
 Sen (1979a: 471) writes the following “This [welfarism] can be seen as imposing an "informational 
constraint" in making moral judgments about alternative states of affairs. If all the personal utility 
information about two states of affairs that can be known is known, then they can be judged without any 
other information about these states (references omitted)”. 
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Proposed distribution of both variants of the utility object has been 
subjected to a number of criticisms. Some of these concern the very possibility of 
accurately capturing the ‘manifestation’ of this object under its modern variant in 
people’s behaviour, let alone being able to ‘distribute’ it in any meaningful sense of 
the term, due to: (1) its fleeting and fickle nature; (2) proposed measurement 
proxies being inadequate; (3) severe technical difficulties in attempting a 
satisfactory distribution of unfettered utilities; (4) human beings usually being 
motivated by many things other than mere egotistical self-interested utility 
optimization.403 Others have been more directly formulated by capability theorists 
in the form of six distinct counterarguments against welfarism. I will concern 
myself with this latter group of arguments here, disregarding the former. My 
reasons for doing so are as follow: the latter group addresses the problem of utility 
distribution at a more fundamental level, causing it to hold priority over the 
former; successfully answering the latter group entails a significant re-
conceptualization of the way the utility object may be selected and distributed — 
something that also incidentally happens to upset the original argumentative 
frame of the former group. Hence, once the latter group is successfully debunked, 
                                                             
403
 More accurately, I am referring here to the fact that: (1) preferences and desires are often formed in a 
manner disconnected from the strict application of rational choice as the entire basis for life planning, and 
are thus subject to significant change and instability over time; (2) the idea of observable behaviour acting 
as proxy for revealing preference or choice depends on behaviourism itself being a viable theory; (3) any 
version of welfarism that simply adopts all utilities as potentially valid invariably needs to answer Arrow’s 
impossibility theorem; (4) crude welfarism assumes a very narrow view of the overall nature of human 
beings. These various aspects befalling utilitarian welfarism are discussed by Sen in a number of his articles 
and books: Sen (1973); Sen (1977); Sen (1982d); Sen (1983); Sen (1988b); Sen (1993b); Sen (1995b); Sen 
(1997); Sen (2009: 174-207, 269-290). A critical discussion pertaining to (1) can be found in Alkire and 
Deneulin (1998). Also, a brief albeit quite good overview of these topics is provided by Fleurbaey (2006: 71-
73), Martins (2006: 680-681), and Hicks (2005b). 
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the outcome of the exercise also presents the former group with new challenges to 
address, which would need to be undertaken within its respective areas of 
expertise. 
The six counterarguments against welfarism contained in the second group 
include the ‘inherent value argument’, the ‘offensive tastes objection’, the 
‘expensive tastes objection’, the ‘pleasure wizard objection’, the ‘adaptive tastes 
objection’, and the ‘agency argument’.404 They are classified according to their 
responsiveness, as based on the desideratum (a, b, c) that they are most directly 
related to: 
 
First desideratum (a) (inherent desirability of distributive object) 
 
1. The ‘inherent value argument’ states that the proposed utility object, 
though potentially quite valuable in itself as one of the recognizable ends of 
good living (so long as it remains otherwise morally non-offensive), 
remains but one salient aspect of well-being, and that focusing on its 
distribution alone would produce states of affairs blind to other concerns of 
a moral nature that have effectively not been addressed.405 
 
                                                             
404
 A good overview of these is provided by Crocker (1992: 599-602), Dowding (2006: 326), and Nussbaum 
(2011a: 50-56, 81-84). 
405
 Sen (1984h: 512); Sen (1985d: 195-196, 200); Sen (1985b: 33-34); Sen (1987: 60); Nussbaum (1988: 181); 
Nussbaum (1990b: 213). This argument is also tied in with the ‘means-ends’ argument (Sen (1985b: 15-16)), 
whereby utility is considered to be superior to resources at least on the singular account of it representing 
end-states of human living, as opposed to mere means thereto. 
178 
 
 
Second desideratum (b) (acceptability of distributive consequences) 
 
2. The ‘offensive tastes objection’ points out that a sole focus on utility 
optimization would entail an unacceptable diversion of resources towards 
individuals whose source of utility generation happens to include goods or 
activities that are otherwise morally offensive or repugnant, so long as the 
end-state ends up superior in terms of said utility optimization.406 
 
3. The ‘expensive tastes objection’ points out that a sole focus on utility 
optimization would entail a potentially unacceptably greater diversion of 
resources towards those whose utility production happens to rely on 
absorbing particularly rare, onerous, or otherwise hard-to-come-by 
resources.407 
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 The offensive tastes objection originated with Rawls (1971 [1999]: 23), and has been discussed by Sen 
(1979b: 210-211), Sen (1979a: 473-477), Cohen (1989: 912-913), and Cohen (1993: 11-16). It essentially 
states that promoting utilities derived from actions that are nefarious to the well-being of others cannot be 
dismissed on non-utilitarian moral grounds, by any known proposed scheme of utility optimization, due to 
the inherent blindness of welfarism regarding the quality of the object (target or originator) of the 
promoted utilities in question. In other words, it harks back to the original critique, according to which 
endorsing utilitarianism would permit the torture of one for the enjoyment of the many, so long as the end 
balance between pleasure and pain would end up greater than under any other alternative. 
407
 The expensive tastes objection is first explained in Scanlon (1975: 659-666), is then mentioned in Rawls 
(1982: 168-169) and Sen (1985d: 196-197), is further discussed at some length by Cohen (1989: 912-941), 
Cohen (1993: 11-16) and Dworkin (1981: 186-224), and more recently by Qizilbash (1997: 252-259), Robeyns 
(2000: 10-11), Keller (2002), Dowding (2005: 16-23), and Dowding (2006: 326-323). The problem is 
compounded by the fact that there are three distinct classes of ‘expensive tastes’: (1) those aimed at 
fulfilling desires for strictly non-essential luxury or frivolity; (2) those aimed at fulfilling otherwise luxurious 
or frivolous desires, but which have been rendered essential by some existing social norms, and; (3) those 
aimed at compensating some handicap or misfortune, in order to regain some semblance of ‘normal living’. 
A combination of these various tastes with welfarism’s lack of any parsing amongst all available utility 
objects would entail a variety of potentially offensive distribution patterns, due to it failing to take (1), (2), 
and (3) into account. 
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4. The ‘pleasure wizard objection’ points out that a sole focus on utility 
optimization would entail diverting very little resources towards those who 
happen to hold very cheap tastes, or who are particularly apt at generating 
significant utility levels from within what are otherwise considered to be 
quite dire and below-standard living conditions.408 
 
5. the ‘adaptive tastes objection’ points out that a sole focus on utility 
optimization would entail diverting resources in a manner that is effectively 
blind towards the respective quality (and consequent acceptability) of the 
desires, choices or preferences that people hold, due to the prevalence of 
psychological coping mechanisms that are responsible for people becoming 
capable of generating significant utility levels out of a variety of what are 
otherwise considered to be morally dubious circumstances.409 
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 The pleasure wizard objection is discussed chiefly by Sen (1979b: 203-04, 217), Sen (1984h: 34, 308-309, 
318), Sen (1985b: 14-15), and Sen (1987: 45-46), but also briefly by Dowding (2005: 16) and Dowding (2006: 
326-327). It functions as an ‘inverted version’ of the expensive tastes objection, whereby welfarism would 
fail to take into account possible non-utilitarian considerations in distributing to individuals who are 
particularly apt at generating great utility levels out of cheap or meagre resources or situations (hence why 
it is also referred to by two very similar variants known as the ‘cheap tastes’ or ‘small mercies’ argument). It 
is also compounded by a dual classification of ‘cheap tastes’: (1) those related to additional activities or 
past-times notwithstanding otherwise decent living conditions; (2) those acting as compensatory 
mechanisms against otherwise dire circumstances, whereby the pleasure wizard objection effectively links 
up with the adaptive tastes one below. 
409
 The adaptive tastes objection in the context of the capabilities approach is treated in Sen (1979a: 473-
477), Sen (1984h: 308-309, 318), Sen (1985d: 188-189, 190-191, 197), Sen (1985b: 14-15), Sen (1990b: 126-
127), Sen (1995a: 263), Sen (1999: 62-63), Nussbaum (1988: 181-182), Nussbaum (1990b: 213), Nussbaum 
(1990a: 62), Nussbaum (1995: 91), Nussbaum (2000e: 135-148), Nussbaum (2001b), Qizilbash (1996a: 154), 
Qizilbash (1997: 252-258), Qizilbash (2007: 170-173, 180-183), Anderson (2001: 23), Teschl and Comim 
(2005), Giovanola (2005: 253-259), Sugden (2006: 40-43), and Watts (2009: 426-434). It also links up with a 
broader body of literature dealing with the concept of adaptive selves. The main recognized problem is that 
this phenomenon, though not necessarily harmful in itself, nevertheless has the potential to form desires or 
preferences that are (1) either offensive or (2) unacceptably expensive or cheap, and that are naturally not 
parsed in welfarism’s quest for utility optimization. Naturally, fine distinctions need to be made here, 
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Third desideratum (c) (distributional compatibility with respect for personal 
agency) 
 
6. The ‘agency argument’ states that welfarism, by treating individuals as 
nothing more than ‘mere loci’, acting as generators of utility, foregoes vital 
consideration of their persons as autonomous agents in the world, endowed 
with the fully endorsable right to act upon (reasonable) self-formed 
comprehensive notions of the good and correspondent life-plans.410 
 
 The reader will immediately recognize that the respective tenability of 
these six arguments depends on the validity of a crucial assumption being made by 
capability theorists, notwithstanding the obvious fact that generic welfarism is 
now reduced solely to its utilitarian-based variants: it (utilitarian welfarism) 
employs inadequate (or inexistent) ‘parsing procedures’ for the utilities that are to 
be distributed. Instead, it is depicted as if all utilities, once identified, are treated 
essentially as equal411 for purposes of distribution, and as if the sole goal of the 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
regarding the time frame of occurrence, actual necessity and beneficence, as well as true cases warranting 
retroactive compensation, when dealing with preference adaptation. This is required in order to be able to 
separate truly problematic instances thereof from benign or even beneficial ones, and is discussed at length 
by Qizilbash (1997) and Clark (2009a). 
410
 This argument is captured eloquently by Sen with his liberal paradox. this paradox showed that, within a 
system of menu-independent social choice, it is impossible to have both a commitment to ‘Minimal Liberty’, 
which was defined as the ability to order tuples of choices, and Pareto optimality: Sen (1970); Sen (1982d); 
Sen (2009: 309-317). See also Rawls (1971 [1999]), Sen and Williams (1982: 4-5), Sen (1985d: 186-187), Sen 
(1987: 47, 58-60), Subramanian (1995), Hees (2000), and Giovanola (2005: 251-253) on this important topic. 
411
 This is not entirely accurate, insofar as utilities are filtered along such criteria as duration, intensity, 
reoccurrence, etc. However, this filtering only serves the purpose of distributional optimization, and it does 
not address the properly moral/consequential considerations at play here. 
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welfarist exercise becomes identifying their optimal distributional spread for 
subsequent application in real life.412 This characterization is what I refer to here 
as ‘crude welfarism’, and, though an ‘enduring cliché’ for some, it is highly 
misleading, and associating it in such manner with welfarism at large entails a 
significant ‘strawmanning’ of the competition, with regards to what a fully fleshed-
out even solely utilities-based distributive theory of justice is truly capable of. 
Indeed, the very idea that all utilities are to be blindly treated as equal is not 
even something that one can reasonably associate with the writings of the classical 
utilitarians. In the case of J.S. Mill, for instance, Mozaffar Qizilbash, Sumner, Robert 
Sugden, and a few others413 have all argued that Mill was quite concerned with the 
significant problem of utilities (pleasures) that are either offensive, expensive, 
cheap, or adaptive, and that this lead him to outline specific selection 
procedures414 to ensure that the only utilities that end up promoted are those that 
are adequately informed and respective of individual autonomy and agency. 
Furthermore, they also argue that Mill’s overall views, when properly understood, 
actually entail the promotion of a form of ‘capability equality’ that highlights 
significant similarities between his utilitarian theory, and the capability theories 
                                                             
412
 Chang (2000: 180) writes “…Sen criticizes any version of welfarism, which deems information regarding 
“different sources of utility and the motivation underlying it” to be morally irrelevant. Sen argues that this 
“uncompromising rejection of the relevance of non-utility information” makes welfarism “a very limiting 
approach.” (references omitted)”. 
413
 Qizilbash (2006: 25-26); Qizilbash (2007: 180); Sumner (2006: 9-10, 12-13); Sugden (2006); Chang (2000: 
193-195); Giovanola (2005: 252); Nussbaum (2000e: 140-142); Nussbaum (2001b: 80-85); Nussbaum (2005: 
175); Nussbaum (2007b: 8, 15n14, 17n18, 35, 54, 66). Interestingly enough, Nussbaum recognizes these 
important aspects of Mill’s theory, despite arguing that they are ultimately unsuccessful in salvaging his 
utilitarianism; Sen (2006a); Bénicourt (2004: 77-78). 
414
 These involved favouring utilities that have been endorsed by his ‘competent judges’. 
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advanced by Sen and Nussbaum.415 This notable likeness between a ‘refined’ 
welfarist approach that relies on adequate selection procedures for choosing 
strictly ‘choice utilities’ for distribution, and the capabilities approach, has been 
further highlighted by Herrero, Singer, and Dorsey416 , insofar as such an 
appropriate welfarist variant would end up promoting (and prioritizing), from 
within its pool of selected utilities, those that are also conceptually equivalent to 
choice capabilities (depending on which key capabilities — those of Sen or 
Nussbaum — end up chosen) 417. 
While one may thus grant that classical utilitarians did indeed anticipate 
the six counterarguments levelled against welfarism by capability theorists (to 
greater or lesser degrees of success), one may still maintain that a characteristic 
feature of contemporary welfarism, namely ‘informational constraint’, necessarily 
precludes the use of any such morally-related parsing data in assessing utility 
distribution models, and that this effectively re-exposes it to the six 
counterarguments in question. In other words, to try and introduce any additional 
non-utilitarian information into the equation would move us further and further 
away from welfarism.418 However, I find this argument unconvincing, insofar as I 
simply see no good reason why one ought to be constricted by this requirement. 
Just because the original idea was to maintain conceptual and practical ‘purity’ in 
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 Qizilbash (2006: 23-25, 27-32); Sumner (2006: 7-9, 13-16) 
416
 Herrero (1996: 84); Singer (2002: 2-5); Dorsey (2008: 432-436) 
417
 More accurately, such a theory would give first priority to the distribution of utilities understood as the 
desire, choice or preference for the presence of key capabilities. 
418
 Nussbaum (2000e: 126-127, 129) 
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terms of treating everyone as counting equally (with all utilities being treated as 
equivocal), clearly holding on to this idea becomes rather futile when faced with 
the onslaught of problems that it engenders. Hence, one can appreciate how 
conceding the need for filtering utilities along moral lines constitutes a natural 
move in this case, and why accepting the higher conceptual load that this 
generates simply becomes a necessary burden to bear for any refined welfarist 
theory that aspires to be successful. 
As a matter of fact, contemporary welfarists, being well aware of these 
numerous problems, have also proposed a variety of techniques intended to 
accomplish this very task. These are characterized by their attempts at ‘laundering 
preferences’.419 Though the ultimate success of these attempts is debateable420, the 
difficulties stem, not from the very idea of preference laundering being somehow 
fundamentally deficient, but rather from said techniques not having been 
sufficiently developed, consolidated, and fleshed out. But then, what would proper 
and fully-developed techniques for filtering utilities look like? From the onset, it is 
clear that such techniques would need to be capable of simultaneously capturing 
the aggregative effects of all possible utility spreads and their respective 
consequences, in order that an optimal distribution pattern be selected — one that 
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 Chang (2000: 183-194).  See also Anderson (2001: 24-25, 37-38). 
420
 Both Sen (1985b: 16) and Nussbaum (2000e: 122-132) express doubts regarding the ultimate success of 
the respective attempts by Bliss, Harsanyi, Becker, and Brandt at ‘laundering preferences’ within the 
welfarist framework. This, despite the fact that Nussbaum recognizes the need and possibility for 
proceduralism in helping to select choice preferences (135-136), and later incorporates this selection 
technique as one of her ‘approaches to moral reasoning’ into her own theory (see The Morally-Constrained 
Proceduralist or Informed-Desire Approach discussed in section 3.8 of the previous chapter). 
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is, at the very least, morally optimal, all other things considered.421 In this respect, 
the associated massive informational and regulative requirements for such a task 
suggest that an approach based on a PIMASA, as discussed in the previous chapter, 
appears to be the best (and possibly minimal) means required for achieving this 
end. This is in no way surprising, insofar as the role of ideal observer theory in 
choosing select utilities constitutes a recurring theme for a number of 
contemporary welfarists and utilitarians, in their many suggestions regarding 
utility filtering.422 However, if one truly were to adopt a PIMASA as the means 
through which utilities are to be selected, under an optimally refined welfarist 
variant, what would its respective implications be, and how would it fare against 
the six counterarguments levelled against its crude variant? 
For a glimpse regarding its probable implications, we can extrapolate from 
the results obtained from section 3.5 of the previous chapter. Following the 
distinction between universal (hence moral) and personal judgments, regarding 
the value of a variety of possible states of affairs, and their respective priorities in 
selecting the ones that are to be brought about, we can conclude that, once all 
possible utility spreads become assessed, the pool of possible utilities would come 
to be broken down into two main types: ‘essential’ and ‘non-essential’ utilities, as 
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 In other words, such techniques would need to be capable of identifying possible utility spreads that 
leave no moral remainders behind as a result of the actual act of utility distribution itself. 
422
 The relationship between ideal observer theory and their respective theories is discussed by Harsanyi 
(1982: 39-41, 55), Brandt (see numerous references in chapter three), and Singer (2002: 2). A thorough 
examination of this very possibility of salvaging utilitarian welfarism by combining it with ideal observer 
theory-based selection procedures for choosing appropriate utilities is undertaken by Sobel (1994). Though 
he ends up sceptical with regards to this possibility, this is partly due to him not considering the possibility 
of employing a PIMASA in order to reach these ends. 
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corresponding respectively to desire, choice, or preference for (and possibly 
pleasure or happiness gained from) universally agreed-upon states of affairs, and 
non-universally agreed-upon states of affairs. Essential utilities would then be 
given distributive priority at the first-level of distribution.423 Non-essential utilities 
could then be entertained as candidates for second-level distribution (for further 
non-moral levels of social improvement), though this would not be absolutely 
required. 
However, this would also present us with an additional problem that has 
been identified in that section: Because non-essential utilities would correspond to 
desire, choice, or preference for states of affairs that are effectively morally-
neutral, they could then be distributed following any one of the possible 
distributive patterns developed by economists thus far, without any negative 
repercussions occurring along the way (so long as this naturally not undermine 
the distribution of the essential ones). However, while such a distribution would 
not be condemned by the PIMASA in any way, it could not be condoned by it either. 
This is because non-essential utilities amount to benign objects of personal fancy 
or luxury, in the eyes of ideal observers, and, while it is ‘neither good nor bad to 
have them’, there is simply no existing mechanism from within the PIMASA that 
could favour distributing some of them over others.424 In other words, the PIMASA 
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 If the conclusion of the previous chapter is also correct, then said essential utilities would also include (as 
a minimum), preference for Nussbaum’s central human capabilities. 
424
 The only exception would involve utilities that may appear prima facie to be non-essential, but whose 
distribution actually ends up impacting the realization of essential ones. The distributional requirements for 
such ‘transitive utilities’ would then be directly linked to their respective impact on the essential ones. 
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simply offers no arbitration mechanisms for resolving any and all conflicts 
pertaining to the distribution of non-essential utilities.425 
These realizations also hold direct implications for the manner and overall 
success of a PIMASA-based ‘supremely refined’ welfarist variant in answering the 
six counterarguments levelled against crude welfarism by capability theorists. 
Consider the following: 
 
1. Regarding the ‘inherent value argument’, its actual pertinence would 
now be reduced solely to non-essential utilities. However, since a 
PIMASA-based welfarist variant also includes and prioritized 
essential utilities within its distributive mandate, the allegation 
according to which welfarism cannot successfully capture other 
salient aspects of well-being would be effectively defeated by the 
PIMASA-based welfarist variant. 
 
2. Regarding the ‘offensive tastes objection’, a PIMASA-based welfarist 
variant clearly disregards utilities associated with such states of 
affairs, thereby defeating the objection. 
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 The problem is even starker if one fully endorses such a version of welfarism. For, not only would there 
be no selective mechanism from within the PIMASA to choose an appropriate distributive spread of non-
essential utilities, but no such external mechanism could ever be morally justified by way of the PIMASA 
either. Hence, the arbitrariness of selecting a distributive pattern for non-essential utilities could, in 
principle, never be contested on any moral grounds properly speaking as such, so long as said grounds 
ultimately lead us back to ideal observer theory. 
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3. Regarding the ‘expensive tastes objection’, a PIMASA-based welfarist 
variant would do the following: first, it would seek a distributive 
spread that would avoid the endorsement, production, or 
enablement of non-sustainable ostentatious or onerous tastes 
required for normal functioning in any society; second, it would seek 
to compensate, up to a reasonable mean426, expensive tastes arising 
out of handicap or misfortune; third, it would remain indifferent, 
regarding the promotion of any remaining expensive tastes that are 
otherwise morally non-offensive, so long as the circumstantial 
possibilities permit it. 
 
4. Regarding the ‘pleasure wizard objection’, a PIMASA-based welfarist 
variant simply disregards the intensity of the pleasure gained from 
utilities as the key (or sole) fundamental ground for establishing 
distributive priority, in favour of their classification along the lines of 
essential and non-essential ones. Hence, the objection does not 
apply. 
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 Indeed, lacking such a proscription would entail an unreasonable diversion of resources towards the 
compensation of extreme types of handicaps. Arneson (2000: 55-58) observes that this is a problem which 
threatens to befall the capabilities approach as well, if similar restrictions are not envisaged therein. 
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5. Regarding the ‘adaptive tastes objection’, same reply as for the 
‘pleasure wizard objection’, only regarding the non-ideal observer 
theory based origin of the taste this time. 
 
6. Regarding the agency argument, while the PIMASA-based welfarist 
variant does place some reasonable restrictions on the types of 
utilities that individuals are free to pursue, it maintains significant 
flexibility in terms of the likeness of essential utilities to central 
human capabilities (inheriting their associated multiple 
realizability), and by remaining indifferent to non-essential ones. 
 
One can tell from the above tally that a PIMASA-based welfarist variant is 
significantly more successful at answering the six counterarguments levelled 
against crude welfarism than other variants that employ no or inadequate filtering 
procedures for the utilities that are to be distributed. While its rebuttal is 
particularly successful against counterarguments 1, 2, 4 and 5, it presents some 
difficulties with counterarguments 3 and 6. There are two main reasons for this. 
First, whilst a PIMASA-based welfarist variant can correct for otherwise 
superfluous expensive tastes made unreasonably necessary out of social fancy for 
the appearance of wealth by distributing in such a way as to mitigate such social 
tendencies in question, it becomes hard-pressed when faced with cases of severe 
handicap or misfortune, requiring heavy resource transfers to attain a semblance 
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of normal living.427 For, while preference adaptation is a clearly recognizable and 
‘cheap’ way out in such circumstances (at least on the subjective level)428, it is 
unclear that distribution in order to generate such adaptation is something that can 
be clearly extrapolated from within a PIMASA. Second, while the multiple pursuit 
of reasonable comprehensive doctrines of the good is something that can be 
allowed and even assisted by the inclusion of central human capabilities amongst 
the essential utilities to be distributed, the PIMASA-based welfarist variant 
effectively hits a wall when such comprehensive doctrines also seek out non-
essential utilities, due to a PIMASA’s inability to arbitrate amongst possible non-
essential utility distribution schemes.429 
Hence, the six counterarguments levelled by capability theorists against 
crude welfarism are highly successful only as long as no serious attempt is made to 
filter utilities before seeking to optimize them by way of a variety of possible 
distributive spreads. Once such attempts are duly introduced, however, these 
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 See: Nussbaum (1992: 228); Nussbaum (2006: §§ 2-3). 
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counterarguments lose much of their potency (and this goes without even 
considering other possible non-utilitarian based welfarist alternatives). 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the resultant maximally refined welfarist 
variant would also bear striking similarities to the foundational project, insofar as 
it would include, amongst its prioritized essential utilities, something akin to 
Nussbaum’s central human capabilities.430 Its major drawbacks relate to the fact 
that it could not satisfactorily mandate for one possible distributive spread of non-
essential utilities over another, due to the impossibility of arbitrating amongst 
them from within a PIMASA, and to the fact that it has difficulties accommodating 
cases of severe handicap or misfortune. While this may be taken as evidentiary of 
the foundational project’s residual superiority over a PIMASA-based welfarist 
variant, it would be a false conclusion to draw. This is because the foundational 
project simply avoids distributive questions beyond those pertaining to the central 
human capabilities, and has similar problems accommodating cases of severe 
handicap or misfortune, even along its central human capabilities. In most other 
respects, however, the foundational project and a PIMASA-based welfarist variant 
appear to be normatively very close, if not outright identical. 
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4.3 The role of agency 
 
 The theme of personal agency and autonomy has appeared a number of 
times in the various discussions surrounding the capabilities vs. resources vs. 
utilities debate explored in the previous two sections. In particular, both crude 
resourcism and welfarism have been criticized on the grounds that their proposed 
distributive spreads entail paying insufficient attention to the need for respect of 
individual agency and autonomy. In the case of crude resourcism, this was due to 
the fact that distributing commodities and services in a non-judicious fashion ends 
up (i) severely handicapping the ability of individuals to convert said resources 
into a number of valuable functionings, and (ii) severely undercutting any say that 
individuals may have in determining how said resources ought be distributed, in 
terms of any social-political planning on their part. In the case of crude welfarism, 
the outcome was similar, though this was now due to the fact that any unfettered 
form of utility distribution seeking optimization simply undercut any form of 
tangible personal action in determining which types of preferences, choices, or 
desires would be tallied up (asides from those salient to the pure utilitarian 
calculus), and what kind of world this would end up creating. 
In essence, both these crude alternatives violate our key liberal intuitions, 
suggesting that individuals ought to have, not only significant levels of reasonable 
freedoms in terms of what is available to them in the world, but also in terms of 
how much they can also end up influencing and affecting the world, in order to 
transform it (or at least parts of it) into something that is to their liking, as 
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determined by their respective personal comprehensive doctrines of the good. 
Refined versions of these alternatives sought to correct these drawbacks by 
suggesting distribution of resources and utilities that actually end up conceptually 
in accordance with the granting of the liberties in question, all other things 
considered. Since the stalwart reference point of said liberties resides with the 
distribution of central human capabilities, for capability theorists, it is also not 
surprising that astute defenders of refined resourcism and welfarism have 
suggested that such variants could overcome the multitude of counterarguments 
levelled against them by at least minimally distributing resources or utilities that 
end up conceptually equivalent to some such central capabilities in question. 
 However, there is another matter that comes into play here. The agency-
based arguments formulated by capability theorists against resourcism and 
welfarism presuppose that the specific kinds of personal liberties inherent to, and 
made possible by, central human capabilities, constitute, not only a practical 
possibility, but also a wholly recognizable worthwhile good, worthy of pursuit by 
any optimal distributive theory of justice. Indeed, the foundational project is also 
supported by a specific (if not tacit) underlying theory of agency and personal 
autonomy, insofar as it carries with it a number of metaphysically-based 
normative presuppositions. This is made evident by its proposed distribution of 
central human capabilities, aimed at enabling significant levels of individual 
planning and choice, by furnishing persons with the materials by way of which 
they can then select, from a variety of possible capability and functioning bundles, 
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those that end up constitutive of what will eventually become their agency-in-the-
world.431 
The problem is that these underlying presuppositions, and their normative 
outcomes, are not shared by all. Indeed, it has been argued, by a number of 
authors, that the type of methodological individualism inherent in the very 
conceptual fabric of the foundational project reflects a number of flaws of varying 
degrees of severity. Firstly, Phillips, as well as Fabre and Miller, draw our attention 
to the specific (and unproven) metaphysical presuppositions regarding the very 
existence of personal autonomy in humans, as assumed by Nussbaum in her 
foundational project.432 Secondly, though not outright unsympathetic to the 
foundational project, Stewart and Deneulin have nevertheless argued that 
‘structures of living together’ (and not just the presence of capabilities) ought to 
constitute an additional space of evaluation for assessing the quality of life, and 
also one which may be influenced by development policies.433 Thirdly (and more 
strongly), Uyan-Semerci has emphasized the fact that we are embedded in a 
cultural, social and religious environment, and that this both precludes, as well as 
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influences (to a significant degree), any kind of ‘free independent autonomy’ that 
we may be able to acquire. In response, she emphasizes the fact that many cultures 
adopt a ‘relationality’ approach to human coexistence, which, together with the 
notion of ‘crowded selves’, reflects how some individuals think in the collective 
(we) as opposed to the singular (I). She then carefully demonstrates how this 
intricate relationality actually permeates each of Nussbaum’s central 
capabilities.434 Finally, Nelson argued that strictly defined autonomy (if it exists) 
and redistribution are not mutually compatible, neither under Rawls’ theory, nor 
under capability theories.435 
The existing philosophical body of literature on the important questions of 
agency and autonomy is sizeable, and any serious attempt at fully rebutting these 
various worries would require development stretching well beyond the scope of 
this present chapter.436 I will therefore limit myself here to proposing a number of 
possible avenues of defence that proponents of the foundational project can adopt 
in seeking at least to appease, if not outright alleviate, these various 
communitarian claims. 
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 Let us begin with the first and strongest argument, namely the metaphysical 
one. To properly address it, this argument first needs to have its two respective 
underlying presuppositions disentangled. The first one concerns the need for the 
actual metaphysical existence (and demonstration thereof) of some sort of 
fundamental agency-based personal autonomy. However, that is not something 
that is actually required by the foundational project. The foundational project does 
not require (or even envisage) that individuals act as ‘self-creating locus of the 
self’, capable of literally ‘creating themselves out of thin air’, without any regards 
to their genetic, physical, psychological, educational, and socio-cultural 
environmental origins, influences, and various other considerations. Quite to the 
contrary, the foundational project recognizes the profound embeddedness of 
individuals within these various existential spheres, and fully understands the 
need for procurement of a variety of specific materials and spaces for the creation 
of the adult self. This is evident in its proposed distribution of central human 
capabilities which act, both as said material, as well as said space, within which 
these adult selves in question are then capable of forming. Consequently, the 
foundational project only requires endorsing the modest existence of the 
possibility of full-fledged adult agency formation with the specific aid provided by 
procurement of central human capabilities — and that is an aspect of the 
development of human beings which one would actually be hard-pressed to argue 
against, as opposed to be forced to demonstrate at some fundamental 
metaphysical level. Hence, one actually only needs to be a ‘soft’, as opposed to a 
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‘hard’, realist, with regards to the existence of human agency-autonomy, to 
support the possibility of the foundational project. 
 The second presupposition concerns the underlying idea that 
demonstration of the metaphysical existence of human agency-autonomy would 
somehow serve to provide support for the endorsement of the foundational 
project. This presupposition is flawed on two accounts. First, Nussbaum has 
already explored the significant difficulties involved in making any kind of 
successful demonstrations regarding the actual existence of fundamental 
metaphysical truths in her discussion on the kind of Aristotelian ‘essentialism’ that 
she envisaged as one of her early moral justification techniques for the 
foundational project.437 Naturally, these same problems carry over for anyone 
attempting a similar hard-and-fast demonstration of the bona fide essentialist 
foundations for the existence of human agency-autonomy. Second, even if the 
metaphysical existence thereof were to somehow become demonstrated, that 
would still not aid the advocate of the foundational project because of the 
(in)famous ‘is-ought’ problem, which states that a properly justified normative 
claim simply cannot be inferred from an actual observable state of affairs (hence 
one cannot derive an ‘ought’ from an ‘is’).438 It would thus only serve to show that 
the kind of agency-autonomy that Nussbaum envisaged as an underlying condition 
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for her foundational project is most-definitely, at the deepest and most 
fundamental level, quite possible — but not that this also automatically makes it 
something worthwhile to endorse. Something more is needed and this is where we 
need to look at the next argument. 
 Moving on to the general ‘embeddedness of human living’ argument, three 
distinct sub-claims can be derived from it. The first states that the foundational 
project takes inadequate account of this embeddedness in articulating its plans for 
central capabilities-based agency-autonomy. The second states that this 
embeddedness severely handicaps the ability of individuals in exercising said 
central capabilities-based agency-autonomy in question. The third states that 
embedded individuals have access to some form of (collective) moral truth that 
ultimately questions or contradicts the moral goodness of implementing the 
foundational project. Responding to the first claim, while conceding its relevance 
and importance, one only need to point to the actual high degree of holistic 
consideration that comes into play in articulating the foundational project, 
especially with regards to the nature of the central human capabilities themselves, 
and (most importantly) to their multiple realizability.439 Responding to the second, 
one need to point to the fact that, if the foundational project truly does constitute a 
morally-justifiable distributive theory of justice (as has been argued at length in 
the previous chapter), then any ‘disturbance’ that this may cause to the 
embeddedness of individual lives constitutes a possibly unfortunate, yet quite 
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justifiable, consequence of moving towards greater states of generalized well-
being. Responding to the third, one simply need to refer oneself to the ultimate 
moral justification for the foundational project, as derived from running it through 
a PIMASA, as explained in the previous chapter. Hence, if all salient information is 
included in the process (including that proper to the alleged collective moral truth 
available to imbedded individuals) and the foundational project still comes out on 
top, then the moral goodness of implementing the foundational project trumps 
such other considerations in the end. 
 Turning now to the final argument, regarding the alleged incompatibility 
between strict autonomy and redistribution, it is important to emphasize that this 
is something that is, in fact, fully realized by proponents of the foundational 
project. Indeed, the specific type of autonomy made possible by the foundational 
project is only of the ‘select capability type’, and it only concerns the natural 
outcome of universal distribution of central human capabilities. Furthermore, it is 
clear that strict unfettered individual choice in deciding whether to have the 
foundational project ‘dropped on one’s head or not’ is not something that is 
envisaged as desirable by proponents of the foundational project, nor is this in any 
way denied. Indeed, the previous chapter emphasized the overriding quality that 
application of a PIMASA in vindicating distributive theories of justice bears on the 
limits of individual freedom of choice, together with strong consideration for why 
this is something that is perfectly defendable. Hence, while conceding the 
existence of a fundamental level of incompatibility between strict autonomy and 
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redistribution, the same cannot be said for capability distribution and capability 
distribution-derived resultant autonomy, as conceptualized within the 
foundational project. 
 These various possible avenues of rebuttal, though only formulated here at 
a very basic and embryonic stage, can nevertheless serve to show that 
communitarian arguments against the conceptual foundations underlying the 
specific notions of agency and autonomy, as found in the foundational project, are 
either unfounded (as in the case of the metaphysical one), or weaker than they 
first appear (as in the case of the embeddedness one and of the alleged 
incompatibility between autonomy and distribution one). While it remains true 
that methodological individualism remains a key feature of the foundational 
project (and of the capabilities approach in general), this does not imply that the 
foundational project actually condones a form of individualistic egoism or socio-
cultural atomism. Quite on the contrary, Sen, Nussbaum, and other capability 
theorists are well aware of the severe problems and drawbacks that appear in 
various societies where these tendencies tend to take over or end up reigning 
supreme, and they remain succinctly aware of the need to retain and preserve a 
variety of existential spheres (family, group, religion, affiliation, etc.) around 
human individuals, in order for them to be able to lead healthy, worthwhile, and 
fulfilling lives.440 This being said, the foundational project unashamedly retains the 
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key philosophical principle that individual human well-being within a well-ordered 
society — as opposed to outside of, or to the detriment of, such a society — ought 
to become one of the key goals of any worthwhile distributive theory of justice. 
And if this perspective is correct (as I believe it is), then it also entails that the 
agency argument formulated against crude versions of resourcism and welfarism 
continues to stand unabated. 
 
4.4 Selection procedures revisited 
 
 I have argued in the previous chapter that the optimal method for selecting 
an appropriate theory of distributive justice should involve running all proposed 
candidates through a PIMASA, and I have provided evidence for why multiple 
moral arguments formulated in favour of the foundational project would pass such 
a test. I will now make the further claim that the very idea of utilizing conditions of 
ideal observation in determining the appropriate distributive object and spread 
for any tangible distributive theory of justice constitutes a key reoccurring theme 
in the capabilities vs. resources vs. utilities debate as well. 
Evidence for this assertion can be gathered from the following facts: First, 
the reader will notice that the variety of arguments formulated against crude 
versions of resourcism and welfarism essentially amount to stipulating that their 
proponents failed to fulfill a number of conditions of ideal observation, in 
articulating their proposals. Hence, if the ultimate desirable end-state is the 
distribution of capability-freedoms, then it is only natural that crude (direct) 
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resources and crude (unfettered) utilities are, not only inadequate at the 
fundamental level, but also that their distribution would invariably lead to a 
variety of undesirable consequences, and violate a number of aspects proper to 
the preservation of, and respect for, personal agency and autonomy. Second, the 
reader will also notice that the various progressive refinements proposed by 
defenders of resourcism (abstraction from commodities and services to basic 
needs, to Rawlsian primary goods) and welfarism (ongoing development of utility 
selection procedures and limitation criteria) are illustrative of them becoming 
more and more cognizant of these various drawbacks, and essentially seeking to 
reformulate their theories in light of conditions of ideal observation, all the while 
holding on, as far as possible, to the core conceptual aspects thereof. Third, I have 
also made clear that allusions or references to ideal observer theory in selecting 
an appropriate distributive object already exist in the writings of a number of 
prominent resourcist and welfarist candidates. 
Hence, the idea of utilizing ideal observer theory pertains, not only to the 
moral justification of the foundational project, as explored in the previous chapter, 
but also to the outright resolution of the capabilities vs. resources vs. utilities 
debate. An appropriate move would therefore involve not only making allusions 
and references to it, but actually supplementing the entire debate as additional 
data to be fed into a PIMASA. 
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Conclusion: 
 
 The very idea of distributive justice constitutes a key theoretical theme for 
capability theorists, and a central aspect of Nussbaum’s foundational project. It is 
therefore only natural that one of the central tasks involved in the global defence 
of the overall preferability of the foundational project involves defending it against 
other ‘competing’ distributive theories of justice. However, while capability 
theorists selected three perfectly reasonable desiderata against which to judge the 
competition, their actual portrayals of said competition left much to be desired in 
terms of their true strengths and possibilities. Indeed, while the numerous 
arguments formulated by capability theorists have been shown to work quite well 
against crudely defined resourcist and utility-based welfarist variants, one can 
also see how they lose much of their potency, once said variants become 
sufficiently refined. Also, it has been shown that very highly refined resourcist and 
welfarist variants either do end up, or would end up, conceptually (or at least 
normatively) very similar to the capabilities approach.441 
This primary and highly important revelation holds significant implications 
for all advocates of the foundational project: on the one hand, the original claim 
that the foundational project is superior to resourcism and welfarism, on a variety 
of alleged grounds, ends up disappearing; on the other, the main reason why the 
foundational project is no longer superior to resourcism and welfarism is precisely 
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because refined resourcism and welfarism end up very much akin to the 
capabilities approach. In other words, capability theorists lose one argument, but 
gain another. Hence, if the probable outcome of running all possible distributive 
theories of justice through a PIMASA truly does ends up producing a final theory 
that warrants the distribution of something akin to central human capabilities, as a 
bare required minimum, then that constitutes a significant point in favour of the 
foundational project. 
However, the theoretical use of a PIMASA in selecting the best possible 
distributive theory of justice also reveals some additional limiting implications. 
First, we have seen that the problem of compensation for severe handicap or 
misfortune constitutes a problem, not only for resourcists and welfarists, but also 
for capability theorists. If such situations constitute genuine cases of ‘hard choices’ 
or ‘irresolvable tragic dilemmas’ (see section 3.2 of previous chapter), then no 
possible distribution of any of the proposed objects (whether refined or not), 
under any of the proposed spreads, can resolve them satisfactory, and no gracing 
justification for them can ever be granted by way of a PIMASA. Second, we have 
seen that, whereas a PIMASA can be used to justify minimal distribution of central 
human capabilities, it can neither condone, nor refute, any additional possible 
distributional spreads over-and-above that initial one. Hence, any remaining 
resources, utilities, or capabilities (however conceived) could then end up 
distributed in any variety of possible ways. These could follow strict equality 
models of distribution, difference principle models, desert models, libertarian 
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models, or any of the other possible existing spreads that have been proposed thus 
far in the relevant literature. The problem is that, no matter what model would 
end up adopted, no moral assessment and ultimate justification nor condemnation 
thereof could ever be reached by using a PIMASA. Finally, we have seen that the 
notion of a ‘person’, as utilized by capability theorists in the articulation of their 
approach, and as implied in their criticisms of crude resourcism and welfarism, is 
by no means as clear cut or problem-free as they thought it would be. Though 
some preliminary avenues of defence have been suggested here, significantly more 
development on this topic needs to be undertaken before the capabilities 
approach becomes endowed with a truly solid conceptual foundation, regarding 
this specific underlying theoretical aspect thereof. 
Ultimately, the capabilities vs. resources vs. utilities debate amounts to a 
false trilemma. There is no inherent conflict present there, insofar as each theory 
can be duly and fairly articulated as advocating the minimal distribution of what 
corresponds to (at least) central human capabilities. While this is certainly a 
positive development for advocates of the capabilities approach, the additional 
implications discovered thereby serve as a cautious reminder of the inherent 
limitations of any distributive theory of justice that essentially focuses on the 
distribution of some basic minimum, and either omits or ignores what is to be done 
over and above it, in the rightful organization of social living and justice for all. 
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Chapter 5: Addressing the challenge of the Realpolitiker 
 
Introduction: 
 
In the previous chapters we have explored two key obstacles to the 
practical realization of Martha Nussbaum’s foundational project. These include 
specific theoretical as well as moral drawbacks that have been identified, either 
directly with her foundational project, or with the capabilities approach in general. 
Hence, conceptual problems of ambiguity and underdetermination befalling the 
capabilities metric have been shown to be caused by a rather loose and 
inconsistent use of the various capabilities terms by capability theorists 
themselves. In response, I have suggested that capability theorists stick to a 
standardized account of the capabilities metric in order to overcome these various 
problems, and I articulated a sketch of what such an account would look like. 
Regarding the variety of argumentative strategies employed by Nussbaum to 
morally defend her theory, I have shown that these are founded on a tacit 
endorsement of ideal observer theory, and I argued for the full-fledged use of an 
institutionalized form of ideal observation (PIMASA), in order to arrive at a final 
verdict regarding the overall moral value of Nussbaum’s foundational project. In 
passing, I also made an anticipatory assessment of the probable outcome of such 
an exercise, together with specific consequences for the foundational project. 
Finally, as an important extension to the moral class of drawbacks befalling the 
foundational project, I explored the alleged superiority of the capabilities 
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approach over existing resourcist and welfarist competitors, and found it to be 
rather unfounded. However, this was done in light of the startling revelation that 
refined versions of resourcism and welfarism appear to endorse a form of 
capability distribution as well, effectively conceding the inherent superiority of 
capabilities in the long run. 
The third obstacle standing in the way of full implementation of 
Nussbaum’s foundational project is of the institutional variety. More accurately, a 
number of authors have observed that Nussbaum holds a rather naïve view of the 
actual role and intent of governments, as well as a variety of non-government 
organizations, and their various institutional branches and affiliates, in helping to 
implement the foundational project. In particular, it is argued that the nature of 
power-relations at this key level of society is severely overlooked by Nussbaum, 
and that a proper focus on the creation of desirable power-equilibria constitutes a 
quasi-unavoidable move, if such institutional actors are to be at all helpful in 
practically implementing Nussbaum’s foundational project. Hence, this last 
chapter is divided into four sections, intended to explore and suggest a number of 
further avenues of development pertaining to this all-important and quite difficult 
topic. The first enumerates the recognizable blind-spots in Nussbaum’s thinking at 
this level, together with the variety of nefarious consequences that this can 
engender if she attempted an ‘as is’ practical implementation of her capabilities 
approach through the presently existing powers that be. The second proposes that 
a greater focus on the creation of desirable power-equilibria, based on key 
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principles of Realpolitik442, can help to avoid such nefarious consequences, and 
orient said institutional actors in a manner that is beneficial to the honest 
implementation of her project. The third explores specific unavoidable problems 
that a hypothetical transition from current states of affairs to global capabilities 
distribution would necessarily entail, and the hard-choice consequences incurred 
thereby. The fourth examines some key characteristics of the optimal type of 
political regime(s) that this would require. Together, these four sections serve to 
sketch out important lines for further development regarding what needs to be 
done at the institutional level in order for Nussbaum’s foundational project to be 
capable of as smooth and honest an implementation as would be realistically 
possible. 
 
5.1 The variety of power-relations and Nussbaum’s many blind spots 
 
 Although dealing here specifically with Nussbaum’s version of the 
capabilities approach in relation to the ‘institutional challenge’, this is actually a 
general problem that has been identified in the work of capability theorists as a 
whole. Two main observations need to be made concerning this problem. First of 
all, the problem of power-relations is one that is usually taken to be either 
misunderstood, overlooked, inadequately examined, or sometimes downright 
ignored by capability theorists. Secondly, practically all proposed solutions to 
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overcoming these drawbacks are of the ‘Realpolitik’ variety, meaning that they 
suggest the realistically-based implementation of appropriate forms of power-
equilibria in order to bring about states of affairs where none of the interested 
parties involved is in a position to yield excessive levels of power, so as not to be 
able to disrupt the desirable social-political and economic equilibrium that is to be 
reached (or has been reached), for purposes of personal gain or benefit.443 I return 
to this second aspect of the problem in the next section of this chapter. In the 
meantime, it is highly informative to examine the many observations that have 
been made in this regard, in the respective works of Amartya Sen and Martha 
Nussbaum. 
 With regards to Sen’s capabilities approach, Frances Stewart and Severine 
Deneulin claim that it endorses an ‘idealistic’ concept of democracy, where there is 
an absence of political power, political economy, and struggle.444 When dealing 
with political economy, for instance, they observe that: 
 
“Some of the most important issues today concern the way 
"market forces," often at a global level, are influencing decision 
making, both within national democracies (and also non 
democracies) and in the determination of the global rulemaking of 
international agencies. But market forces here do not refer to the 
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supply and demand for goods and services depicted in textbooks, but 
the influence of large corporations on political decision making, 
through the financing of political parties, direct representation in 
powerful political parties, ownership and use of the media, and 
(probably of least importance) explicitly corrupt practices. The 
current outcome is a political system that increasingly favors global 
capitalism.”445 
 
Furthermore, while democratic consensus has been envisaged by Sen (as 
well as by many other capability theorists) as a possible tool for bringing about 
positive change, Stewart and Deneulin have the following to say about it: 
 
“In principle, the capabilities approach looks to democratic 
consensus to bring about the change needed. But a democratic 
consensus may not be able to achieve this (for some reasons 
mentioned in the first part of this essay). Here we would especially 
draw attention to the difficulties posed by the overwhelming power 
of large corporations which in many contexts shape the democratic 
consensus, while the locus of decision making (often a small 
individual nation) lacks the autonomy to make such decisions on its 
own. Decisions that challenge the capitalist system in a substantive 
way can only be effected by groups that wield power comparable to 
that of the interest groups being challenged. As noted, this almost 
invariably requires collective action of one kind or another.”446 
 
This being said, the authors are not dismissive in an outright manner of the 
importance and capacity of democratic freedom in bringing about such desirable 
change. Indeed, in a later article, Deneulin articulates the many ways in which 
democratic freedom is seen as a key component of capability selection, in allowing 
a PIMASA to do its function. The author even argues (albeit somewhat crudely) for 
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something along the lines of PIMASA-like procedures of public participation to do 
the job. However, she also claims that excessive political freedom at the expense of 
proceduralism can actually lead to capability deprivation, which is due to existing 
power inequalities in the exercise of political freedom skewing the balance. The 
author argues that proper proceduralism can prevent this by hedging the power of 
all participants involved in the process, hence achieving the very sort of ‘power-
equilibrium’ that interests us here.447 
Many diverse observations of a similar nature have also been made by a 
number of additional authors. Hence, Shyam J. Kamath shows that development 
can help alleviate unequal power relations by giving practical examples of positive 
changes that have taken place in three Indian states, though later commentators 
tend to be more careful regarding this claim.448 Vincente Navarro’s careful and in-
depth examination of Sen’s Development as Freedom illustrates how the absence of 
an analysis of the power relations that cause and reproduce underdevelopment 
through national and international political institutions leaves Sen’s work wanting. 
This is performed in the context of a careful analysis of Sen’s five instrumental 
freedoms, presented in his Development as Freedom.449 Stuart Corbridge alleges 
that problematic areas in Sen’s work revolve around his treatment of 
authoritarian rule, of the rights to difference of certain social groups, and of 
political power (amongst others). This is specifically done here in the context of 
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socio-cultural and gender-based power struggles and resultant inequalities, as has 
permeated much of Sen’s work (A similar albeit more sympathetic claim has also 
been made by Des Gasper450, regarding Sen’s take on power-relations and the 
various problems associated with authoritarian rule).451 Marianne Hill argues that, 
while Sen’s capability approach to human welfare recognizes the impact of social 
institutions on human capabilities, as an evaluative framework it does not analyze 
the role of institutionalized power in causing or perpetuating inequalities in 
individual opportunities to achieve.452 Christine Koggel suggests that we need to 
add further levels of complexity when we examine how global forces of power 
interact with local systems of oppression in ways that often limit women’s 
freedom. The author illustrates this specifically within the context of women’s paid 
work.453 Elaine Unterhalter illustrates how a superficial understanding of the 
school context by capability authors (by overlooking existing underlying power-
relations) undermines the capabilities approach’s abilities at enabling capability 
freedom. This is done by using the South African context as a test-bed.454 
Emmanuelle Bénicourt claims (albeit briefly) that Sen holds a rather superficial 
market-based notion of the role of the state in implementing capabilities. The 
author claims that Sen’s envisaged role for the state is effectively limited to 
‘activating’ market forces which will then self-stabilize through the process of ‘free 
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competition’, such that ‘all will be well’ afterwards. Any further forms of envisaged 
state-intervention are minimal and limited to correcting possible remaining small 
deficiencies that this autonomously-running system may exhibit.455 
Jay Drydyk argues that development can be democratically dysfunctional in 
three ways: exclusion from political activity, lack of influence by political activity 
over decision making, and lack of effect on capability shortfalls within the 
community. He concludes that the debate on participatory development points to 
dysfunctionalities of all three kinds, even within participatory development. 
Therefore, rather than merely calling for development to be more participatory, he 
suggests that we ought to call for it to be more democratic, by way of the 
capabilities approach.456 Deneulin demonstrates how existing power inequalities 
hamper the ability of individuals to successfully exercise their political freedom of 
democratic participation. She also argues that such exercise can actually lead to 
decisions that end up hampering the actual freedoms of individuals. She proposes 
a type of procedural (as opposed to a solely consequential) mode of assessment of 
development policies, based on the four requirements of phronesis, in order to 
monitor to what extent the exercise of political freedom successfully promotes 
human freedoms in political communities.457 Shelly Feldman and Paul Gellert 
argue that attention to state forms and practices, as well as unequal power 
relations, must be incorporated into analyses of capability and development, 
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which leads them to support Sen’s advocacy of deliberative democracy as a 
productive space for collectivities and individuals to strive for social justice and 
equity. Such a focus is necessarily attentive to multiple forms of inequality and 
domination, and is best understood by engaging historically specific analyses of 
state formations.458 Stephen Porter and Jacques de Wet explore the relationship 
amongst all agents participating in development as one essentially based on 
power-relations and power-struggles. The authors suggests that the guardians of 
development can be ‘guarded’ by having the capability approach strengthened by 
drawing on the literature of deliberative democracy, and by synthesizing the 
capability approach with a rights-based approach, whereby adequate 
implementation of the capabilities approach can best help to guard the 
guardians.459 Finally, Alexandre Apsan Frediani argues for the need to incorporate 
power relations into the capabilities approach in order to make it more suited to 
development economics, and he examines five specific types of ‘power modes’ that 
can clarify this. In doing so, the author also provides us with a rundown of the 
main figures involved in examining and highlighting the intimate links between 
power, agency and autonomy.460 
Together, these many authors all press forth the common claim that there is 
a recognizable and rather serious failing in Sen’s overall understanding and 
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analysis of the depth and extent to which existing power-relations, as well as 
power-imbalances, at various levels and strata of society, seriously upset (or 
threaten to upset) the proper implementation of the capabilities approach. 
Because of its close ties to Sen’s capabilities approach, Nussbaum’s 
foundational project is also affected by these various observations. However, 
because she envisaged and advocated for an even stronger governmental role in 
implementing and sustaining her more narrowly delimited version of this 
approach than Sen ever did, critiques of this type are all the more pertinent when 
it comes to her theory. This is further reinforced by authors who have taken on 
Nussbaum’s foundational project directly with regards to these specific issues. 
Hence, Henry S. Richardson claims that the role of social institutions in 
establishing international justice is underdeveloped by Nussbaum.461 Similarly, 
Phillip McReynolds recognizes the specifically authoritarian danger associated 
with implementing Nussbaum’s capabilities approach.462 Marianna Papastephanou 
argues at some length that Nussbaum’s idea of the role of cosmopolitan education 
in overcoming biased points of view is plagued by shortcomings (ethnocentrism 
and patriotism, which Nussbaum claims it avoids), and she presses for an 
implementation of a historical-relational dimension to Nussbaum’s account, in 
order to overcome its biased qualities. 463  Michael Skerker warns against 
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incompatibility and potential for abuse in a government-backed implementation of 
Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, especially when concerning a number of 
traditionally-minded communities.464 Andrea Boggio shows that the problem of 
power differentials is illustrated eloquently by transnational human rights 
litigation, as relate to the capabilities approaches of Sen and Nussbaum (in 
particular, it is argued that countries, as well as individuals, from which such 
claims originate, will be discriminated against by more powerful actors (namely 
companies), who are threatened by said litigation).465 Finally, Tony Fitzpatrick 
alleges that Nussbaum underestimates all that it takes to overcome injustice at the 
various levels of society.466  
While these specific observations have all had their notable effect, the most 
complete and direct criticism of Nussbaum’s capabilities approach along the lines 
of power-relations has been formulated by Nivedita Menon. Menon demonstrates 
quite clearly that Nussbaum’s overwhelming reliance on (and belief in) state 
power betrays a certain naivety regarding the extent of benevolence expected 
from such institutions, as well as blindness to the dangers of corruption of initial 
intent, abuse, and eventual tyranny. She illustrates this by way of many examples 
based on specific statements and claims taken directly from Nussbaum’s Women 
and Human Development, showing a gradual slide towards granting more and 
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more license for the state to intrude into people’s lives — which involves 
transferring many powers of decision to the state — while simultaneously 
attempting an (unsuccessful) reconciliation between paternalism and freedom of 
choice. Such examples include state coercion when enforcing the choices of 
children upon parents, as well as decisions regarding building codes, food, 
medicine and environmental contaminants based on the dubious allegation that 
that is not something that citizens are at all capable of determining for themselves, 
all the while itself engaging in such nefarious actions as toxic dumping and 
submitting their populations to dangerous activities like uranium mining, nuclear 
power plants and research for chemical warfare.467 The author also points out that 
Nussbaum’s specific notion of the state follows Charles Taylor’s interpretation of 
Hegel’s fully rational state — a naïve concept based on a state’s benign 
representation of people’s will in matters of governance. She argues that this is not 
possible in practice, basing herself on an example of the impossibility of 
legitimizing individual non-religious beliefs that go against state laws over 
‘legitimate’ religious ones, insofar as doing so “would quickly make a mockery of 
drug laws, of mandatory military service, and many other laws of general 
applicability’ (p. 208).” 468  Furthermore, Menon reaffirms that Nussbaum’s 
assumption of the state holding legitimate monopoly over coercion is especially 
problematic and dangerous, as illustrated by the specific cases of her endorsement 
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of mandatory military service469, and of the role Nussbaum envisages for the state 
in the education of children, as mentioned above470. 
Menon then further reinforces the validity of all these points above in a 
detailed example of the debate in India on the conflict between the rights of 
women and that of religious communities. It shows, both the dangers of ceding too 
much power to the state in a quest to improve justice, together with Nussbaum’s 
many misunderstandings of the situation leading to potentially dangerous policy 
suggestions on her part.471 Finally, the author observes that Nussbaum’s idea that 
nations that have endorsed the foundational project export it to others through 
force if need be fails to realize that the only nations capable of doing so right now 
are especially powerful ones, whose goals in foreign policy are often far from 
benevolent or benign, aimed squarely at preserving their national interests. The 
following quote drives this point home: 
 
“The universalism espoused by Nussbaum includes the idea 
that nations which have adopted this account of human capabilities 
should ‘commend this norm strongly to other nations’, using 
whenever necessary ‘economic and other strategies to secure 
compliance’ (p. 104). The only nation in a position to ‘secure 
compliance’ today is the United States of America. Thomas Friedman 
puts it succinctly when he says ‘The hidden hand of the market will 
never work without a hidden fist . . . and the hidden fist that keeps 
the world safe for Silicon Valley’s technologies to flourish is called 
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the US Army, Air Force, Navy and Marine Corps’. The US as global 
champion of universal human rights cannot but be seen in this 
context, with its selective regime of sanctions and human rights 
conditionalities protecting the interests of American and 
multinational corporations all over the world.”472 
 
Menon concludes her extensive critique with the following stark 
summary: 
 
“In short, Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, functioning in a 
vacuum where power is absent, fails altogether to come to grips with 
political realities, and not in India alone. Since Nussbaum presents 
this approach as a basis for policy recommendations in the interests 
of social justice, the failure is even more stark. The core reason for 
the failure, it seems to me, lies in its a priori characterization of the 
state as benign, the privileging of liberal individualism and the 
naturalization of culturally specific norms designated as ‘universal’ 
in an abstract space.”473 
 
 In other words, it is absolutely crucial for Nussbaum to take these very 
important aspects of power-relations into careful consideration if her foundational 
project is to avoid becoming another well-intentioned philosophical project that 
ironically ends up sanctioning various levels of state-backed injustice. How this 
may be accomplished is explored next. 
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5.2 The quest for desirable power-equilibria 
 
 One of the most important things to realize from the observations made by 
the numerous commentators above is the need for achieving appropriate forms of 
power-equilibria in order to avoid the many nefarious consequences that an 
unfettered form of the foundational project is likely to engender. In this vein, it is 
notable to observe that there is no proposal to discard presently existing 
institutional structures outright.474 Quite to the contrary, the need for various 
forms of institutional backing, in order to serve as an underlying framework for 
the implementation of the capabilities approach, is advocated by such diverse 
authors as Fred R. Dallmayr475, Sakiko Fukuda-Parr476, Saul Tobias477, J. P. Ruger 
478, Sharath Srinivasan479, and Rutger J.G. Claassen480 (in addition to Sen481 and 
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Nussbaum482 as well). To get a preliminary grasp at what such backing would 
consist in, we can look at the specific recommendations set forth by Stewart.483 
 The first and most important tool for attaining proper levels of power-
equilibria is appropriate monitoring of the social situation with correspondingly 
accurate levels of data collection, examination, and dissemination. This is by no 
means surprising, insofar as the implementation, as well as preservation of, power 
imbalances, relies on (and most probably has always relied on) intentional 
filtering of all information as it flows through the various strata of society.484 
Breaking down such intentional filtering is key to raising required awareness 
levels in individuals, that they may then be mobilized in order to bring about a 
redistribution of various social weights and counterweights, so that presently 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
479
 Srinivasan (2007: 460-76). The author argues that the good functioning of democracy needs to be 
buttressed by requirements of justice that would allow it to function in a manner consistent with capability 
egalitarianism. 
480
 Claassen (2009). The role of institutions is discussed in the context of their provision of care and media 
content to the public. Once again, their utility ought to be assessed in terms of the impact they cause on the 
enablement of morally relevant (central human) capabilities. 
481
 Sen (2009: 75-86, 111-113) 
482
 Nussbaum (2006: 306-310) provides us with four distinct reasons why the duties associated with global 
capability implementation are to be derivatively assigned to institutions. These include collective action 
problems, fairness, capacity, and a set of specific issues about personal life. 
483
 Stewart (1989). Though regarding basic needs, many such issues of enforcement can be transposed to 
the foundational project directly. Against this, Alkire (2006) argues that a proper understanding of the 
implementation of basic needs along capabilities allows one to avoid force-based need-implementation at 
the international level, thanks to the capabilities approach’s emphasis on freedom of choice. However, this 
conclusion foregoes the realization that such freedom of choice may itself require (at times rather drastic) 
force-based methods of implementation. 
484
 An adequate overview of this process in action enacted in order to coercively impose one’s beliefs upon 
others is provided by Kadt (2005). Furthermore, Sen (2006b) himself provides us with a thorough  account 
backed by multiple global examples of what can happen when the need for proper information 
dissemination becomes subverted towards the incitement of violence in order to effect regime changes. 
Note that this process begins at the level of early childhood education (whether by transmission of 
information through the parents, the community, or state-based early educational institutions) and that, for 
all intents and purposes, it continues on throughout the course of an adult’s life. 
221 
 
 
existing unjust situations be presented with an opportunity for rectification. As I 
have already dwelt upon this topic at some length in chapter three (and proposed 
an institutionalized procedural solution to accomplish the desired goal), I will not 
justify the inherent goodness of this first requirement any longer, other than to 
take it as a given. More pressingly, one needs to examine what needs to be done at 
the level of currently existing institutional structures, such that this desirable goal 
become, not only unimpeded but also pressed along nicely. 
 Indeed, Stewart observes that appropriate monitoring of the social situation 
is something that is rarely achievable to a high degree in the real world.485 Though 
this is no doubt due in no small part to existing inefficiencies and bottlenecks in 
data distribution systems (though this has diminished significantly more recently 
thanks to modern means of telecommunication), it is intentional data skewing and 
containment (i.e., a combination of censorship and propaganda) that is of 
immediate interest to us. But what motivates such activity? One possible 
explanatory avenue that seems quite likely (and that has also been extensively 
explored) involves what I call here the ‘Foucauldian thesis’. Indeed, Foucault’s 
ideas depict institutions functioning akin to ‘organisms’, with similar drives for 
self-preservation, growth, and power-garnering characteristics. If this thesis is 
correct, then one can envisage how any institutional structure seeking to ‘survive’ 
will, given appropriate opportunity, attempt to channel and filter the general flow 
of information throughout society for its own benefit, to the greatest extent of its 
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abilities.486 Hence, governments, companies and various other private and public 
institutions, as well as their many branches and divisions, will naturally try and 
skew the flow of information to correspondingly greater extremes, the more 
prevalent their power and position in society, and the weaker the position of any 
opposing ‘counter-institutions’ that hold a direct stake in seeing the opposite 
happen.487 Though the idea of a ‘free press’ has served as the staple of just such a 
general ‘counter-institution’ for some time now, aimed at exposing the dirty 
workings of prominent figures and their parent organizations488, its legitimacy as a 
genuine conduit for delivering truthful information has come under serious 
scrutiny in recent times, given the increasing ownership of major news networks 
by private consortiums. 489  For this very reason, genuinely independent 
organizations are clearly better at veridical information dissemination than 
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government (and private) ones490, though they naturally require appropriate 
levels of backing and protection from any and all attempts by the bigger (and 
usually stronger) concerned parties at neutralizing their activities. 
 Such ‘protection’ can come under a number of forms. Firstly, such 
organizations need to be backed by public funds that are attributed to them under 
no restrictive conditions of what it is that they be allowed to disseminate through 
their work, so long as it be veridical, properly-backed information that is of 
interest to the general well-being of all.491 Secondly, judicial protection is also 
needed, though this naturally requires the existence of a moderately robust and 
effective legal system. Hence, this crucial combination of financial and judicial 
backing is the first level of support required for such institutions to function 
properly.492 At higher levels, however, any interested opposing institutions that 
may hold a stake in disrupting the proper workings of such veridical information-
disseminating ones may also be neutralized by effectively playing them against 
one another. This being said, care needs to be taken to ensure that even matches 
be found, and that no rigged contests or ‘paper tigers’ be brought forth, in order to 
                                                             
490
 Stewart (1989: 370). In this vein, a denser, more theoretical take on the use of such ‘liberating knowledge’ 
and the methodologies that can be utilized to bring it to light, has been formulated by Hill (2007). 
491
 In the case of the foundational project, this ‘general well-being’ involves the implementation and 
preservation of central human capabilities for all. 
492
 Stewart (1989: 371) points out that financial leverage by way of institutions such as the World Bank and 
the International Monetary Fund are another option (to force compliance), though they have so far been 
less than interested. Still, some willingness to consider basic needs on their part has appeared more recently 
(372). Use of the legal system is another possibility. Tying it together with the financial one enables 
significantly greater leverage against non-compliance than having each of them function alone (372-373). 
224 
 
 
give a mere semblance of equilibrium when in fact there is none.493 Hence, the 
specific goal sought by these various actions involves setting up and maintaining 
sufficient levels of power-equilibrium, such that the salient information be allowed 
to ‘seep on down’ through the cracks to the public and into the hands of the 
general population at large. 
 These last points notwithstanding, a steady flow of veridical information is 
only the first step in preserving appropriate forms of power-equilibria — for such 
data is effectively useless if it ends up falling into the hands of a public that is 
either too ignorant of the subject matter at hand to be able to form an appropriate 
opinion thereof, or otherwise too ‘embedded’ in one of Sen’s ‘small mercies’, 
‘adapted tastes’, or any other such possible conditions which would cause it to fail 
to take any serious interest in it.494 Thus, the very real possibility of an ongoing 
‘bread and circus scenario’ represents a grave threat to the possibility of effective 
popular mobilization towards a rectification of presently existing levels of social 
injustice. It is therefore not surprising that, just as information needs to be 
protected for its veracity, so does the individual need to be protected for his or her 
integrity. This occurs at three general levels. On the first level, a balanced and 
thorough education, at home as well as in (meritoriously) reputable institutions is 
necessary to ensure that the individual not be brought up with crippling 
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deficiencies in any of the cognitive and emotive faculties required to process the 
veridical information flow in an appropriate and fruitful manner. On the second, 
all thought influencing dispositions throughout society need to be properly 
managed, oriented and contained, in order to avoid the appearance or 
perpetuation of the infamous ‘bread and circus scenario’.495 On the third, the 
individual needs to be properly shielded from all unwarranted forms of coercion, 
abuse, arrest or seizure associated with said individual’s religious, social or 
political and ideological leanings. 
 Though these may all sound like straightforward enough prescriptions, it is 
well worth reiterating them here, and emphasis enough cannot be placed on them, 
since failings along either one or many of them are always responsible for a slide 
from relatively adequate levels of social justice into various forms of societal 
injustice. More so, the respective fulfillment of these various prescriptions befalls 
three distinct groups of institutions. The first concerns the educational system, 
starting at home, and moving right on through to the levels of various institutions 
of higher learning. The second concerns, not only public as well as private media 
channels, but also all organisms involved will all forms of publicity and 
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advertisement throughout society. The third concerns the various branches of 
law-enforcement and peace-keeping organizations necessary for the preservation 
of social order. 
 Having a constant flow of veridical information, as well as a concerned and 
alert citizenry, is the resulting fruit of the successful preservation of adequate 
levels of power-equilibria in society, as well as an ongoing cause for it. Indeed, one 
effectively feeds off of, as well as maintains, the other. Hence, in the specific case of 
Nussbaum’s foundational project, these two components are crucial in allowing 
her project to become successfully implemented without falling into the trappings 
of the many potential dire consequences discussed above. The third crucial 
component discussed here includes adequate institutional protection for the first 
two. In this respect, the ultimate key to a successful implementation of the 
foundational project, based on the principles of Realpolitik, rests with the constant 
preservation of an underlying fundamental triangle of veridical information, alert 
individuals, and appropriate institutional protection — the specific details thereof 
which are to be determined within the respective socio-cultural, political, 
religious, and economic context of each geographical area where the foundational 
project is to be implemented.496 Some particular areas of consideration with 
regards to these specific details are brought forth in the next two sections. 
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 This triangle needs to be preserved by a consortium of capable individuals, not only in times of peace and 
abundance, but also (most importantly and to the best of one’s abilities) in times of hardship or under 
upsetting circumstances, such as during natural or man-made ecological disasters. Indeed, Holland (2008) 
illustrates how human impacts on large-scale ecological interactions effectively confer fundamental 
advantages of wealth and power to some members of society and not to others. He does so by referring to a 
1993 cholera outbreak resulting from the degradation of aquatic ecosystems caused by human activity. 
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5.3 Global capabilities and hard-choices revisited 
 
 In the previous section, I have argued that an essential component for 
realistic implementation of the foundational project without falling into its many 
potential trappings involves a constant preservation of an underlying triangle of 
veridical information, alert individuals, and appropriately counterbalanced 
institutional forms of protection for all involved. While this may preserve the 
foundational project without falling into either abuse or tyranny, it does not 
address specific transitive problems that a move towards the foundational project 
will engender. Though a PIMASA may serve to successfully legitimize its universal 
implementation in a categorical manner, and though the underlying triangle 
described above may allow for its preservation without dire mishaps caused by 
the fundamentally ‘Foucauldian’ nature of a great number of our social 
institutions, this does not forego the very real fact that many individuals and 
communities will nevertheless offer up staunch resistance to the foundational 
project showing up at their doorstep. 
 The problem rests with the unavoidable fact that the PIMASA will not 
convince everybody that the foundational project should be implemented. Some 
individuals will simply not understand the nature of the universal judgments 
drawn therefrom, nor the basis for the inherent goodness advocated thereby. 
Others will harbour the very kinds of doubts explored in section 5.1 of this 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
Naturally, a severe enough catastrophe occurring in a weak-enough socio-political and economic 
environment will upset this balance beyond the best means of containment, and will result in a certain 
period of central human capability failure, as has been illustrated by Dorsey (2008: 426-432). 
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chapter. Many others still who find themselves either in a subordinate or 
authoritative position in society will endorse the preservation of the presently 
existing status quo over the foundational project, either out of fear of loss or 
reprisal, or out of fear of losing one’s personal interest and gain in some stake or 
other. In any event, each of these individuals represents both a barrier as well as 
goal for global implementation of the foundational project. This is because, while 
they do impede the implementation of the foundational project by their actions (or 
inactions), the very goal of the foundational project, by its very nature, also 
includes central human capability distribution to them as well. The problem rests 
with the fact that a transition from presently existing states of affairs to a global 
implementation of the foundational project will invariably imply some such 
individuals losing out in the end.497 Hence, how is such loss to be measured, and 
how ought capability theorists to react thereto? 
 As has already been argued at significant length by Nussbaum and others, 
any such deficiencies along the lines of missing and unfulfilled central capability 
realization by any individuals involves a tragic cost, insofar it is claimed by them 
that no ultimate utilitarian calculus or deontic reason can be invoked in order to 
morally justify the loss incurred thereby as being somehow ‘erased’ due to 
                                                             
497
 Qizilbash (1996a: 151) foresees the possibility of having to impose the central human capabilities by 
force, despite believing that Nussbaum is relatively free from criticism on these grounds. Likewise, Fabre 
and Miller (2003: 7) observe that Economic development may require curtailing freedoms, as opposed to 
expanding them. Finally, Murphy and Gardoni (2007: 494-496, 496-503) discuss ways of mitigating natural 
hazards by making use of the capabilities approach, as preferable to a cost-benefit analysis-based one 
(which relies on a combination of utilitarianism and resourcism and thus inherits their respective drawbacks, 
as discussed in chapter four). They observe that this may involve having to make hard choices in attempting 
to minimize losses understood as the respective reduction of people’s capabilities. Procedures and 
conditions (HII) for achieving this are provided and explained by the authors. 
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positive gains counterbalancing it.498 This is not to say that such gain has no moral 
value in itself, and that there are no worthwhile aspects in realizing it. Rather, it is 
to remind us that, ultimately, a moral loss remains a moral loss no matter how you 
look at it, and that it simply cannot be dismissed as such by any worthwhile 
attempts at ethical theorizing envisaged thus far. Quite to the contrary, any and all 
losses arising out of tragic choices ought to serve as a model for reflection — not 
merely for pity and mourning, but also for concern over what lead to such a 
situation in the first place, and what (most importantly) can be done to avoid it in 
the future.499 
 Hence, regarding the global implementation of the foundational project, 
moral losses will be directly and invariably proportional to the respective degree 
of opposition that is mobilized against it, and that needs to be overcome for it to 
succeed in the end. Furthermore, it is very important to realize that such moral 
losses are to be measured along the specific lines of central human capability 
deficiency, as that is the crucial benchmark against which such losses come to be 
deemed tragic. 500  Now, as far as specific factors that contribute to our 
understanding of this phenomenon in action go, two key aspects come into play, 
and determine just how much loss is to be incurred and by what means. The first 
concerns the specific society and regime type where the foundational project ends 
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 See chapter three, section 3.2. 
499
 This is discussed in Nussbaum (2000b: 1005-1036) and Nussbaum (2003b: 415-416). 
500
 This is because non-central capability-type losses, though upsetting and possibly quite disturbing for 
some, nevertheless do not factor-in as actual cases of moral loss per se. This is the inevitable conclusion 
reached if one follows the observations of chapter three, section 3.5, and if the foundational project does 
come to be morally vindicated by the PIMASA in the end. 
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up introduced. Indeed, one can reasonably expect progressively greater individual 
capability loss to arise in more fundamentalist-minded societies, cultures, and 
totalitarian regimes that are particularly entrenched in their ways, and that are 
(very importantly) most capable and willing to mobilize more and more violent 
levels of opposition against a practical implementation of the foundational project. 
In counterpart, the ‘softer’ and more loosely entrenched the regime (and the more 
open, democratic and free its institutional traditions), the less drastic and violent 
is to be the expected opposition against the foundational project. 
The second aspect concerns the methods and means by which the 
foundational project ends up implemented or even ‘enforced’. And here we are 
confronted by a particularly nasty catch-22 version of the hard-choices dilemma. 
Since less radical regimes also employ a looser grip on information and population 
control, a progressive phasing-in process, characterized by an implementation of 
the foundational project by way of policy changes, the educational system, and 
public awareness campaigns, is usually sufficient to attain the desirable results in 
the long run. Though this may take more time than might be required by way of 
more ‘expedient’ means, the fact that such a transition occurs more smoothly and 
causes less moral loss along the way, together with the fact that less radical 
regimes usually also tend to suffer lesser levels of capability deprivation to begin 
with501, make this a clearly preferable route to undertake. Problems begin when 
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 To be perfectly honest, a properly-managed totalitarian or dictatorial regime may fulfill, to a very high 
degree, a sizeable number of central human capabilities (minus the all-important freedom-related ones) — 
sometimes even better than ‘freer’ ones, as demonstrated by a number of historical examples. Hence, Nazi 
Germany and Mussolini’s Fascist Italy were initially praised by their populations for improving drastically on 
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dealing with particularly recalcitrant and stubborn regimes that are also severe 
violators of human (and thus capability) rights. In such cases, public information 
campaigns as well as any attempted work performed by non-government 
organizations and other such related organisms are woefully inadequate, and may 
even end up obstructed from the get-go by the present authorities in power. More 
subtle means of information dissemination, such a taking advantage of the 
internet, may yield some initial successes, but can also usually be thwarted by 
government censorship measures and (failing that) by nasty and sometimes quite 
violent means of repression towards those who end up getting the ‘wrong idea’ 
regarding what it is that they are to expect out of life.502 More often than not, 
radical change in such environments requires a concerted combination of well-
supported internal opposition movements as well as external political, economic, 
and (if need be) military pressure, in order to force the concerned powers to give 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
previously deplorable living conditions. Corresponding trade-offs in the loss of a number of opportunity 
freedoms (capabilities) were thus quite acceptable at the time. Nevertheless, history has shown that the 
quest for such opportunity freedom is a very powerful drive, sometimes leading people to accept drastic 
drops in living standards against the obtainment of mastery of their own destiny. A number of well-
managed and reasonably tolerant (for the times) colonial examples that eventually gained independence 
could be provided as evidence for this. Sen (1999: 147-159, 219-224) also discusses this topic, and concludes 
that, despite its inherent limitations, a free democratic regime is essential to the process of development, 
and subsequent improvements in people’s living conditions and the capability sets that they come to 
acquire. 
502
 Events in China and North Korea come to mind here. In both cases, failures by the authorities to fully 
restrict information flow lead many people to realize the extent of injustice characterizing their own 
existence. Unfortunately, the inability to successfully break out of or otherwise alter their circumstances 
lead to them experiencing more misery than before, due to their newfound awareness of what they were 
missing out on in life being added on top of already existing deficiencies in living conditions. 
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up some of their substantial privileges, so that their populations at large may 
benefit from genuinely improved living conditions.503 
 Interestingly enough, this ought not to be such a problem for powerful 
nations and international organizations with the means for doing so. In reality, 
however, a myriad of factors come into play to undermine the proper application 
of internal and external pressures so as to effect a pro-foundational project regime 
change. First of all, there is the ongoing and often publicly unaccounted-for 
duplicity between such radical regimes and more ‘liberal’ and ‘progressive’ ones, 
with a complex web of benefits stemming from arrangements made by interested 
parties on both sides, having every reason to preserve the presently existing status 
quo. This crucial underlying factor not only ends up sabotaging any attempts at 
putting genuine forms of pressure on such former regimes by the latter ones, but 
can also lead to scenarios where international corrective measures end up acting 
as a smokescreen in order to preserve unwitting public support for presently 
existing power-structures, whilst interested parties on both sides end up in no 
way affected by them. Worst still, various forms of international pressure, such as 
economic sanctions, for instance, often can and do end up hurting the very people 
they are intended to assist, by causing public commercial losses and failed trade 
opportunities to befall them directly, whereas the oppressive regime heads that 
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 South Africa is a particular case in point here. Information dissemination coupled with social mobilization 
against the apartheid regime lead to more and more drastic attempts by the then-existing government at 
repression of dissidence and resulted in ever greater violent clashes and social turmoil, culminating in the 
eventual transfer of power into the hands of Nelson Mandela. Living standards have fallen significantly since 
then, though uniform freedoms for all have been gained, making the South-African example an imperfect 
and ongoing work in progress, where much still remains to be done. 
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are allegedly targeted thereby actually end up unaffected thanks to long-standing 
and secure connections and supply routes.504 
 Assuming, however, that genuine opposition movements do successfully 
end up putting effective pressure on oppressive regimes, there is the further 
problem of such interested parties not willing to give up their acquired privileges 
and positions quietly. One of the key underlying characteristics associated with the 
acquisition of significant levels of power, wealth, influence, and control over 
others is the correspondingly ever greater looming presence and uneasiness with 
which the Sword of Damocles ends up wavering over one’s head. This, in turn, 
tends to breed increasing levels of suspicion and paranoia, backed by 
correspondingly more and more draconian means of control and suppression of 
dissent.505 Such a climate is especially anathema to proposals such as the 
foundational project, whereby, even if its implementation were to cause no truly 
severe reduction in privileges for those presently in power, the very nature of its 
contents as presented by Nussbaum greatly undermine its ‘marketability’ as it 
stands for such concerned individuals.506 The particularly tragic catch-22 in such 
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 Such was the case with Iraq, Cuba, and (according to some) pre-WW2 Imperial Japan. 
505
 Indeed, authority figures tend to surround themselves with a closely knit network of informants and 
bodyguards, which becomes ever tighter the more draconian and oppressive their regime, given the 
correspondingly ever greater impetus by the (ever more determined) opposition to see them dethroned. 
Even then, suspicion and paranoia continue to loom, as even the best internal control measures within their 
very own closest circles (including family members) are susceptible to breaking down. For this reason, ‘savvy’ 
dictators have understood that maintaining a good general standard of living for all, topped with a hearty 
dose of ‘bread and games’ (if need be), is a much better ‘insurance policy’ than ever-more heavy-handed 
repression of a starving and restless populace. 
506
 The charge of imperialism, as well as the arguments from culture and from diversity (discussed in chapter 
three), represent three possible attempts at a sympathetic form of rebuttal of the foundational project by 
parties especially interested in preserving the status quo. 
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cases is that potential dislodgment of tyrants in order to implement the 
foundational project may only be attainable by significant use of force in such 
circumstances, which would invariably provoke significant levels of moral (and 
material) loss for all those who end up losing their central human capabilities (and 
possibly much more) along the way. However, seeing as how tyrannical regimes 
usually already act as notable orchestrators of significant capability deprivation, 
and since allowing their ongoing perpetuation does little to help the case of all 
those suffering thereunder, forced implementation, potentially going as far as 
relying on military intervention, may end up being the only ‘sensible’ way out.507 
 The general purpose of this third section has been to draw attention to the 
very important role that proper calculations of moral loss need to play in the 
planning of central human capability implementation at the global level. Naturally, 
the optimally-envisaged scenario involves a ‘quick and painless’ implementation, 
whereby central human capabilities become available to all in the most efficient 
and direct manner possible. This idealized vision notwithstanding, a more gradual 
yet likewise smooth and easy implementation into existing environments where 
there is already no significant capability deprivation to begin with reveals itself as 
the ‘next best thing’ on the list. Moving on to more serious circumstances, 
particularly recalcitrant regimes could also stand for smooth (albeit far longer) 
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 In such cases, problems related to the just war tradition spill on over. In a related article, I discuss the 
need for sufficient fulfillment of conditions of ideal observation in order to be able to wage a just war, as 
well as the specific consequences and options open to those parties that are unable to do so, but who still 
wish to intervene militarily: Kurstak (2007a). This is obviously a very difficult topic covered by a significant 
body of literature, and reliance on it is therefore only presented here as an additional point of consideration 
in addressing the institutional challenge befalling the foundational project. 
235 
 
 
transitions, if it were not for presently existing cases of severe capability 
deprivation lending a particular sense of urgency to the situation, coupled with the 
unfortunate possibility of the need for the use of force in order to bring about the 
required changes. In such cases, an appropriate combination of careful diplomatic 
work, together with well-chosen and subtle yet firm forms of political, social, and 
economic pressure, can help to lessen the transitive blow — but there is no 
guarantee, and the inherent volatility of such situations makes them especially 
hard to handle. In any event, full responsibility needs to be taken for the fallout 
caused by global capability implementation as it progresses throughout the 
various stages of its realization. 
 
5.4 Towards a ‘global capabilities regime’ 
 
 A final point of consideration that shows up regarding the transition 
towards central human capability globalization involves the optimal type of 
regime (or regimes) under which the foundational project could operate. 
Originally, Nussbaum advocated for a form of political liberalism, which she 
argued holds high degrees of affinity with her foundational project. This being 
said, it has been observed by a number of authors that Nussbaum’s foundational 
project holds characteristics that are either incompatible with or, at times, 
downright contrary to, the central tenets of a form of political liberalism akin to 
the one advocated by Rawls, and one which Nussbaum appears especially fond 
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of.508 Hence, Deneulin carefully shows that the capabilities approach necessarily 
entails more paternalism and perfectionism (of a moderate kind) than is usually 
allowed under (Rawlsian) political liberalism. She illustrates how this is the case in 
Sen’s and Nussbaum’s respective approaches. This puts it at notable odds with 
regards to its alleged alliance and basis couched in said liberalism.509 Linda 
Barclay remarks that liberalism endorses the importance of choice and respect for 
the individual, and that this is indeed promoted by Nussbaum, by providing the 
central human capabilities for all, which are meant to increase said choice, and are 
selected by way of a Rawlsian overlapping consensus. Because of their 
compatibility with varying worldviews, the process of selecting the foundational 
project is directly compatible with political liberalism. However, Barclay also 
observes that Nussbaum’s foundational project is actually aligned with 
comprehensive liberalism, because, while she claims to be close to the late Rawls’ 
political liberalism, it (Rawls’ political liberalism) states that a conception of 
justice begins from the shared ideals implicit in the public political culture, and 
that no such consensus presently exists regarding Nussbaum’s foundational 
project, despite arguments that it should. Furthermore, the foundational project 
takes the freedom afforded by the central capabilities to constitute the main object 
of value (i.e., greatest value), whereas under Rawls’ primary goods, their value is 
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 Nussbaum (2011b) expresses her latest views on the specific type of political liberalism that she endorses 
in a most recent article. She argues at length for the superiority of political liberalism over a perfectionist 
one, on ethical grounds. This topic is also discussed in her latest book: Nussbaum (2011a: 89-93) 
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 Deneulin (2002: 498-516). Nevertheless, the charge of ‘illiberal perfectionism’ is given an extensive 
rebuttal by Arneson (2000). 
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only deemed to be ‘instrumental’ (shared conception of citizenship). Also, 
Nussbaum ‘strawmans’ comprehensive liberals, and then favours political 
liberalism instead. This is erroneous, as illustrated eloquently by the author — 
though notable differences do exist amongst comprehensive liberals. Hence, 
Barclay concludes that Nussbaum’s foundational project is therefore very close to 
and compatible with comprehensive liberalism, once the latter is given a proper 
treatment.510 John M. Alexander argues that the specific concept of a person that 
underpins Nussbaum’s theory actually entails the adoption of a non-liberal view of 
the self.511 Fabre and Miller discuss this topic as well. Following a critique of Sen, 
Nussbaum, Rawls and O’Neill, they argue that full liberal rights should be endorsed 
in order to enable and maintain adequate levels of justice in all societies, and that 
the attempts by liberal political philosophers to mutually satisfy the conditions of 
decency and pluralism to an acceptable degree ends up affording too little 
protection to specifically vulnerable members of society. Furthermore, liberal 
institutions can be proved, empirically, to be the best means of securing said 
conditions of decency.512 Eric Nelson observes that Nussbaum’s capabilities 
approach fails to fulfill political liberalism’s requirement of neutrality, by 
advocating constitutional enshrinement of her central capabilities. These, in turn, 
overlap over people’s rights to choose their own conception of the good, meaning 
that her theory is not at all ‘thin’, as it should be. Nussbaum counters this by her 
                                                             
510
 Barclay (2003: 6-22) 
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 Alexander (2003: 10-17) 
512
 Fabre and Miller (2003: 8-16) 
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‘capabilities, not functionings’ argument, but this fails because of the nature of 
what is distributed by capabilities (i.e., full-fledged abilities to exercise said 
functionings). However, Nelson also remarks that no government can be fully 
neutral in the Rawlsian sense of the word. For indeed, whatever is promoted (even 
primary goods) will invariably override someone else’s idea of the good life. 
Another way to put it is that this type of ‘neutrality’ naturally overrides anybody’s 
idea of the good life that is not compatible with it. Nelson foresees two ways to 
avoid this neutrality problem: (a) jettison the Rawlsian framework or (b) concede 
the difficulties, but suggest resolution by modifying the capabilities on the list. He 
then argues that, despite Sen’s insistence that his version of the capabilities 
approach avoids the problem of non-neutrality, it does not, because it amounts to 
replacing Rawls’ primary goods with capabilities. And this invariably entails 
formulating some definite list thereof, voiding the claim to neutrality. 
Furthermore, arguing that this be done in various contexts precludes the idea that 
said list ought to be selected on the basis that it would represent what is rational 
to want whatever else one wants.513 
While the complex debate over the (in)compatibility between Nussbaum’s 
foundational project and political liberalism is a fascinating one, what is actually at 
issue here is not so much whether the foundational project requires absolute 
compatibility with some form of political or comprehensive liberalism or not (as 
the answer to this question has already been settled in chapter three), but rather 
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what variety of regimes would end up adequately compatible with a successful 
implementation of the foundational project, what type of political ‘gradient’ this 
implies, and what ‘degrees of tolerance’ are to be allowed across said regimes in 
question. From a prima facie perspective, there is no definitely fixed form of 
government that appears to be absolutely required for a successful 
implementation of the foundational project. Nevertheless, it stands to reason that, 
given the specific requirements brought forth by the central human capabilities, 
any political regime that ends up compatible with the foundational project will, by 
necessity, hold a number of characteristics quite similar to a liberal form of 
government (notwithstanding some of the irreconcilable incompatibilities 
observed above), as far as providing ‘free access’ to (and guarantees of), the 
central human capabilities is concerned.514 Hence, while one can expect a number 
of liberal or quasi-liberal variants to fulfill the role successfully, it is less likely that 
non-liberal (or downright illiberal) ones will be up to the task at hand. One can 
thus expect a set of liberal as well as quasi-liberal variants to make up the full 
range of possible ‘foundational project-friendly’ regimes to be implemented 
throughout the world. Furthermore, so long as the fundamental benchmark of 
acceptability involves, and is limited to, the ongoing preservation of central human 
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 Hence, Fabre and Miller (2003: 15) point out that “even Rawls, who aims to set a less demanding 
standard of decency, admits in a footnote that ‘some writers maintain that full democratic and liberal rights 
are necessary to prevent violations of human rights. This is stated as an empirical fact supported by 
historical experience. I do not argue against this contention, and indeed it may be true’ (LP, p. 75). But if so, 
decent hierarchical societies as he describes them become a mere conceptual possibility of no practical 
significance”. Furthermore, Alexander (2008) argues for a republican form of government as a need to 
ensure capability implementation, as opposed to a more mainstream liberal one. This topic is also discussed 
by Bourdeau (2009). 
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capabilities for all, none of these variants ends up inherently preferable to any 
other. Granted, while some such possibilities may end up offering different 
‘benefits packages’, they do remain, for all intents and purposes, wholly 
interchangeable — presenting one with an ‘apples or oranges’ scenario of sorts. 
 Another topic of interest regarding such possible foundational project-
friendly regimes regards the all-important question of the role of (some form of 
representative and/or elective) democracy in their operative structure. Ought 
such regimes to be, by necessity, ‘democratic’ in nature, in addition to being liberal 
or quasi-liberal? Cleary, meaningful political participation of the people in society 
constitutes one of the central human capabilities, and liberal-democratic regimes 
purport to offer just that, by allowing the citizenry to shape the workings of their 
country by voting for (either directly or by the proxy of elected representatives) 
laws, policies, and regulations that come to shape their society. There are, 
however, a number of serious drawbacks to democratic forms of government that 
need to be duly taken into account. First of all, there is the issue of mere semblance 
of democracy, where the right to vote does exist, but where the reliability of the 
voting process is compromised by inadequate regulations to ensure that all votes 
are truly accurately counted, even going so far as creating scenarios where said 
votes end up ‘recounted until the proper party wins’. Alternatively, where such 
corruption of due process is not present, policy choices can still be easily limited 
by having a restricted number of candidates with pre-determined orientations 
(often associated with the interests of powerful lobbies), offering the people no 
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real options in terms of what they would truly like to see happen in their society. 
Finally, there is also the specter of the ‘tyranny of democracy’, where none of the 
two previously-described scenarios above exist, but where the careful creation of 
a dumbed-down and ignorant populace entails that the majority ends up voting 
candidates (and/or policy choices) into power that offer-up a number of short-
term superficial forms of gratification in ‘exchange’ for serious social-economic 
hardships in the long run — a truly society-wide Faustian bargain if there ever 
was one. 
 While these three scenarios above can still be heavily mitigated by insuring 
the proper preservation of the underlying fundamental triangle of veridical 
information, alert individuals, and appropriate institutional protection (as 
discussed in section 5.2 above), this does not answer the question whether a 
‘democratic’ form of government remains the best option for allowing meaningful 
political participation in society, as per the foundational project. Indeed, other 
forms of participation might well be envisaged, where the voting process is simply 
not a part of the underlying procedures of governance. However, history has 
shown that the absence of such a process in question can quickly lead to a drastic 
stratification of power-levels without the proper checks and balances required to 
prevent such power-skews leading to ‘absolute corruption by absolute power’ of 
the individuals in charge.515 Hence, it appears that some (genuine) form of 
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 This last observation notwithstanding the recognizable past existence of ‘beneficent rulers’, the ‘lottery 
effect’ of clan or family-based authoritative regimes does not guarantee to the people a ‘proper choice’ in 
the hereditary succession line to the reins of power. Hence, a merit-based elective system is preferable in 
the long run. 
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democracy remains, at least for the time being, an underlying requirement for any 
foundational project-friendly regime, in addition to such regimes sharing an 
important number of liberal characteristics.516 Asides from that, all other options 
remain essentially up for grabs. 
Finally, the further question of the very need for a plurality of individual 
governments also arises, given the potential alterative preference for a global 
capabilities regime, as opposed to a number of localized possible variants thereof. 
However, this last point opens up a whole other can of worms that I will not get 
into here, related to specific problems of administration, as well as pitfalls and 
dangers associated with the idea of a cosmopolitan world government.517 Indeed, 
Nussbaum eventually rejects this option in favour of strictly regulated cross-
border cooperation amongst presently existing institutional structures. 518 
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 Indeed, Sen (1999: 146-159), Sen (2009: 408-410) provides us with a thorough rundown of the many 
benefits and successes (as well as recognizable drawbacks) of democratic regimes in enabling capability-
related levels of well-being. This is also backed by Jayasurika (2000) arguing for the role of the capabilities 
approach in enabling the new social democracy, as well as by Qizilbash (2007: 179-185) who illustrates the 
complex connection between public reasoning, democracy, the formation of preferences, justice, and social 
choice theory in the application of Sen’s capabilities approach. 
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 In this vein, Nussbaum (2006: 224-272) eventually argues in favour of a Kantian international 
contractarian approach to help push the process of global capability implementation along (despite all of 
the problems associated with contractarianism identified by her before, as described under the Rawlsian 
‘selection procedures argument’ in chapter four). She does this after an analysis of regional, followed by 
international, levels of social contracting, as suggested by Rawls (1999). 
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 Despite (or perhaps as a corrective response to) the many worries solicited by her ideas initially pressed 
forth in Women and Human Development (as illustrated in section 5.1 above), Nussbaum (2006: 311-324) 
better recognizes a number of Foucauldian opportunities for corruption of intent by globalized institutions, 
given the enormous size and power that they would eventually come to acquire, and proposes ten 
(ambitious) principles for the global structure that are intended to mitigate these specific dangers. Though 
clearly well-intentioned, these principles nevertheless strike one as somewhat inadequate (and, at times, 
misguided) — assuming, naturally, that the Foucauldian power-thesis ends up correct, and that its strength 
reveals itself to be particularly remarkable. These include: (1) overdetermination of responsibility: the 
domestic never escapes it; (2) national sovereignty should be respected, within the constraints of promoting 
human capabilities; (3) prosperous nations have a responsibility to give a substantial portion of their GDP to 
poorer nations; (4) Multinational corporations have responsibility for promoting human capabilities in the 
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Furthermore, given that the inertia of current world affairs is directly moulded 
over said structures in question, it sounds like a notably safer and more realistic 
bet, at least in the short(er) run of things. 
Hence, one can expect a global capabilities regime to be constituted, at 
ground level, by way of a number of local liberal or quasi-liberal democratic 
governing bodies charged with implementing the foundational project within their 
respective areas of jurisdiction, and according to the direct specificities of local 
needs and customs. Above and beyond these, one will also encounter the notable 
existence of non-government organizations and (more importantly) supra-
governmental and supra-national bodies responsible, both for the assistance 
required to local authorities that fail to maintain the foundational project due to a 
lack of resources, means, provisions or natural hazards, as well as for the role of 
‘watchmen’, intended to prevent multiple forms of abuse at any existing level of 
governance. In this vein, wealthy developed nations are already in a privileged 
position to make this happen, not only at home but also abroad, thanks to a variety 
of assistance and development programs that can be utilized to export the means 
and wherewithal for central capability distribution to other less well-equipped 
ones. Furthermore, ‘watchdog and helper’ organizations, such as the United 
Nations as well as NATO, are also in a privileged position to ‘coerce and assist’ 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
regions in which they operate; (5) The main structures of the global economic order must be designed to be 
fair to poor and developing countries; (6) We should cultivate a thin, decentralized, and yet forceful global 
public sphere; (7) All institutions and (most) individuals should focus on the problems of the disadvantaged in 
each nation and region; (8) Care for the ill, the elderly, children, and the disabled should be a prominent 
focus of the world community; (9) The family should be treated as a sphere that is precious but not “private”; 
(10) All institutions and individuals have a responsibility to support education, as key to the empowerment of 
currently disadvantaged people. This is discussed further in Nussbaum (2011a: 113-122). 
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wherever and whenever the need arises. Thus, so long as the end result is the 
desirable one, and so long as the process involves as little capability violation as is 
realistically possible, a gradual move towards a global capabilities regime will be 
successfully achieved in the form of an overlain curtain of improved opportunity 
freedoms for all, covering and moulding itself over currently existing institutional 
structures, and altering them only when and where needed, and to the precise 
degree required to make the end goal of global capability distribution happen. 
 
Conclusion: 
 
 Though the foundational project is a highly commendable proposal for 
establishing minimal levels of social justice for all, its formulation thus far has 
been all but fully cognizant of the inherently very heavy difficulties associated with 
the practical realization of such a widely beneficial program. Indeed, much of the 
theorizing done by capability authors on this topic has suffered from the ‘ivory 
tower’ syndrome, to potentially greater degrees than regarding other strictly 
theoretical or moral aspects proper to the capabilities approach, as explored in the 
previous three chapters. The hard truth is that capability authors have simply 
underestimated the significance and scope of the role played by various forms of 
power-struggles and power-relations inherent in our complex human societies. 
Given that many important individuals stand to lose a lot in terms of power, status, 
wealth, and personal interest through the implementation of the foundational 
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project, this does not bode well even for the most determined policy makers that 
would wish to see central human capabilities become a universal reality for all 
persons worldwide. 
As has been argued in this chapter, though some regimes will indeed accept 
the foundational project with relatively little growing pains, others will simply ‘not 
go quietly’, and one is to expect various levels of social strife, turmoil, resistance, 
and even violence on the part of the guardians of the most totalitarian and 
recalcitrant ones, as their leaders vehemently refuse to give up their exorbitant 
privileges, even as it means serious levels of misery and social injustice for their 
populations. Also, though concerted efforts by interested parties may eventually 
overcome such unjust regimes, significant levels of moral loss are to be expected 
along the way. And to further complicate things, gains earned along the central 
tenets of the foundational project are never earned forever, and these require 
constant care for the ongoing preservation of the central human capabilities. 
Hence, the Foucauldian nature of our institutions is such that there will always be 
attempts at upsetting any delicately achieved power-equilibrium that enables 
reasonable levels of social justice for all. In reaction to this, the constant 
preservation of an underlying triangle of veridical information, alert individuals, 
and appropriately counterbalanced institutional forms of protection for all 
involved, has been reaffirmed once again as a core necessity for preserving said 
desirable power-equilibria in question. Furthermore, while the foundational 
project does not require any specifically-delineated form of government to insure 
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its successful implementation, compatible regimes nevertheless will, by necessity, 
share central determining features with presently-existing liberal-democratic 
ones. Finally, its short-term international implementation will invariably need to 
be achieved with the concerted efforts of presently existing nation-states, as the 
eventual move to a global capabilities-based government, though envisaged, is 
simply beyond the means of the presently-existing world order. 
 In the end, and despite all that has been said here, I maintain that the 
foundational project does not represent an over-idealized form of human living, 
impossible to achieve in our present world. Numerous historical examples based 
on the gradual acquisition of various forms of human rights, as well as vast 
improvements in the social, economic, political, legal, and civil administration of 
our human societies, aimed at creating greater levels of social justice (often in 
defiance of significant privileges held by some) stand as a testament to the 
possibility of social progress of this very sort. Granted, the foundational project is 
a ‘cut above the rest’ in terms of what it proposes that be realized still, but the road 
does not appear closed to its eventual fulfillment. 
This being said, practical difficulties are numerous, and the very nature and 
scope of power-relations serve both as obstacles to overcome, as well as tools to 
be utilized, in allowing for the foundational project to endure and prosper. As 
always, balance is the key. Thus, a greater recognition and incorporation of the 
important realm of Realpolitik by capability theorists constitutes an unavoidable 
move if they are to be successful in overcoming the monumental worldwide 
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‘challenge of the Realpolitiker’. And this is all the more pressing in our time of 
ongoing globalization, with all of the corresponding erosion and loss of human 
rights, dignity, justice, and capabilities that this entails at the global level. 
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(Conclusion) Future avenues of development for the foundational 
project 
 
 In the preceding chapters I have argued that Nussbaum’s foundational 
project ultimately does not flounder at any of the theoretical, moral or practical 
levels at which it needs to operate for it to function as a successful minimal 
distributive theory of justice. In passing, I have made a number of observations 
leading way to further avenues of development that it needs to undertake for it to 
become fully fleshed-out. I discuss them below: 
On the theoretical side, a restriction down to the central notion of 
capabilities as full-fledged freedom-units is essential to avoiding the charges of 
ambiguity and underdetermination that have been levelled against the capabilities 
approach in general. This is accomplished by sticking to a critical conceptual core 
constituted by the functioning-capability pair, together with the relationship 
between functioning vectors and capability sets, itself combined with an analysis 
along positive and negative conditions of realization, and further refined according 
to the corollary concepts of ‘multiple realizability’ and ‘freedom amplitude’. This 
minimally standardized conceptual frame is then to be applied to Nussbaum’s list of 
central human capabilities, in order that the respective parameters of its 
employment become devised. This exercise can be aided by making good use of 
further developments towards capability operationalization present in the salient 
literature, so long as these not forego any of the essential elements constitutive of 
the conceptual core outlined above. In this respect, one encounters a greater 
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similitude to Sen’s original idea for a number of capability lists to be drafted 
within various socio-political, economic and cultural environments than initially 
envisaged by Nussbaum, insofar as the significant flexibility for realization 
inherent in the multiple realizability characteristic of her list allows for a great 
number of ways in which her central human capabilities can be put into practice. 
Nevertheless, the remaining crucial difference resides with the fact that each such 
possible instantiation of a central human capability remains inextricably linked to 
its original (albeit vague) formulation in the centralized list. Hence, the possibility 
of wholly divergent and even incompatible lists is simply not possible under 
Nussbaum’s model, preserving its underlying universal characteristic, all the while 
maintaining (reasonable) degrees of pluralism and freedom of choice regarding 
the variety of ways in which individuals and communities may come to choose 
from a substantial ‘inventory’ the number of means by which they may exercise 
the corresponding functionings associated with each central human capability in 
question. Hence, appropriate drafting of the corresponding parameters in which 
Nussbaum’s list is to be realized in each respective environment in which it is to be 
implemented constitutes the major route of further development for this 
particular aspect of her foundational project. 
Regarding moral justification for her project, further development hinges 
on the actual creation of the project for the ideal moral assessment of states of 
affairs’ (PIMASA) discussed in chapter three of this thesis. In this respect, I argued 
that present empirical evidence suggests that individuals situated in a position 
250 
 
 
that captures closely enough the parameters proper to the fulfillment of conditions 
of ideal observation already advocate for the overall moral tenability of 
Nussbaum’s foundational project. In the following corollary chapter, I also argued 
that a close-enough examination of the capabilities vs. resources vs. utilities 
debate points towards an eventual concession of the overall moral desirability for 
the minimal distribution of at least the conceptual equivalent of basic human 
capabilities. Nevertheless, the requirements of ideal observation that I have 
endorsed in this thesis require full immersion in both cases, in order that the 
moral judgments emitted thereby receive the final ‘stamp of approval’ on behalf of 
all concerned individuals. Hence, the actual creation of a number of PIMASAs 
around the world will allow all individuals to judge for themselves the overall 
moral value of Nussbaum’s foundational project (in relation to the objections 
explored respectively in chapters three and four), and will correspondingly 
increase the exposure that it will receive along the requirements of ideal observer 
theory. Actual programs for putting these into place can be devised by current 
members of the Human Development and Capability Association, submitted to the 
proper authorities for eventual ratification and green-lighting. Indeed, such 
endeavours are crucial to the eventual obtainment of Nussbaum’s desired ‘global 
overlapping consensus’ regarding the overall moral goodness of the foundational 
project, and constitute probably the most difficult and challenging further avenue 
of development, bested only by the specific requirements brought forth in the last 
chapter of this thesis. 
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 Addressing the ‘challenge of the Realpolitiker’ represents the most difficult 
part of the foundational project in need of further development. Not only is this 
aspect already quite difficult to flesh out properly at the theoretical level, insofar 
as it relies on the overarching principle of establishing appropriate levels of 
power-relations and power-equilibria in order to prevent practical 
implementation of the foundational project from spinning out of control, putting it 
into actual practice is likewise notoriously difficult for a variety of reasons. Firstly, 
it requires convincing all concerned individuals in the various levels of power 
constitutive of the institutional structures envisaged as the implementers and 
guardians of the foundational project that this is, indeed, a good idea. Secondly, 
because of its international scope of application, this requires appropriate levels of 
transnational cooperation to bring it about amongst sympathetic actors, as well as 
the potential mobilization of appropriate means for enforcement when dealing 
with outright recalcitrant members of the international community when there is 
no other way out. Thirdly, all of this needs to be achieved in light of the multitude 
of current pressing issues that take up the time of all these concerned actors in 
question. Despite these numerous obstacles, however, the foundational project can 
rely on one important factor to help it along: Because of the significant levels of 
development experienced by the capabilities approach since its original 
appearance, and thanks to its already existing operationalization at various levels 
of society (such as with the United Nations Development Program’s Human 
Development Report – one of many such reports in existence – being utilized by 
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many nations as a guide for various forms of policy formation), one is not working 
with a blank slate when attempting to convince all appropriate actors of its 
credibility and overall desirability. Consequently, further development along these 
lines require making use of presently existing models for operationalization and 
tweaking them towards the direction of the parameters proper to the foundational 
project. And this needs to be performed at all levels of power in order to be able to 
address the challenge of the Realpolitiker successfully. 
 As a final word, present trends indicate that, despite the numerous 
objections identified in this thesis, further general development of the capabilities 
approach will continue unabated. Furthermore, while Nussbaum’s particular 
version of this approach represents one of the more daring and controversial 
examples of its many proposed uses, none of the multitude of objections 
formulated against it invalidate it in a categorical manner. Quite to the contrary, 
there is significant evidence to affirm that a return to a form of ethical-political 
universalism as advocated by the foundational project represents a genuinely 
acceptable direction to undertake in our present times and by our contemporary 
human societies. 
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